syntax = "proto3"; package envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v4alpha; import "envoy/config/core/v4alpha/base.proto"; import "envoy/config/core/v4alpha/extension.proto"; import "envoy/type/matcher/v4alpha/string.proto"; import "google/protobuf/any.proto"; import "google/protobuf/wrappers.proto"; import "udpa/annotations/sensitive.proto"; import "udpa/annotations/status.proto"; import "udpa/annotations/versioning.proto"; import "validate/validate.proto"; option java_package = "io.envoyproxy.envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v4alpha"; option java_outer_classname = "CommonProto"; option java_multiple_files = true; option (udpa.annotations.file_status).package_version_status = NEXT_MAJOR_VERSION_CANDIDATE; // [#protodoc-title: Common TLS configuration] message TlsParameters { option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type = "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.TlsParameters"; enum TlsProtocol { // Envoy will choose the optimal TLS version. TLS_AUTO = 0; // TLS 1.0 TLSv1_0 = 1; // TLS 1.1 TLSv1_1 = 2; // TLS 1.2 TLSv1_2 = 3; // TLS 1.3 TLSv1_3 = 4; } // Minimum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_2`` for clients and ``TLSv1_0`` for // servers. TlsProtocol tls_minimum_protocol_version = 1 [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}]; // Maximum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_2`` for clients and ``TLSv1_3`` for // servers. TlsProtocol tls_maximum_protocol_version = 2 [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}]; // If specified, the TLS listener will only support the specified `cipher list // `_ // when negotiating TLS 1.0-1.2 (this setting has no effect when negotiating TLS 1.3). // // If not specified, a default list will be used. Defaults are different for server (downstream) and // client (upstream) TLS configurations. // // In non-FIPS builds, the default server cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // [ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // [ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA // AES128-GCM-SHA256 // AES128-SHA // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA // AES256-GCM-SHA384 // AES256-SHA // // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `, the default server cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA // AES128-GCM-SHA256 // AES128-SHA // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA // AES256-GCM-SHA384 // AES256-SHA // // In non-FIPS builds, the default client cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // [ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // [ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `, the default client cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 repeated string cipher_suites = 3; // If specified, the TLS connection will only support the specified ECDH // curves. If not specified, the default curves will be used. // // In non-FIPS builds, the default curves are: // // .. code-block:: none // // X25519 // P-256 // // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `, the default curve is: // // .. code-block:: none // // P-256 repeated string ecdh_curves = 4; } // BoringSSL private key method configuration. The private key methods are used for external // (potentially asynchronous) signing and decryption operations. Some use cases for private key // methods would be TPM support and TLS acceleration. message PrivateKeyProvider { option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type = "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.PrivateKeyProvider"; reserved 2; reserved "config"; // Private key method provider name. The name must match a // supported private key method provider type. string provider_name = 1 [(validate.rules).string = {min_len: 1}]; // Private key method provider specific configuration. oneof config_type { google.protobuf.Any typed_config = 3 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true]; } } // [#next-free-field: 8] message TlsCertificate { option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type = "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.TlsCertificate"; // The TLS certificate chain. // // If *certificate_chain* is a filesystem path, a watch will be added to the // parent directory for any file moves to support rotation. This currently // only applies to dynamic secrets, when the *TlsCertificate* is delivered via // SDS. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource certificate_chain = 1; // The TLS private key. // // If *private_key* is a filesystem path, a watch will be added to the parent // directory for any file moves to support rotation. This currently only // applies to dynamic secrets, when the *TlsCertificate* is delivered via SDS. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource private_key = 2 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true]; // If specified, updates of file-based *certificate_chain* and *private_key* // sources will be triggered by this watch. The certificate/key pair will be // read together and validated for atomic read consistency (i.e. no // intervening modification occurred between cert/key read, verified by file // hash comparisons). This allows explicit control over the path watched, by // default the parent directories of the filesystem paths in // *certificate_chain* and *private_key* are watched if this field is not // specified. This only applies when a *TlsCertificate* is delivered by SDS // with references to filesystem paths. See the :ref:`SDS key rotation // ` documentation for further details. config.core.v4alpha.WatchedDirectory watched_directory = 7; // BoringSSL private key method provider. This is an alternative to :ref:`private_key // ` field. This can't be // marked as ``oneof`` due to API compatibility reasons. Setting both :ref:`private_key // ` and // :ref:`private_key_provider // ` fields will result in an // error. PrivateKeyProvider private_key_provider = 6; // The password to decrypt the TLS private key. If this field is not set, it is assumed that the // TLS private key is not password encrypted. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource password = 3 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true]; // The OCSP response to be stapled with this certificate during the handshake. // The response must be DER-encoded and may only be provided via ``filename`` or // ``inline_bytes``. The response may pertain to only one certificate. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource ocsp_staple = 4; // [#not-implemented-hide:] repeated config.core.v4alpha.DataSource signed_certificate_timestamp = 5; } message TlsSessionTicketKeys { option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type = "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.TlsSessionTicketKeys"; // Keys for encrypting and decrypting TLS session tickets. The // first key in the array contains the key to encrypt all new sessions created by this context. // All keys are candidates for decrypting received tickets. This allows for easy rotation of keys // by, for example, putting the new key first, and the previous key second. // // If :ref:`session_ticket_keys ` // is not specified, the TLS library will still support resuming sessions via tickets, but it will // use an internally-generated and managed key, so sessions cannot be resumed across hot restarts // or on different hosts. // // Each key must contain exactly 80 bytes of cryptographically-secure random data. For // example, the output of ``openssl rand 80``. // // .. attention:: // // Using this feature has serious security considerations and risks. Improper handling of keys // may result in loss of secrecy in connections, even if ciphers supporting perfect forward // secrecy are used. See https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html for some // discussion. To minimize the risk, you must: // // * Keep the session ticket keys at least as secure as your TLS certificate private keys // * Rotate session ticket keys at least daily, and preferably hourly // * Always generate keys using a cryptographically-secure random data source repeated config.core.v4alpha.DataSource keys = 1 [(validate.rules).repeated = {min_items: 1}, (udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true]; } // [#next-free-field: 13] message CertificateValidationContext { option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type = "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.CertificateValidationContext"; // Peer certificate verification mode. enum TrustChainVerification { // Perform default certificate verification (e.g., against CA / verification lists) VERIFY_TRUST_CHAIN = 0; // Connections where the certificate fails verification will be permitted. // For HTTP connections, the result of certificate verification can be used in route matching. ( // see :ref:`validated ` ). ACCEPT_UNTRUSTED = 1; } reserved 4, 5; reserved "verify_subject_alt_name"; // TLS certificate data containing certificate authority certificates to use in verifying // a presented peer certificate (e.g. server certificate for clusters or client certificate // for listeners). If not specified and a peer certificate is presented it will not be // verified. By default, a client certificate is optional, unless one of the additional // options (:ref:`require_client_certificate // `, // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // `, // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // `, or // :ref:`match_subject_alt_names // `) is also // specified. // // It can optionally contain certificate revocation lists, in which case Envoy will verify // that the presented peer certificate has not been revoked by one of the included CRLs. Note // that if a CRL is provided for any certificate authority in a trust chain, a CRL must be // provided for all certificate authorities in that chain. Failure to do so will result in // verification failure for both revoked and unrevoked certificates from that chain. // // See :ref:`the TLS overview ` for a list of common // system CA locations. // // If *trusted_ca* is a filesystem path, a watch will be added to the parent // directory for any file moves to support rotation. This currently only // applies to dynamic secrets, when the *CertificateValidationContext* is // delivered via SDS. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource trusted_ca = 1; // If specified, updates of a file-based *trusted_ca* source will be triggered // by this watch. This allows explicit control over the path watched, by // default the parent directory of the filesystem path in *trusted_ca* is // watched if this field is not specified. This only applies when a // *CertificateValidationContext* is delivered by SDS with references to // filesystem paths. See the :ref:`SDS key rotation ` // documentation for further details. config.core.v4alpha.WatchedDirectory watched_directory = 11; // An optional list of base64-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that the // SHA-256 of the DER-encoded Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the presented certificate // matches one of the specified values. // // A base64-encoded SHA-256 of the Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the certificate // can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -pubkey // | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER // | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary // | openssl enc -base64 // NvqYIYSbgK2vCJpQhObf77vv+bQWtc5ek5RIOwPiC9A= // // This is the format used in HTTP Public Key Pinning. // // When both: // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // ` and // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // ` are specified, // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted. // // .. attention:: // // This option is preferred over :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // `, // because SPKI is tied to a private key, so it doesn't change when the certificate // is renewed using the same private key. repeated string verify_certificate_spki = 3 [(validate.rules).repeated = {items {string {min_len: 44 max_bytes: 44}}}]; // An optional list of hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that // the SHA-256 of the DER-encoded presented certificate matches one of the specified values. // // A hex-encoded SHA-256 of the certificate can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256 | cut -d" " -f2 // df6ff72fe9116521268f6f2dd4966f51df479883fe7037b39f75916ac3049d1a // // A long hex-encoded and colon-separated SHA-256 (a.k.a. "fingerprint") of the certificate // can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d"=" -f2 // DF:6F:F7:2F:E9:11:65:21:26:8F:6F:2D:D4:96:6F:51:DF:47:98:83:FE:70:37:B3:9F:75:91:6A:C3:04:9D:1A // // Both of those formats are acceptable. // // When both: // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // ` and // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // ` are specified, // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted. repeated string verify_certificate_hash = 2 [(validate.rules).repeated = {items {string {min_len: 64 max_bytes: 95}}}]; // An optional list of Subject Alternative name matchers. If specified, Envoy will verify that the // Subject Alternative Name of the presented certificate matches one of the specified matchers. // // When a certificate has wildcard DNS SAN entries, to match a specific client, it should be // configured with exact match type in the :ref:`string matcher `. // For example if the certificate has "\*.example.com" as DNS SAN entry, to allow only "api.example.com", // it should be configured as shown below. // // .. code-block:: yaml // // match_subject_alt_names: // exact: "api.example.com" // // .. attention:: // // Subject Alternative Names are easily spoofable and verifying only them is insecure, // therefore this option must be used together with :ref:`trusted_ca // `. repeated type.matcher.v4alpha.StringMatcher match_subject_alt_names = 9; // [#not-implemented-hide:] Must present signed certificate time-stamp. google.protobuf.BoolValue require_signed_certificate_timestamp = 6; // An optional `certificate revocation list // `_ // (in PEM format). If specified, Envoy will verify that the presented peer // certificate has not been revoked by this CRL. If this DataSource contains // multiple CRLs, all of them will be used. Note that if a CRL is provided // for any certificate authority in a trust chain, a CRL must be provided // for all certificate authorities in that chain. Failure to do so will // result in verification failure for both revoked and unrevoked certificates // from that chain. config.core.v4alpha.DataSource crl = 7; // If specified, Envoy will not reject expired certificates. bool allow_expired_certificate = 8; // Certificate trust chain verification mode. TrustChainVerification trust_chain_verification = 10 [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}]; // The configuration of an extension specific certificate validator. // If specified, all validation is done by the specified validator, // and the behavior of all other validation settings is defined by the specified validator (and may be entirely ignored, unused, and unvalidated). // Refer to the documentation for the specified validator. If you do not want a custom validation algorithm, do not set this field. // [#extension-category: envoy.tls.cert_validator] config.core.v4alpha.TypedExtensionConfig custom_validator_config = 12; }