syntax = "proto3"; package envoy.api.v2.auth; option java_package = "io.envoyproxy.envoy.api.v2.auth"; option go_package = "auth"; import "envoy/api/v2/core/base.proto"; import "envoy/api/v2/core/config_source.proto"; import "google/protobuf/wrappers.proto"; import "validate/validate.proto"; import "gogoproto/gogo.proto"; option (gogoproto.equal_all) = true; // [#protodoc-title: Common TLS configuration] message TlsParameters { enum TlsProtocol { // Envoy will choose the optimal TLS version. TLS_AUTO = 0; // TLS 1.0 TLSv1_0 = 1; // TLS 1.1 TLSv1_1 = 2; // TLS 1.2 TLSv1_2 = 3; // TLS 1.3 TLSv1_3 = 4; } // Minimum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_0``. TlsProtocol tls_minimum_protocol_version = 1 [(validate.rules).enum.defined_only = true]; // Maximum TLS protocol version. By default, it's ``TLSv1_3`` for servers in non-FIPS builds, and // ``TLSv1_2`` for clients and for servers using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `. TlsProtocol tls_maximum_protocol_version = 2 [(validate.rules).enum.defined_only = true]; // If specified, the TLS listener will only support the specified `cipher list // `_ // when negotiating TLS 1.0-1.2 (this setting has no effect when negotiating TLS 1.3). If not // specified, the default list will be used. // // In non-FIPS builds, the default cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // [ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // [ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256|ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305] // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA // AES128-GCM-SHA256 // AES128-SHA // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA // AES256-GCM-SHA384 // AES256-SHA // // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `, the default cipher list is: // // .. code-block:: none // // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA // AES128-GCM-SHA256 // AES128-SHA // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 // ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA // ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA // AES256-GCM-SHA384 // AES256-SHA repeated string cipher_suites = 3; // If specified, the TLS connection will only support the specified ECDH // curves. If not specified, the default curves will be used. // // In non-FIPS builds, the default curves are: // // .. code-block:: none // // X25519 // P-256 // // In builds using :ref:`BoringSSL FIPS `, the default curve is: // // .. code-block:: none // // P-256 repeated string ecdh_curves = 4; } message TlsCertificate { // The TLS certificate chain. core.DataSource certificate_chain = 1; // The TLS private key. core.DataSource private_key = 2; // The password to decrypt the TLS private key. If this field is not set, it is assumed that the // TLS private key is not password encrypted. core.DataSource password = 3; // [#not-implemented-hide:] core.DataSource ocsp_staple = 4; // [#not-implemented-hide:] repeated core.DataSource signed_certificate_timestamp = 5; } message TlsSessionTicketKeys { // Keys for encrypting and decrypting TLS session tickets. The // first key in the array contains the key to encrypt all new sessions created by this context. // All keys are candidates for decrypting received tickets. This allows for easy rotation of keys // by, for example, putting the new key first, and the previous key second. // // If :ref:`session_ticket_keys ` // is not specified, the TLS library will still support resuming sessions via tickets, but it will // use an internally-generated and managed key, so sessions cannot be resumed across hot restarts // or on different hosts. // // Each key must contain exactly 80 bytes of cryptographically-secure random data. For // example, the output of ``openssl rand 80``. // // .. attention:: // // Using this feature has serious security considerations and risks. Improper handling of keys // may result in loss of secrecy in connections, even if ciphers supporting perfect forward // secrecy are used. See https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html for some // discussion. To minimize the risk, you must: // // * Keep the session ticket keys at least as secure as your TLS certificate private keys // * Rotate session ticket keys at least daily, and preferably hourly // * Always generate keys using a cryptographically-secure random data source repeated core.DataSource keys = 1 [(validate.rules).repeated .min_items = 1]; } message CertificateValidationContext { // TLS certificate data containing certificate authority certificates to use in verifying // a presented peer certificate (e.g. server certificate for clusters or client certificate // for listeners). If not specified and a peer certificate is presented it will not be // verified. By default, a client certificate is optional, unless one of the additional // options (:ref:`require_client_certificate // `, // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // `, // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // `, or // :ref:`verify_subject_alt_name // `) is also // specified. // // It can optionally contain certificate revocation lists, in which case Envoy will verify // that the presented peer certificate has not been revoked by one of the included CRLs. // // See :ref:`the TLS overview ` for a list of common // system CA locations. core.DataSource trusted_ca = 1; // An optional list of base64-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that the // SHA-256 of the DER-encoded Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the presented certificate // matches one of the specified values. // // A base64-encoded SHA-256 of the Subject Public Key Information (SPKI) of the certificate // can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -pubkey \ // | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \ // | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary \ // | openssl enc -base64 // NvqYIYSbgK2vCJpQhObf77vv+bQWtc5ek5RIOwPiC9A= // // This is the format used in HTTP Public Key Pinning. // // When both: // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // ` and // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // ` are specified, // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted. // // .. attention:: // // This option is preferred over :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // `, // because SPKI is tied to a private key, so it doesn't change when the certificate // is renewed using the same private key. repeated string verify_certificate_spki = 3 [(validate.rules).repeated .items.string = {min_bytes: 44, max_bytes: 44}]; // An optional list of hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes. If specified, Envoy will verify that // the SHA-256 of the DER-encoded presented certificate matches one of the specified values. // // A hex-encoded SHA-256 of the certificate can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256 | cut -d" " -f2 // df6ff72fe9116521268f6f2dd4966f51df479883fe7037b39f75916ac3049d1a // // A long hex-encoded and colon-separated SHA-256 (a.k.a. "fingerprint") of the certificate // can be generated with the following command: // // .. code-block:: bash // // $ openssl x509 -in path/to/client.crt -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d"=" -f2 // DF:6F:F7:2F:E9:11:65:21:26:8F:6F:2D:D4:96:6F:51:DF:47:98:83:FE:70:37:B3:9F:75:91:6A:C3:04:9D:1A // // Both of those formats are acceptable. // // When both: // :ref:`verify_certificate_hash // ` and // :ref:`verify_certificate_spki // ` are specified, // a hash matching value from either of the lists will result in the certificate being accepted. repeated string verify_certificate_hash = 2 [(validate.rules).repeated .items.string = {min_bytes: 64, max_bytes: 95}]; // An optional list of Subject Alternative Names. If specified, Envoy will verify that the // Subject Alternative Name of the presented certificate matches one of the specified values. // // .. attention:: // // Subject Alternative Names are easily spoofable and verifying only them is insecure, // therefore this option must be used together with :ref:`trusted_ca // `. repeated string verify_subject_alt_name = 4; // [#not-implemented-hide:] Must present a signed time-stamped OCSP response. google.protobuf.BoolValue require_ocsp_staple = 5; // [#not-implemented-hide:] Must present signed certificate time-stamp. google.protobuf.BoolValue require_signed_certificate_timestamp = 6; // An optional `certificate revocation list // `_ // (in PEM format). If specified, Envoy will verify that the presented peer // certificate has not been revoked by this CRL. If this DataSource contains // multiple CRLs, all of them will be used. core.DataSource crl = 7; // If specified, Envoy will not reject expired certificates. bool allow_expired_certificate = 8; } // TLS context shared by both client and server TLS contexts. message CommonTlsContext { // TLS protocol versions, cipher suites etc. TlsParameters tls_params = 1; // :ref:`Multiple TLS certificates ` can be associated with the // same context to allow both RSA and ECDSA certificates. // // Only a single TLS certificate is supported in client contexts. In server contexts, the first // RSA certificate is used for clients that only support RSA and the first ECDSA certificate is // used for clients that support ECDSA. repeated TlsCertificate tls_certificates = 2; // Configs for fetching TLS certificates via SDS API. repeated SdsSecretConfig tls_certificate_sds_secret_configs = 6 [(validate.rules).repeated .max_items = 1]; message CombinedCertificateValidationContext { // How to validate peer certificates. CertificateValidationContext default_validation_context = 1 [(validate.rules).message.required = true]; // Config for fetching validation context via SDS API. SdsSecretConfig validation_context_sds_secret_config = 2 [(validate.rules).message.required = true]; }; oneof validation_context_type { // How to validate peer certificates. CertificateValidationContext validation_context = 3; // Config for fetching validation context via SDS API. SdsSecretConfig validation_context_sds_secret_config = 7; // Combined certificate validation context holds a default CertificateValidationContext // and SDS config. When SDS server returns dynamic CertificateValidationContext, both dynamic // and default CertificateValidationContext are merged into a new CertificateValidationContext // for validation. This merge is done by Message::MergeFrom(), so dynamic // CertificateValidationContext overwrites singular fields in default // CertificateValidationContext, and concatenates repeated fields to default // CertificateValidationContext, and logical OR is applied to boolean fields. CombinedCertificateValidationContext combined_validation_context = 8; } // Supplies the list of ALPN protocols that the listener should expose. In // practice this is likely to be set to one of two values (see the // :ref:`codec_type // ` // parameter in the HTTP connection manager for more information): // // * "h2,http/1.1" If the listener is going to support both HTTP/2 and HTTP/1.1. // * "http/1.1" If the listener is only going to support HTTP/1.1. // // There is no default for this parameter. If empty, Envoy will not expose ALPN. repeated string alpn_protocols = 4; reserved 5; } message UpstreamTlsContext { // Common TLS context settings. CommonTlsContext common_tls_context = 1; // SNI string to use when creating TLS backend connections. string sni = 2 [(validate.rules).string.max_bytes = 255]; // If true, server-initiated TLS renegotiation will be allowed. // // .. attention:: // // TLS renegotiation is considered insecure and shouldn't be used unless absolutely necessary. bool allow_renegotiation = 3; // Maximum number of session keys (Pre-Shared Keys for TLSv1.3+, Session IDs and Session Tickets // for TLSv1.2 and older) to store for the purpose of session resumption. // // Defaults to 1, setting this to 0 disables session resumption. google.protobuf.UInt32Value max_session_keys = 4; } message DownstreamTlsContext { // Common TLS context settings. CommonTlsContext common_tls_context = 1; // If specified, Envoy will reject connections without a valid client // certificate. google.protobuf.BoolValue require_client_certificate = 2; // If specified, Envoy will reject connections without a valid and matching SNI. // [#not-implemented-hide:] google.protobuf.BoolValue require_sni = 3; oneof session_ticket_keys_type { // TLS session ticket key settings. TlsSessionTicketKeys session_ticket_keys = 4; // [#not-implemented-hide:] SdsSecretConfig session_ticket_keys_sds_secret_config = 5; } } // [#proto-status: experimental] message SdsSecretConfig { // Name (FQDN, UUID, SPKI, SHA256, etc.) by which the secret can be uniquely referred to. // When both name and config are specified, then secret can be fetched and/or reloaded via SDS. // When only name is specified, then secret will be loaded from static resources [V2-API-DIFF]. string name = 1; core.ConfigSource sds_config = 2; } // [#proto-status: experimental] message Secret { // Name (FQDN, UUID, SPKI, SHA256, etc.) by which the secret can be uniquely referred to. string name = 1; oneof type { TlsCertificate tls_certificate = 2; TlsSessionTicketKeys session_ticket_keys = 3; CertificateValidationContext validation_context = 4; } }