Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖)
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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472 lines
13 KiB
472 lines
13 KiB
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
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#include <openssl/dh.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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#include <openssl/bn.h> |
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#include <openssl/err.h> |
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#include <openssl/digest.h> |
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#include <openssl/mem.h> |
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#include <openssl/thread.h> |
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#include "../../internal.h" |
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#include "../bn/internal.h" |
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#include "../service_indicator/internal.h" |
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#include "internal.h" |
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#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 |
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DH *DH_new(void) { |
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DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH)); |
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if (dh == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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OPENSSL_memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH)); |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock); |
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dh->references = 1; |
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return dh; |
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} |
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void DH_free(DH *dh) { |
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if (dh == NULL) { |
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return; |
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} |
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dh->references)) { |
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return; |
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} |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->p); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->g); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->q); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->j); |
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OPENSSL_free(dh->seed); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->counter); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key); |
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BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock); |
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OPENSSL_free(dh); |
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} |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->pub_key; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->priv_key; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return dh->p; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return dh->q; } |
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const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return dh->g; } |
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void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key, |
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const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) { |
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if (out_pub_key != NULL) { |
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*out_pub_key = dh->pub_key; |
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} |
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if (out_priv_key != NULL) { |
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*out_priv_key = dh->priv_key; |
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} |
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} |
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int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { |
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if (pub_key != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->pub_key); |
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dh->pub_key = pub_key; |
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} |
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if (priv_key != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->priv_key); |
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dh->priv_key = priv_key; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q, |
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const BIGNUM **out_g) { |
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if (out_p != NULL) { |
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*out_p = dh->p; |
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} |
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if (out_q != NULL) { |
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*out_q = dh->q; |
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} |
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if (out_g != NULL) { |
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*out_g = dh->g; |
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} |
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} |
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int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { |
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if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || |
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(dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (p != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->p); |
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dh->p = p; |
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} |
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if (q != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->q); |
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dh->q = q; |
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} |
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if (g != NULL) { |
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BN_free(dh->g); |
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dh->g = g; |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) { |
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dh->priv_length = priv_length; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { |
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boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
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int ok = 0; |
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int generate_new_key = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; |
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if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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priv_key = BN_new(); |
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if (priv_key == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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generate_new_key = 1; |
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} else { |
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priv_key = dh->priv_key; |
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} |
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if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { |
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pub_key = BN_new(); |
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if (pub_key == NULL) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} else { |
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pub_key = dh->pub_key; |
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} |
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock, |
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dh->p, ctx)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (generate_new_key) { |
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if (dh->q) { |
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if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 2, dh->q)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} else { |
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// secret exponent length |
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unsigned priv_bits = dh->priv_length; |
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if (priv_bits == 0) { |
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const unsigned p_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p); |
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if (p_bits == 0) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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priv_bits = p_bits - 1; |
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} |
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if (!BN_rand(priv_key, priv_bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dh->g, priv_key, dh->p, ctx, |
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dh->method_mont_p)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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dh->pub_key = pub_key; |
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dh->priv_key = priv_key; |
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ok = 1; |
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err: |
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if (ok != 1) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
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} |
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if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { |
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BN_free(pub_key); |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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BN_free(priv_key); |
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} |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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return ok; |
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} |
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static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key, |
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const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
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if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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int check_result; |
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if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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int ret = 0; |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!p_minus_1 || |
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!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock, |
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dh->p, ctx)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, |
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ctx, dh->method_mont_p) || |
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!BN_copy(p_minus_1, dh->p) || |
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!BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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// This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two. |
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if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 || |
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BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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ret = 1; |
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err: |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out, |
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const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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int dh_size = DH_size(dh); |
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int ret = -1; |
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BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (shared_key && |
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dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx) && |
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BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) { |
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ret = dh_size; |
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} |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
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boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
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return dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(out, peers_key, dh); |
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} |
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int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
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boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
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if (ctx == NULL) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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int ret = -1; |
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BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx)) { |
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ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out); |
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} |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
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size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key, |
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const EVP_MD *digest) { |
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*out_len = (size_t)-1; |
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const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest); |
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if (digest_len > max_out_len) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
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int ret = 0; |
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const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh); |
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uint8_t *shared_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len); |
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unsigned out_len_unsigned; |
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if (!shared_bytes || |
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// SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior |
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// to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies |
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// padding to the length of p. |
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// |
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// Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly |
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// advisable. |
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DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len || |
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!EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, NULL) || |
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out_len_unsigned != digest_len) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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*out_len = digest_len; |
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ret = 1; |
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err: |
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FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
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OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); } |
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unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); } |
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int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) { |
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references); |
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return 1; |
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} |
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DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048(void) { |
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// This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1, |
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// which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3. |
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static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = { |
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TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97), |
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TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2), |
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TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73), |
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TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff), |
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TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec), |
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TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19), |
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TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468), |
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TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61), |
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TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735), |
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TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77), |
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TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3), |
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TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561), |
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TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8), |
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TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb), |
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TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1), |
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TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), |
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}; |
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BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_p = BN_new(); |
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BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_q = BN_new(); |
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BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_g = BN_new(); |
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DH *const dh = DH_new(); |
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if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p, kFFDHE2048Data, |
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OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048Data)); |
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if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_p) || |
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!BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g, 2) || |
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!DH_set0_pqg(dh, ffdhe2048_p, ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_g)) { |
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goto err; |
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} |
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return dh; |
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err: |
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BN_free(ffdhe2048_p); |
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BN_free(ffdhe2048_q); |
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BN_free(ffdhe2048_g); |
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DH_free(dh); |
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return NULL; |
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}
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