Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖)
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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533 lines
13 KiB
533 lines
13 KiB
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
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#include <openssl/dh.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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#include <openssl/bn.h> |
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#include <openssl/err.h> |
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h> |
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#include <openssl/mem.h> |
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#include <openssl/thread.h> |
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#include "../internal.h" |
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#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 |
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; |
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DH *DH_new(void) { |
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DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH)); |
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if (dh == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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OPENSSL_memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH)); |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock); |
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dh->references = 1; |
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data); |
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return dh; |
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} |
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void DH_free(DH *dh) { |
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if (dh == NULL) { |
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return; |
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} |
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dh->references)) { |
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return; |
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} |
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data); |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->p); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->g); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->q); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->j); |
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OPENSSL_free(dh->seed); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->counter); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock); |
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OPENSSL_free(dh); |
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} |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->pub_key; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->priv_key; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return dh->p; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return dh->q; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return dh->g; } |
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void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key, |
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const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) { |
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if (out_pub_key != NULL) { |
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*out_pub_key = dh->pub_key; |
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} |
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if (out_priv_key != NULL) { |
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*out_priv_key = dh->priv_key; |
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} |
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} |
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int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { |
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if (pub_key != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->pub_key); |
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dh->pub_key = pub_key; |
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} |
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if (priv_key != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->priv_key); |
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dh->priv_key = priv_key; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q, |
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const BIGNUM **out_g) { |
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if (out_p != NULL) { |
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*out_p = dh->p; |
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} |
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if (out_q != NULL) { |
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*out_q = dh->q; |
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} |
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if (out_g != NULL) { |
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*out_g = dh->g; |
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} |
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} |
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int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { |
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if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || |
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(dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (p != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->p); |
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dh->p = p; |
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} |
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if (q != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->q); |
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dh->q = q; |
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} |
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if (g != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->g); |
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dh->g = g; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) { |
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dh->priv_length = priv_length; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
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// We generate DH parameters as follows |
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// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long. |
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// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q |
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// For this case, g is a generator if |
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// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1. |
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// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check |
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// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1. |
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// |
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// Having said all that, |
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// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5. |
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// for 2, p mod 24 == 11 |
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// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes. |
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// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7 |
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// |
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// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the |
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// special generators and for answering some of my questions. |
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// |
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// I've implemented the second simple method :-). |
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// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime), |
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// this generator function can take a very very long time to run. |
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// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator. |
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// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the |
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// order-q subgroup. |
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BIGNUM *t1, *t2; |
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int g, ok = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements |
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if (dh->p == NULL) { |
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dh->p = BN_new(); |
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if (dh->p == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} |
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if (dh->g == NULL) { |
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dh->g = BN_new(); |
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if (dh->g == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} |
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if (generator <= 1) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) { |
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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g = 2; |
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} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) { |
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss |
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// out on these ones :-( |
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g = 5; |
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} else { |
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// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a |
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// generator or not: since we are using safe primes, |
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// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group, |
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// which both is OK |
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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g = generator; |
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} |
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ok = 1; |
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err: |
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if (!ok) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
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} |
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if (ctx != NULL) { |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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} |
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return ok; |
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} |
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int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { |
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int ok = 0; |
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int generate_new_key = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; |
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if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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priv_key = BN_new(); |
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if (priv_key == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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generate_new_key = 1; |
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} else { |
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priv_key = dh->priv_key; |
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} |
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if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { |
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pub_key = BN_new(); |
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if (pub_key == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} else { |
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pub_key = dh->pub_key; |
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} |
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock, |
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dh->p, ctx)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (generate_new_key) { |
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if (dh->q) { |
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if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 2, dh->q)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} else { |
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// secret exponent length |
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unsigned priv_bits = dh->priv_length; |
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if (priv_bits == 0) { |
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const unsigned p_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p); |
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if (p_bits == 0) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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priv_bits = p_bits - 1; |
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} |
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if (!BN_rand(priv_key, priv_bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dh->g, priv_key, dh->p, ctx, |
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dh->method_mont_p)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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dh->pub_key = pub_key; |
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dh->priv_key = priv_key; |
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ok = 1; |
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err: |
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if (ok != 1) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
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} |
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if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { |
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BN_free(pub_key); |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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BN_free(priv_key); |
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} |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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return ok; |
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} |
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int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *shared_key; |
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int ret = -1; |
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int check_result; |
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if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (shared_key == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock, |
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dh->p, ctx)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, |
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ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out); |
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err: |
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if (ctx != NULL) { |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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} |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); } |
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unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); } |
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int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) { |
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references); |
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return 1; |
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} |
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static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) { |
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BIGNUM *a = NULL; |
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if (src) { |
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a = BN_dup(src); |
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if (!a) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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BN_free(*dst); |
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*dst = a; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) { |
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if (is_x942 == -1) { |
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is_x942 = !!from->q; |
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} |
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if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) || |
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!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (!is_x942) { |
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return 1; |
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} |
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if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) || |
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!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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OPENSSL_free(to->seed); |
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to->seed = NULL; |
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to->seedlen = 0; |
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if (from->seed) { |
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to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen); |
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if (!to->seed) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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to->seedlen = from->seedlen; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) { |
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DH *ret = DH_new(); |
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if (!ret) { |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) { |
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DH_free(ret); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
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int index; |
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if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, |
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free_func)) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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return index; |
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} |
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int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) { |
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg); |
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} |
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void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) { |
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx); |
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}
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