Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖)
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
295 lines
9.5 KiB
295 lines
9.5 KiB
/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
|
* All rights reserved. |
|
* |
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written |
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
|
* |
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
|
* |
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
|
* the code are not to be removed. |
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
|
* |
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
|
* are met: |
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
|
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
|
* |
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
|
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
|
* |
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence |
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
|
|
|
#include <string.h> |
|
|
|
#include <openssl/asn1.h> |
|
#include <openssl/digest.h> |
|
#include <openssl/err.h> |
|
#include <openssl/mem.h> |
|
#include <openssl/obj.h> |
|
#include <openssl/stack.h> |
|
#include <openssl/x509.h> |
|
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
|
|
|
#include "../internal.h" |
|
#include "../x509v3/internal.h" |
|
#include "internal.h" |
|
|
|
|
|
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { |
|
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { |
|
return a->cert_info->issuer; |
|
} |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { |
|
return a->cert_info->subject; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { |
|
return a->cert_info->serialNumber; |
|
} |
|
|
|
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) { |
|
return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; |
|
} |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { |
|
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: |
|
// Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" |
|
// arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these |
|
// operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
|
// certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the |
|
// "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. |
|
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
|
// Fill in the |cert_hash| fields. |
|
// |
|
// TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all |
|
// zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but |
|
// not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent |
|
// comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we |
|
// retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See |
|
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); |
|
|
|
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
// Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date |
|
|
|
if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
|
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
|
if (ret < 0) { |
|
return -2; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
|
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
|
if (ret < 0) { |
|
return -2; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
|
|
|
if (ret) { |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
|
} |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { |
|
unsigned long ret = 0; |
|
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
|
|
|
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding |
|
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
|
if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
|
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & |
|
0xffffffffL; |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
|
// this is reasonably efficient. |
|
|
|
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { |
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
|
unsigned long ret = 0; |
|
unsigned char md[16]; |
|
|
|
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding |
|
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
|
// EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
|
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && |
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && |
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) { |
|
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
|
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & |
|
0xffffffffL; |
|
} |
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
|
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { |
|
if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
|
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 && |
|
X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) { |
|
return x509; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { |
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
|
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) { |
|
return x509; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { |
|
if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) { |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { |
|
if (!x) { |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { |
|
EVP_PKEY *xk; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
|
|
|
if (xk) { |
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
|
} else { |
|
ret = -2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
switch (ret) { |
|
case 1: |
|
break; |
|
case 0: |
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
|
break; |
|
case -1: |
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
|
break; |
|
case -2: |
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
|
} |
|
if (xk) { |
|
EVP_PKEY_free(xk); |
|
} |
|
if (ret > 0) { |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference |
|
// count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of |
|
// each X509 structure. |
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
|
STACK_OF(X509) *ret; |
|
size_t i; |
|
ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
|
X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); |
|
} |
|
return ret; |
|
}
|
|
|