protocol parsing: check input data stricter

... so that bad length fields aren't blindly accepted

Bug: http://c-ares.haxx.se/mail/c-ares-archive-2013-04/0016.shtml
pull/10/merge
Patrick Valsecchi 12 years ago committed by Daniel Stenberg
parent 2004a7a111
commit 148c8e0353
  1. 2
      ares_expand_name.c
  2. 6
      ares_parse_a_reply.c
  3. 6
      ares_parse_aaaa_reply.c
  4. 5
      ares_parse_mx_reply.c
  5. 5
      ares_parse_naptr_reply.c
  6. 6
      ares_parse_ns_reply.c
  7. 8
      ares_parse_ptr_reply.c
  8. 5
      ares_parse_srv_reply.c
  9. 11
      ares_parse_txt_reply.c

@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int name_length(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
int n = 0, offset, indir = 0;
/* Allow the caller to pass us abuf + alen and have us check for it. */
if (encoded == abuf + alen)
if (encoded >= abuf + alen)
return -1;
while (*encoded)

@ -136,6 +136,12 @@ int ares_parse_a_reply(const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN(aptr);
rr_ttl = DNS_RR_TTL(aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
free(rr_name);
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_A
&& rr_len == sizeof(struct in_addr)

@ -136,6 +136,12 @@ int ares_parse_aaaa_reply(const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN(aptr);
rr_ttl = DNS_RR_TTL(aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
free(rr_name);
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_AAAA
&& rr_len == sizeof(struct ares_in6_addr)

@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ ares_parse_mx_reply (const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS (aptr);
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN (aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
/* Check if we are really looking at a MX record */
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_MX)

@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ ares_parse_naptr_reply (const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS (aptr);
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN (aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
/* Check if we are really looking at a NAPTR record */
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_NAPTR)

@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ int ares_parse_ns_reply( const unsigned char* abuf, int alen,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS( aptr );
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN( aptr );
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
free(rr_name);
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
if ( rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_NS )
{

@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ int ares_parse_ptr_reply(const unsigned char *abuf, int alen, const void *addr,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS(aptr);
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN(aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
free(rr_name);
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_PTR
&& strcasecmp(rr_name, ptrname) == 0)
@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ int ares_parse_ptr_reply(const unsigned char *abuf, int alen, const void *addr,
status = ARES_ENOMEM;
}
for (i=0 ; i<aliascnt ; i++)
if (aliases[i])
if (aliases[i])
free(aliases[i]);
free(aliases);
if (hostname)

@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ ares_parse_srv_reply (const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS (aptr);
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN (aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
/* Check if we are really looking at a SRV record */
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_SRV)

@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ ares_parse_txt_reply (const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
rr_class = DNS_RR_CLASS (aptr);
rr_len = DNS_RR_LEN (aptr);
aptr += RRFIXEDSZ;
if (aptr + rr_len > abuf + alen)
{
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
/* Check if we are really looking at a TXT record */
if (rr_class == C_IN && rr_type == T_TXT)
@ -144,6 +149,12 @@ ares_parse_txt_reply (const unsigned char *abuf, int alen,
strptr += substr_len + 1;
}
if (strptr != (aptr + rr_len))
{
status = ARES_EBADRESP;
break;
}
/* Including null byte */
txt_curr->txt = malloc (txt_curr->length + 1);
if (txt_curr->txt == NULL)

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