docs: add comments about inherited options on SPIFFE validator (#15621)

* docs: add comments about inherited options on SPIFFE validator

Signed-off-by: Takeshi Yoneda <takeshi@tetrate.io>

Mirrored from https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy @ b77811970d551cb8ae0102b246975a8f84c60e0e
pull/624/head
data-plane-api(Azure Pipelines) 4 years ago
parent 3da9310024
commit 16009d2087
  1. 6
      envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/tls_spiffe_validator_config.proto
  2. 6
      envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v4alpha/tls_spiffe_validator_config.proto

@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ option (udpa.annotations.file_status).package_version_status = ACTIVE;
// the "foo.pem" x.509 certificate. All the trust bundles are isolated from each other, so no trust domain can mint
// a SVID belonging to another trust domain. That means, in this example, a SVID signed by `envoy.com`'s CA with `spiffe//foo.com/**`
// SAN would be rejected since Envoy selects the trust bundle according to the presented SAN before validate the certificate.
//
// Note that SPIFFE validator inherits and uses the following options from :ref:`CertificateValidationContext <envoy_v3_api_msg_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.CertificateValidationContext>`.
//
// - :ref:`allow_expired_certificate <envoy_api_field_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.CertificateValidationContext.allow_expired_certificate>` to allow expired certificates.
// - :ref:`match_subject_alt_names <envoy_api_field_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.CertificateValidationContext.match_subject_alt_names>` to match **URI** SAN of certificates. Unlike the default validator, SPIFFE validator only matches **URI** SAN (which equals to SVID in SPIFFE terminology) and ignore other SAN types.
//
message SPIFFECertValidatorConfig {
message TrustDomain {
// Name of the trust domain, `example.com`, `foo.bar.gov` for example.

@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ option (udpa.annotations.file_status).package_version_status = NEXT_MAJOR_VERSIO
// the "foo.pem" x.509 certificate. All the trust bundles are isolated from each other, so no trust domain can mint
// a SVID belonging to another trust domain. That means, in this example, a SVID signed by `envoy.com`'s CA with `spiffe//foo.com/**`
// SAN would be rejected since Envoy selects the trust bundle according to the presented SAN before validate the certificate.
//
// Note that SPIFFE validator inherits and uses the following options from :ref:`CertificateValidationContext <envoy_v3_api_msg_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.CertificateValidationContext>`.
//
// - :ref:`allow_expired_certificate <envoy_api_field_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v4alpha.CertificateValidationContext.allow_expired_certificate>` to allow expired certificates.
// - :ref:`match_subject_alt_names <envoy_api_field_extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v4alpha.CertificateValidationContext.match_subject_alt_names>` to match **URI** SAN of certificates. Unlike the default validator, SPIFFE validator only matches **URI** SAN (which equals to SVID in SPIFFE terminology) and ignore other SAN types.
//
message SPIFFECertValidatorConfig {
option (udpa.annotations.versioning).previous_message_type =
"envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.SPIFFECertValidatorConfig";

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