adds the required visibility rules and delegates the rest to the generic
api_proto_library. I tested the change by doing the following without
getting errors.
./ci/run_envoy_docker.sh './ci/do_ci.sh docs'
I changed the BUILD files using the following commands.
/envoy/api$ find . -type f -name BUILD | xargs sed -i -e 's/api_proto_library(/api_proto_library_internal(/g'
envoy/api$ find . -type f -name BUILD | xargs sed -i -e 's/"api_proto_library"/"api_proto_library_internal"/g'
Signed-off-by: mickey <mickeyju@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 4b871c0ab9350882271a490adcee44e613ed9807
SAN-based verification without trusted CA is insecure, since provided
values are easily spoofable.
Becasue of how the existing verification code is structured, this was
already enforced at run-time, and all certificates were rejected when
trusted CA wasn't specified, but previously it wasn't obvious why.
*Risk Level*: None
*Testing*: bazel test //test/...
*Docs Changes*: Added
*Release Notes*: n/a
Fixes#1268.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 72db143131c1030e7c448e034a1a08980dc826f9
No functional changes, only API update.
*Risk Level*: Low
*Testing*: bazel test //test/...
*Docs Changes*: n/a
*Release Notes*: n/a
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 4eb09f86cbfff67404591cf812a7db8d7880c413
*Risk Level*: None
*Testing*: bazel test //test/...
*Docs Changes*: n/a
*Release Notes*: n/a
Found with buildifier.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 0e8964c83f359916ecbf9c01a03ade3c92aac479
While there, add support for the standard hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes without colon delimiters.
Risk Level: Low
Testing: Unit tests added.
Docs Changes: Added
Release Notes: Added
Fixes#3418, #3419.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ f7e1e23379fae6045546e63584435b78ae5f30e6
Previously, we would assert when we failed to set SNI for a socket. Now,
we reject the bad config.
Risk Level: Low
Testing: New ssl_socket_test.
Signed-off-by: Harvey Tuch <htuch@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 3b084a7d747750cfcb868f0cce463af2fe4e781c
Added protos to support Role Based Access Control in Envoy.
Also removed existing auth.proto because the new RBAC proto is a replacement of it.
Ealier discussions at
envoyproxy/data-plane-api#586.
Signed-off-by: Limin Wang <liminwang@google.com>
Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ 13de384ab34428af99c53201f6b3c95991b7ae10
There are several main changes in this PR:
Create envoy.api.v2.core packages to break circular dependencies from xDS on to subpackages on to base protos.
Create individual packages for each filter and add independent versioning to each filter.
Add visibility constraints to prevent formation of dependency cycles.
Add gogoproto annotations to improve go code generation.
After moving xDS service definitions and top-level resource protos back to envoy.core.api.v2, cycles were created, since the second-level definitions depend on base protobuf definitions, and are in turn included from xDS; however xDS and base definitions are in the same package.
The solution is to split the base protos into another package, envoy.api.v2.core. That eliminates dependency cycles (validated using go-control-plane).
Added a few gogoproto annotations to improve golang code generation.
Signed-off-by: Kuat Yessenov <kuat@google.com>