Node seems uncommonly sensitive to this, so let's write these functions
in a way that stays in sync and test this. See also
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49585
This does incur a cost across all BoringSSL consumers that use these
functions: as a result of Node indiscriminately exposing every cipher,
we end up pulling more and more ciphers into these getters. But that
ship sailed long ago, so, instead, document that EVP_get_cipherby*
should not be used by size-conscious callers.
EVP_get_digestby* probably should have the same warning, but I've left
it alone for now because we don't quite have the same proliferation of
digests as ciphers. (Though there are things in there, like MD4, that
ought to be better disconnected.)
Change-Id: I61ca406c146279bd05a52bed6c57200d1619c5da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds a check to EVP_get_cipherbyname which ensures that name
is not null when passed to OPENSSL_strcasecmp, which cannot handle
null values.
OpenSSL already ensures this in their implementation of
EVP_get_cipherbyname by using OBJ_NAME_get, so this improves parity.
Change-Id: Icea45a5da2a7a461d2a65fbfbc84653c4f124dab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47844
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
David Benjamin
Shelley Vohr
Adam Langley