Chiebot-Mirror/boringssl - boringssl - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
David Benjamin	8648c53690	Refer to RFCs consistently. We were a mix of "RFC1234" and "RFC 1234". Apparently there is actually an answer for this, which is with a space textually and without a space in the citation/reference tag: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7322#section-3.5 Change-Id: I0c44023163fe3a2a3ffe28cbc644d4c952dc8f1e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48965 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	47c5f9d2f6	Update ghashv8-armx.pl from upstream. This syncs this file up to e7ff223a20697e5a401d2d9bb7a75e699ed46633 from upstream's OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable branch. The main change of note is the 4x loop from upstream's 7ff2fa4b9281232f0ca1db03d42a954c462ef77d, 9ee020f8dc7813db82a119058d8f57e70e7e8904, aa7bf316980259a11dcbaf6128ed86d33dc24b97, and 603ebe03529101424670051aa0c616dc6e037b28. Benchmarks on a Pixel 4a. Before: Did 14069000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000042us (112.5 MB/sec) Did 6768000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000182us (866.2 MB/sec) Did 1902000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000479us (1283.5 MB/sec) Did 359000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2003942us (1467.6 MB/sec) Did 182000 AES-128-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2002245us (1489.3 MB/sec) Did 13388000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000144us (107.1 MB/sec) Did 6069000 AES-256-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000276us (776.7 MB/sec) Did 1638000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2001076us (1105.1 MB/sec) Did 305000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2000040us (1249.3 MB/sec) Did 155000 AES-256-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2009398us (1263.8 MB/sec) After: Did 13837000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000131us (110.7 MB/sec) [-1.7%] Did 7506000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000197us (960.7 MB/sec) [+10.9%] Did 2289000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000734us (1544.5 MB/sec) [+20.3%] Did 443000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2000321us (1814.2 MB/sec) [+23.6%] Did 225000 AES-128-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2002308us (1841.1 MB/sec) [+23.6%] Did 13280000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000011us (106.2 MB/sec) [-0.8%] Did 6630000 AES-256-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000229us (848.5 MB/sec) [+9.2%] Did 1916000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000373us (1293.1 MB/sec) [+17.0%] Did 365000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2001519us (1493.9 MB/sec) [+19.6%] Did 185000 AES-256-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2006588us (1510.5 MB/sec) [+19.5%] (See cl/387919990 for some notes I made in reviewing, though likely future me will find them incomprehensible anyway.) Change-Id: Id386e80143611487e07b2fbfda15d0abc54ea145 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48726 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	549e4e7995	Align with upstream on 'close STDOUT' lines. When upstreaming `c1d8c5b0e0` as https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and then https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930, we ended up diverging slightly: in the upstream version, I ended up applying the same change to the xlate files. Upstream also suggested "error closing STDOUT: $!". Apply the same changes here. Change-Id: I8a8cbc3944432e94a8844f9f628a900edfe77b30 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48725 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Florin Crișan	7a3e801217	fix #415 : Perl scripts fail when building from a path with spaces Because file names are not enclosed in quotation marks in the open call. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/boringssl/issues/detail?id=415 ``` cmake --build "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\." [9/439] Generating rdrand-x86_64.asm FAILED: crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.asm cmd.exe /C "cd /D "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\crypto\fipsmodule" && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E make_directory . && C:\Perl64\bin\perl.exe "C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl" nasm rdrand-x86_64.asm" Can't open perl script "C:/Projects/": No such file or directory error closing STDOUT at C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl line 87. ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. ``` Bug: 415 Change-Id: I83c4a460689b9adeb439425ad390322ae8b2002a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47884 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	ca4598781a	Move load/store helpers to crypto/internal.h. We have loads of variations of these. Align them in one set. This avoids the HOST_* macros defined by md32_common.h, so it'll be a little easier to make it a more conventional header. Change-Id: Id47fe7b51a8f961bd87839f8146d8a5aa8027aa6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46425 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	8d4c8fc41b	Make words in crypto/fipsmodule/modes actually words. It's a little confusing to have load_word_le but actually use size_t instead of crypto_word_t. NOTE: on some platforms, notably NaCl, crypto_word_t is larger than size_t. (Do we still need to support this?) We don't have a good testing story here, so I tested it by hacking up a 32-bit x86 build to think it was OPENSSL_64_BIT. Change-Id: Ia0ce469e86803f22655fe2d9659a6a5db766429f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46424 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	502fceede9	Test empty EVP_CIPHER inputs and fix exact memcpy overlap. See also 8129ac6ac4c0ca3a488c225cde580ede7dabe874 and 81198bf323ea9deda907714170d329ca7d2ff01f from upstream. In trying to figure out why ASan (which normally catches overlapping memcpys) didn't flag this, I noticed that we actually don't have tests for empty inputs. I've added them to cipher_tests.txt where missing and fixed a bad assert in ofb.c. ASan still doesn't flag this because LLVM even requires memcpy handle dst == src. Still, fixing it is less effort than getting a clear answer from GCC and MSVC. Though this puts us in the frustrating position of trying to follow a C rule that our main toolchain and sanitizer disavow. https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11763 https://reviews.llvm.org/D86993 Change-Id: I53c64a84834ddf5cddca0b3d53a29998f666ea2f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46285 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	b67732a163	aarch64: Remove some flavour conditionals This change is expected to be a non-functional change. Original request: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Change-Id: Ifbf85eb6cafebabf0cf063b7dd147417d01c280c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43584 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	a0b49d63fd	aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- \| Compiler \| -mbranch-protection \| Feature macros \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| clang \| 9.0.0 \| 11.0.0 \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| gcc \| 9 \| expected in 10.1+ \| ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	5 years ago
Adam Langley	fb0c05cac2	acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	5 years ago