OpenSSL added a bunch of these. oct2priv is a little weird (see
https://crbug.com/boringssl/534), but I've made it match OpenSSL and
set_private_key for now. But I think we should reduce the state-space a
bit.
EC_KEY_oct2priv behaves slightly differently from upstream OpenSSL in
one way: we reject inputs that aren't exactly the right size. This
matches the OpenSSL documentation (the OCTET STRING inside an
ECPrivateKey, per spec, is fixed-width), but not OpenSSL's behavior.
Update-note: see go/xshow when incorporating this change internally.
Change-Id: I33863d773ac4c7f3eabf4ffda157e8250c7fdbd9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55066
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Some third-party code requires it.
For now, I've just introduced a new hook on the method table. This is
rather goofy though. First, making EVP know about TLS is a layering
violation that OpenSSL introduced. They've since fixed this and added
EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key in OpenSSL 3.0, but callers expect the
TLS one to exist in OpenSSL 1.1.1, so implement that one.
Along the way, implement EC_KEY_oct2key from upstream, which is slightly
less tedious when you're already working in EC_KEY.
To make this third-party code work (and to write a test without dipping
out of EVP, or using the very tedious EVP_PKEY_paramgen API), we also
need to change EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters to work when the source EVP_PKEY
is empty, per upstream's 2986ecdc08016de978f1134315623778420b51e5.
OpenSSL's API has *multiple* levels of empty states to worry about!
Something to avoid when we get to rethinking this error-prone API.
Bug: b:238920520
Change-Id: I3fd99be560db313c1bf549a4e46ffccc31e746e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54905
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Our FIPS module only claims support for RSA signing/verification, and
|RSA_generate_key_fips| already performs a sign/verify pair-wise
consistency test (PCT). For ECDSA, |EC_KEY_generate_fips| performs a
sign/verify PCT too. But when |EC_KEY_generate_fips| is used for key
agreement a sign/verify PCT may not be correct.
The FIPS IG[1], page 60, says:
> Though not a CAST, a pairwise consistency test (PCT) shall be
> conducted for every generated public and private key pair for the
> applicable approved algorithm (per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section
> 7.10.3.3). To further clarify, at minimum, the PCT that is required by
> the underlying algorithm standard (e.g. SP 800- 56Arev3 or SP
> 800-56Brev2) shall be performed.
SP 800-56Ar3, page 36, says:
> For an ECC key pair (d, Q): Use the private key, d, along with the
> generator G and other domain parameters associated with the key pair,
> to compute dG (according to the rules of elliptic-curve arithmetic).
> Compare the result to the public key, Q. If dG is not equal to Q, then
> the pair-wise consistency test fails
But |EC_KEY_generate_fips| has always done that via
|EC_KEY_check_key|. So I believe that |EC_KEY_generate_fips| works for
either case.
This change documents that.
[1] FIPS 140-3 IG dated 2022-03-14 and with SHA-256
2f232f7f5839e3263284d71c35771c9fdf2e505b02813be999377030c56b37e4
Change-Id: I4b4e2ed92ae3d59e2f2404c41694abeb3eb283f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51988
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There are a lot of d2i and i2d functions, and there will be even more
once asn1.h and x509.h are properly documented. We currently replicate
the text in each, but as a result a miss a few points:
- The i2d outp != NULL, *outp == NULL case isn't documented at all.
- We should call out what to do with *inp after d2i.
- Unlike our rewritten functions, object reuse is still quite rampant
with the asn1.h functions. I hope we can get rid of that but, until we
can, it would be nice to describe it in one place.
While I'm here, update a few references to the latest PKCS#1 RFC, and
try to align how we reference ASN.1 structures a bit. The d2i/i2d
functions say "ASN.1, DER-encoded RSA private key" while the CBS/CBB
functions say "DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey structure".
Bug: 426
Change-Id: I8d9a7b0aef3d6d9c8240136053c3b1704b09fd41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49906
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley