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843 lines
24 KiB
843 lines
24 KiB
/* |
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
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* 2004. |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
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* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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*/ |
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#include <string.h> |
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|
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#include <openssl/mem.h> |
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#include <openssl/obj.h> |
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#include <openssl/stack.h> |
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#include <openssl/thread.h> |
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#include <openssl/x509.h> |
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
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#include "pcy_int.h" |
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#include "../internal.h" |
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#include "../x509/internal.h" |
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/* |
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* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during |
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* evaluation. |
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*/ |
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|
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/* |
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* #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
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*/ |
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|
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#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
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|
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static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) |
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{ |
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if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
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BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); |
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else { |
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int i; |
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
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BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
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oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
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if (i) |
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BIO_puts(err, ", "); |
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i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); |
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} |
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BIO_puts(err, "\n"); |
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} |
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} |
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static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
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{ |
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
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int i; |
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BIO *err; |
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err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
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if (!curr) |
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curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
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else |
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curr++; |
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BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); |
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BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); |
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for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
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BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", |
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plev - tree->levels, plev->flags); |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); |
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expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); |
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BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); |
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} |
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if (plev->anyPolicy) |
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
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} |
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BIO_free(err); |
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} |
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#else |
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# define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */ |
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#endif |
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/*- |
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* Initialize policy tree. Return values: |
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* 0 Some internal error occurred. |
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* -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates. |
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* 1 Tree initialized OK. |
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* 2 Policy tree is empty. |
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* 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
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* 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
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*/ |
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static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
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unsigned int flags) |
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{ |
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
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X509 *x; |
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int ret = 1; |
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int i, n; |
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int explicit_policy; |
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int any_skip; |
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int map_skip; |
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*ptree = NULL; |
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n = sk_X509_num(certs); |
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#if 0 |
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/* Disable policy mapping for now... */ |
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flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
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#endif |
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) |
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explicit_policy = 0; |
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else |
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explicit_policy = n + 1; |
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
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any_skip = 0; |
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else |
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any_skip = n + 1; |
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
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map_skip = 0; |
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else |
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map_skip = n + 1; |
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/* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
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if (n == 1) |
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return 1; |
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/* |
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* First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust |
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* anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate |
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* explicit_policy value at this point. |
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*/ |
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for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
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cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
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/* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */ |
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if (cache == NULL) |
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return 0; |
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/* |
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* If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue |
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*/ |
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
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ret = -1; |
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/* |
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* Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and |
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* haven't already set an inconsistent code note it. |
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*/ |
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else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) |
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ret = 2; |
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if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
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explicit_policy--; |
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if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) |
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&& (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
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explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
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} |
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} |
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if (ret != 1) { |
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if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) |
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return 6; |
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return ret; |
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} |
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/* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
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tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE)); |
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if (!tree) |
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return 0; |
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tree->flags = 0; |
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tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n); |
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tree->nlevel = 0; |
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tree->extra_data = NULL; |
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tree->auth_policies = NULL; |
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tree->user_policies = NULL; |
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if (!tree->levels) { |
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OPENSSL_free(tree); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); |
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tree->nlevel = n; |
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level = tree->levels; |
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/* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ |
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); |
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if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) |
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goto bad_tree; |
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for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
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level++; |
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
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cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
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X509_up_ref(x); |
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level->cert = x; |
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if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
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|
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/* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
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if (any_skip == 0) { |
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/* |
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* Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the |
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* last in the chain. |
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*/ |
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
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} else { |
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
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any_skip--; |
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if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) |
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&& (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
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any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
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} |
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if (map_skip == 0) |
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
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else { |
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
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map_skip--; |
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if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) |
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&& (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
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map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
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} |
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} |
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*ptree = tree; |
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if (explicit_policy) |
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return 1; |
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else |
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return 5; |
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bad_tree: |
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X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
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{ |
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
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int matched = 0; |
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size_t i; |
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/* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
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if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) |
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return 0; |
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matched = 1; |
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} |
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} |
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if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
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return 0; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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/* |
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* This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
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* CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
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*/ |
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static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
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{ |
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size_t i; |
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
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data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
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/* |
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* If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding |
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* CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would |
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* be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be |
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* no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link |
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* because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune |
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* it later. |
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*/ |
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#if 0 |
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if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY) |
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&& !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)) |
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continue; |
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#endif |
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/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
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if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
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return 0; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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/* |
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* This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
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* policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
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*/ |
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static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
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const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
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{ |
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
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if (id == NULL) |
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id = node->data->valid_policy; |
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/* |
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* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
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* node. |
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*/ |
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node)); |
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|
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if (data == NULL) |
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return 0; |
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
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policy_data_free(data); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
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{ |
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const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
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size_t i; |
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|
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if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
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/* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
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if (node->nchild) |
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return 1; |
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
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return 0; |
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/* Add it */ |
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} else { |
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/* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
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if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
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return 1; |
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/* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
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if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
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continue; |
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
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{ |
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size_t i; |
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/* |
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* X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
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*/ |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
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|
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if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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#if 0 |
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|
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/* |
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* Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes. |
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* Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node |
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* may have multiple children |
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*/ |
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if (node->nchild) |
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continue; |
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|
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/* |
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* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from |
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* unmatched node. |
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*/ |
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, |
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node_critical(node)); |
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|
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if (data == NULL) |
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return 0; |
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
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policy_data_free(data); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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#endif |
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|
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} |
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/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
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if (last->anyPolicy) { |
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if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
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return 0; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level |
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* then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever |
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* have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
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*/ |
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|
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static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
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{ |
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
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int i; |
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nodes = curr->nodes; |
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if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
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/* Delete any mapped data: see RFC 3280 XXXX */ |
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if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
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node->parent->nchild--; |
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OPENSSL_free(node); |
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(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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|
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for (;;) { |
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--curr; |
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nodes = curr->nodes; |
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
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if (node->nchild == 0) { |
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node->parent->nchild--; |
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OPENSSL_free(node); |
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(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
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} |
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} |
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if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
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if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
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curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
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OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
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curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
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} |
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if (curr == tree->levels) { |
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/* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
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if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
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return 2; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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} |
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|
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static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
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X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
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{ |
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if (!*pnodes) { |
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*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); |
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if (!*pnodes) |
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return 0; |
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} else { |
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes); |
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if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) |
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return 1; |
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} |
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if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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return 1; |
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|
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter |
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* is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user |
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* set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to |
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* the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set |
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* of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return |
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* value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed. |
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*/ |
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|
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static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
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{ |
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
|
int i; |
|
size_t j; |
|
curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
|
|
|
/* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
|
if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
|
if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
|
return 0; |
|
addnodes = pnodes; |
|
} else |
|
/* Add policies to authority set */ |
|
addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
|
|
|
curr = tree->levels; |
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
|
/* |
|
* If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
|
* levels so end search. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) |
|
break; |
|
curr++; |
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
|
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
|
if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
|
&& !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (addnodes == pnodes) |
|
return 2; |
|
|
|
*pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
|
{ |
|
size_t i; |
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
|
ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
|
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
|
X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
|
* will happen if it is a leaf node. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
|
tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
|
node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
|
if (!node) { |
|
if (!anyPolicy) |
|
continue; |
|
/* |
|
* Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
|
* from anyPolicy. |
|
*/ |
|
extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
|
if (!extra) |
|
return 0; |
|
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
|
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
|
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
|
node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
|
} |
|
if (!tree->user_policies) { |
|
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
|
if (!tree->user_policies) |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
|
{ |
|
int ret, i; |
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
|
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
|
cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
|
if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
|
&& !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
|
return 0; |
|
tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); |
|
ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
|
if (ret != 1) |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
|
{ |
|
if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
|
OPENSSL_free(node); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
|
{ |
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (!tree) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
|
|
|
for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
|
if (curr->cert) |
|
X509_free(curr->cert); |
|
if (curr->nodes) |
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
|
if (curr->anyPolicy) |
|
policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (tree->extra_data) |
|
sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
|
OPENSSL_free(tree); |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
/*- |
|
* Application policy checking function. |
|
* Return codes: |
|
* 0 Internal Error. |
|
* 1 Successful. |
|
* -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions |
|
* -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
|
STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
|
{ |
|
int ret; |
|
int calc_ret; |
|
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
|
*ptree = NULL; |
|
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 0; |
|
ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
|
|
|
switch (ret) { |
|
|
|
/* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */ |
|
case 2: |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
/* Some internal error */ |
|
case -1: |
|
return -1; |
|
|
|
/* Some internal error */ |
|
case 0: |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
/* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */ |
|
|
|
case 6: |
|
*pexplicit_policy = 1; |
|
return -2; |
|
|
|
/* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */ |
|
case 5: |
|
*pexplicit_policy = 1; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
/* Tree OK: continue */ |
|
|
|
case 1: |
|
if (!tree) |
|
/* |
|
* tree_init() returns success and a null tree |
|
* if it's just looking at a trust anchor. |
|
* I'm not sure that returning success here is |
|
* correct, but I'm sure that reporting this |
|
* as an internal error which our caller |
|
* interprets as a malloc failure is wrong. |
|
*/ |
|
return 1; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!tree) |
|
goto error; |
|
ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
|
|
|
tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); |
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
/* Return value 2 means tree empty */ |
|
if (ret == 2) { |
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
|
if (*pexplicit_policy) |
|
return -2; |
|
else |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
|
|
|
calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); |
|
|
|
if (!calc_ret) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); |
|
|
|
if (calc_ret == 2) |
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree) |
|
*ptree = tree; |
|
|
|
if (*pexplicit_policy) { |
|
nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
|
if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
|
return -2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
error: |
|
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
}
|
|
|