This PR adds the Authority Key Identifier to CertificateInfo. This value _can be_ important in finding the right CRLs to use if there are Issuer name overlaps or a more complicated CA setup with multiple signing keys.
We should observe no behavior change in our `CrlProvider` implementations, this is just adding an important field for users who implement it themselves.
Closes#35931
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/35931 from gtcooke94:AkidCheck dd048a53b6
PiperOrigin-RevId: 611143198
…p and add some verification helpers (#35641)"
This reverts commit 310770d61d.
It breaks all portability tests.
```
[==========] Running 1 test from 1 test suite.
[----------] Global test environment set-up.
[----------] 1 test from CrlUtils
[ RUN ] CrlUtils.HasCrlSignBitExists
/[var/local/git/grpc/test/core/tsi/ssl_transport_security_utils_test.cc:566](https://cs.corp.google.com/piper///depot/google3/var/local/git/grpc/test/core/tsi/ssl_transport_security_utils_test.cc?l=566): Failure
Value of: HasCrlSignBit(root_ca_)
Actual: false
Expected: true
[ FAILED ] CrlUtils.HasCrlSignBitExists (0 ms)
[----------] 1 test from CrlUtils (0 ms total)
[----------] Global test environment tear-down
[==========] 1 test from 1 test suite ran. (0 ms total)
[ PASSED ] 0 tests.
[ FAILED ] 1 test, listed below:
[ FAILED ] CrlUtils.HasCrlSignBitExists
```
Closes#35962
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/35962 from drfloob:revert-310770d61d3b25d358d877a074bebf6ae85549d0 e6a2f03309
PiperOrigin-RevId: 609075479
This PR does 2 distinct things, I can unbundle them if desired
1) Add functions in `ssl_transport_security_utils` and associated tests that will eventually be used for additional Crl validation (the logic of actually doing this will be in a future PR), so other than the tests these fns are currently unused.
2) Remove the use of `X509_NAME_oneline` - it is not a guaranteed stable way to get the issuer name for lookups. Instead, use the DER encoding via `i2d_X509_NAME` - the results in a non-human readable string that is stable for lookup, and necessitated some change to the CrlProvider test code that previously used a human readable string for this value.
Neither should result in behavior changes.
Closes#35641
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/35641 from gtcooke94:CrlRefactor 2b6f63717c
PiperOrigin-RevId: 607701254
The basic APIs for the CRL Reloading features.
This adds external types to represent CRL Providers, CRLs, and
CertificateInfo.
Internally we will use `CrlImpl` - this layer is needed to hide OpenSSL
details from the user.
GRFC - https://github.com/grpc/proposal/pull/382
Things Done
* Add external API for `CrlProvider`, `Crl`, `CertInfo` (`CertInfo` is
used during CRL lookup rather than passing the entire certificate).
* Add code paths in `ssl_transport_security` to utilize CRL providers
* Add `StaticCrlProvider`
* Refactor `crl_ssl_transport_security_test.cc` so it is more extensible
and can be used with providers
This PR is a small code change with a lot of new test data.
[In OpenSSL, there are two flags that configure CRL checks. Coping
relevant
section:](https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth.html)
> - X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK enables CRL checking for the certificate chain
leaf certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found.
> - X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL enables CRL checking for the entire
certificate chain.
We currently only set `X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK`, so we will only ever
check if the leaf certificate is revoked. We should check the whole
chain. I am open to making this a user configuration if we want to do it
that way, but we certainly need to be able to check the whole chain.
So, this PR contains the small code change in
`ssl_transport_security.cc` to use the `X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL` flag.
Then the rest of the changes are in tests. I've added all the necessary
files to have a chain built that looks as follows
`Root CA -> Revoked Intermediate CA -> Leaf Certificate`, and added a
test for this case as well.
You can verify that on master this new test will fail (i.e. the
handshake will succeed even though the intermediate CA is revoked) by
checking out this branch, running `git checkout master --
./src/core/tsi/ssl_transport_security.cc`, then running the test.
I also slightly reorganized test/core/tsi/test_creds/ so that the CRLs
are in their own directory, which is the way our API intends to accept
CRLs.
Gregory Cooke
AJ Heller
apolcyn
krestofur
Vignesh Babu
Mark D. Roth