syntax = "proto3";

package envoy.api.v2.auth;

import "envoy/api/v2/core/base.proto";
import "envoy/type/matcher/string.proto";

import "google/protobuf/any.proto";
import "google/protobuf/struct.proto";
import "google/protobuf/wrappers.proto";

import "udpa/annotations/migrate.proto";
import "udpa/annotations/sensitive.proto";
import "udpa/annotations/status.proto";
import "validate/validate.proto";

option java_package = "io.envoyproxy.envoy.api.v2.auth";
option java_outer_classname = "CommonProto";
option java_multiple_files = true;
option (udpa.annotations.file_migrate).move_to_package =
    "envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3";
option (udpa.annotations.file_status).package_version_status = FROZEN;

// [#protodoc-title: Common TLS configuration]

message TlsParameters {
  enum TlsProtocol {
    // Envoy will choose the optimal TLS version.
    TLS_AUTO = 0;

    // TLS 1.0
    TLSv1_0 = 1;

    // TLS 1.1
    TLSv1_1 = 2;

    // TLS 1.2
    TLSv1_2 = 3;

    // TLS 1.3
    TLSv1_3 = 4;
  }

  // Minimum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_2`` for clients and ``TLSv1_0`` for
  // servers.
  TlsProtocol tls_minimum_protocol_version = 1 [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}];

  // Maximum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_2`` for clients and ``TLSv1_3`` for
  // servers.
  TlsProtocol tls_maximum_protocol_version = 2 [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}];

  // If specified, the TLS listener will only support the specified `cipher list
  // <https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/ssl.h.html#Cipher-suite-configuration>`_
  // when negotiating TLS 1.0-1.2 (this setting has no effect when negotiating TLS 1.3). If not
  // specified, the default list will be used.
  //
  // In non-FIPS builds, the default cipher list is:
  //
  // .. code-block:: none
  //
  //   [ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305]
  //   [ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305]
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
  //   AES128-GCM-SHA256
  //   AES128-SHA
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
  //   AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   AES256-SHA
  //
  // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS <arch_overview_ssl_fips>`, the default cipher list is:
  //
  // .. code-block:: none
  //
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
  //   AES128-GCM-SHA256
  //   AES128-SHA
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
  //   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
  //   AES256-GCM-SHA384
  //   AES256-SHA
  repeated string cipher_suites = 3;

  // If specified, the TLS connection will only support the specified ECDH
  // curves. If not specified, the default curves will be used.
  //
  // In non-FIPS builds, the default curves are:
  //
  // .. code-block:: none
  //
  //   X25519
  //   P-256
  //
  // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS <arch_overview_ssl_fips>`, the default curve is:
  //
  // .. code-block:: none
  //
  //   P-256
  repeated string ecdh_curves = 4;
}

// BoringSSL private key method configuration. The private key methods are used for external
// (potentially asynchronous) signing and decryption operations. Some use cases for private key
// methods would be TPM support and TLS acceleration.
message PrivateKeyProvider {
  // Private key method provider name. The name must match a
  // supported private key method provider type.
  string provider_name = 1 [(validate.rules).string = {min_bytes: 1}];

  // Private key method provider specific configuration.
  oneof config_type {
    google.protobuf.Struct config = 2 [deprecated = true, (udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true];

    google.protobuf.Any typed_config = 3 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true];
  }
}

// [#next-free-field: 7]
message TlsCertificate {
  // The TLS certificate chain.
  core.DataSource certificate_chain = 1;

  // The TLS private key.
  core.DataSource private_key = 2 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true];

  // BoringSSL private key method provider. This is an alternative to :ref:`private_key
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.TlsCertificate.private_key>` field. This can't be
  // marked as ``oneof`` due to API compatibility reasons. Setting both :ref:`private_key
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.TlsCertificate.private_key>` and
  // :ref:`private_key_provider
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.TlsCertificate.private_key_provider>` fields will result in an
  // error.
  PrivateKeyProvider private_key_provider = 6;

  // The password to decrypt the TLS private key. If this field is not set, it is assumed that the
  // TLS private key is not password encrypted.
  core.DataSource password = 3 [(udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true];

  // [#not-implemented-hide:]
  core.DataSource ocsp_staple = 4;

  // [#not-implemented-hide:]
  repeated core.DataSource signed_certificate_timestamp = 5;
}

message TlsSessionTicketKeys {
  // Keys for encrypting and decrypting TLS session tickets. The
  // first key in the array contains the key to encrypt all new sessions created by this context.
  // All keys are candidates for decrypting received tickets. This allows for easy rotation of keys
  // by, for example, putting the new key first, and the previous key second.
  //
  // If :ref:`session_ticket_keys <envoy_api_field_auth.DownstreamTlsContext.session_ticket_keys>`
  // is not specified, the TLS library will still support resuming sessions via tickets, but it will
  // use an internally-generated and managed key, so sessions cannot be resumed across hot restarts
  // or on different hosts.
  //
  // Each key must contain exactly 80 bytes of cryptographically-secure random data. For
  // example, the output of ``openssl rand 80``.
  //
  // .. attention::
  //
  //   Using this feature has serious security considerations and risks. Improper handling of keys
  //   may result in loss of secrecy in connections, even if ciphers supporting perfect forward
  //   secrecy are used. See https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html for some
  //   discussion. To minimize the risk, you must:
  //
  //   * Keep the session ticket keys at least as secure as your TLS certificate private keys
  //   * Rotate session ticket keys at least daily, and preferably hourly
  //   * Always generate keys using a cryptographically-secure random data source
  repeated core.DataSource keys = 1
      [(validate.rules).repeated = {min_items: 1}, (udpa.annotations.sensitive) = true];
}

// [#next-free-field: 11]
message CertificateValidationContext {
  // Peer certificate verification mode.
  enum TrustChainVerification {
    // Perform default certificate verification (e.g., against CA / verification lists)
    VERIFY_TRUST_CHAIN = 0;

    // Connections where the certificate fails verification will be permitted.
    // For HTTP connections, the result of certificate verification can be used in route matching. (
    // see :ref:`validated <envoy_api_field_route.RouteMatch.TlsContextMatchOptions.validated>` ).
    ACCEPT_UNTRUSTED = 1;
  }

  // TLS certificate data containing certificate authority certificates to use in verifying
  // a presented peer certificate (e.g. server certificate for clusters or client certificate
  // for listeners). If not specified and a peer certificate is presented it will not be
  // verified. By default, a client certificate is optional, unless one of the additional
  // options (:ref:`require_client_certificate
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.DownstreamTlsContext.require_client_certificate>`,
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_spki>`,
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_hash>`, or
  // :ref:`match_subject_alt_names
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.match_subject_alt_names>`) is also
  // specified.
  //
  // It can optionally contain certificate revocation lists, in which case Envoy will verify
  // that the presented peer certificate has not been revoked by one of the included CRLs.
  //
  // See :ref:`the TLS overview <arch_overview_ssl_enabling_verification>` for a list of common
  // system CA locations.
  core.DataSource trusted_ca = 1;

  // An optional list of base64-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that the
  // SHA-256 of the DER-encoded Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the presented certificate
  // matches one of the specified values.
  //
  // A base64-encoded SHA-256 of the Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the certificate
  // can be generated with the following command:
  //
  // .. code-block:: bash
  //
  //   $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -pubkey
  //     | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER
  //     | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary
  //     | openssl enc -base64
  //   NvqYIYSbgK2vCJpQhObf77vv+bQWtc5ek5RIOwPiC9A=
  //
  // This is the format used in HTTP Public Key Pinning.
  //
  // When both:
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_hash>` and
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_spki>` are specified,
  // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted.
  //
  // .. attention::
  //
  //   This option is preferred over :ref:`verify_certificate_hash
  //   <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_hash>`,
  //   because SPKI is tied to a private key, so it doesn't change when the certificate
  //   is renewed using the same private key.
  repeated string verify_certificate_spki = 3
      [(validate.rules).repeated = {items {string {min_bytes: 44 max_bytes: 44}}}];

  // An optional list of hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that
  // the SHA-256 of the DER-encoded presented certificate matches one of the specified values.
  //
  // A hex-encoded SHA-256 of the certificate can be generated with the following command:
  //
  // .. code-block:: bash
  //
  //   $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256 | cut -d" " -f2
  //   df6ff72fe9116521268f6f2dd4966f51df479883fe7037b39f75916ac3049d1a
  //
  // A long hex-encoded and colon-separated SHA-256 (a.k.a. "fingerprint") of the certificate
  // can be generated with the following command:
  //
  // .. code-block:: bash
  //
  //   $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d"=" -f2
  //   DF:6F:F7:2F:E9:11:65:21:26:8F:6F:2D:D4:96:6F:51:DF:47:98:83:FE:70:37:B3:9F:75:91:6A:C3:04:9D:1A
  //
  // Both of those formats are acceptable.
  //
  // When both:
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_hash>` and
  // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki
  // <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.verify_certificate_spki>` are specified,
  // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted.
  repeated string verify_certificate_hash = 2
      [(validate.rules).repeated = {items {string {min_bytes: 64 max_bytes: 95}}}];

  // An optional list of Subject Alternative Names. If specified, Envoy will verify that the
  // Subject Alternative Name of the presented certificate matches one of the specified values.
  //
  // .. attention::
  //
  //   Subject Alternative Names are easily spoofable and verifying only them is insecure,
  //   therefore this option must be used together with :ref:`trusted_ca
  //   <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.trusted_ca>`.
  repeated string verify_subject_alt_name = 4 [deprecated = true];

  // An optional list of Subject Alternative name matchers. Envoy will verify that the
  // Subject Alternative Name of the presented certificate matches one of the specified matches.
  //
  // When a certificate has wildcard DNS SAN entries, to match a specific client, it should be
  // configured with exact match type in the :ref:`string matcher <envoy_api_msg_type.matcher.StringMatcher>`.
  // For example if the certificate has "\*.example.com" as DNS SAN entry, to allow only "api.example.com",
  // it should be configured as shown below.
  //
  // .. code-block:: yaml
  //
  //  match_subject_alt_names:
  //    exact: "api.example.com"
  //
  // .. attention::
  //
  //   Subject Alternative Names are easily spoofable and verifying only them is insecure,
  //   therefore this option must be used together with :ref:`trusted_ca
  //   <envoy_api_field_auth.CertificateValidationContext.trusted_ca>`.
  repeated type.matcher.StringMatcher match_subject_alt_names = 9;

  // [#not-implemented-hide:] Must present a signed time-stamped OCSP response.
  google.protobuf.BoolValue require_ocsp_staple = 5;

  // [#not-implemented-hide:] Must present signed certificate time-stamp.
  google.protobuf.BoolValue require_signed_certificate_timestamp = 6;

  // An optional `certificate revocation list
  // <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_revocation_list>`_
  // (in PEM format). If specified, Envoy will verify that the presented peer
  // certificate has not been revoked by this CRL. If this DataSource contains
  // multiple CRLs, all of them will be used.
  core.DataSource crl = 7;

  // If specified, Envoy will not reject expired certificates.
  bool allow_expired_certificate = 8;

  // Certificate trust chain verification mode.
  TrustChainVerification trust_chain_verification = 10
      [(validate.rules).enum = {defined_only: true}];
}