Matching Chromium, Go, and TLS 1.3, only allow SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512 RSA-PSS signatures, where MGF-1 and message hash match and salt
length is hash length. Sadly, we are stuck tolerating an explicit
trailerField for now. See the certificates in cl/362617931.
This also fixes an overflow bug in handling the salt length. On
platforms with 64-bit long and 32-bit int, we would misinterpret, e.g,
2^62 + 32 as 32. Also clean up the error-handling of maskHash. It was
previously handled in a very confusing way; syntax errors in maskHash
would succeed and only be noticed later, in rsa_mgf1_decode.
I haven't done it in this change, but as a followup, we can, like
Chromium, reduce X.509 signature algorithms down to a single enum.
Update-Note: Unusual RSA-PSS combinations in X.509 are no longer
accepted. This same change (actually a slightly stricter version) has
already landed in Chrome.
Bug: 489
Change-Id: I85ca3a4e14f76358cac13e66163887f6dade1ace
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53865
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CPython uses this function.
Change-Id: I03ead7f54ad19e2a0b2ea3b142298cc1e55c3c90
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53967
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A later CL will tighten up SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN handling. In
preparation for this, test that SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown can trigger
SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN.
Bug: 507
Change-Id: Ib50a02c514673ad4b73540934480d54b372d9505
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53945
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL renamed X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack to
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack. This name is a partially an
improvement as this is a setter, and partially a setback. The "set0"
name is a bit misleading.
set0 is narrowly correct, in that this function does not adjust
refcounts. But usually set0 functions don't adjust refcounts because
they take ownership of the input. This function does not. It simply
borrows the pointer and assumes it will remain valid for the duration of
X509_STORE_CTX.
OpenSSL also renamed X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain to
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted. I've declined to add that one for now, in
hopes that we can remove both functions. From what I can tell, there's
no point in ever using either function. It's redundant with the last
parameter to X509_STORE_CTX_init.
Change-Id: I0ef37ba56a2feece6f927f033bdcb4671225dc6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53966
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. cryptography.io binds it. They don't
actually use it, but this is a useful feature to have anyway. Projects
like Envoy currently implement such a mode with
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb, which is a very problematic API to support.
Add this so we can move them to something more sustainable.
Change-Id: Iaff2d08daa743e0b5f4be261cb785fdcd26a8281
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53965
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
More OpenSSL compatibility functions.
Change-Id: I8e9429fcbc3e285f4c4ad9bdf4c1d9d3c73c3064
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53925
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This runs through much the same code as the TLS 1.3 bits, though we use
a different hint field to avoid mixups between the fields. (Otherwise
the receiver may misinterpret a decryptPSK hint as the result of
decrypting the session_ticket extension, or vice versa. This could
happen if a ClientHello contains both a PSK and a session ticket.)
Bug: 504
Change-Id: I968bafe12120938e6e46e52536efd552b12c66a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53805
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than documenting the private sk_new_null, etc., APIs and then
expecting callers to infer the real API, describe a real sample API
under #if 0.
Also rename the function pointers to sk_FOO_whatever, which both matches
OpenSSL and reduces the namespaces we squat. The generic callback types
I've renamed to OPENSSL_sk_whatever, to similarly match OpenSSL. We
should also rename plain sk_whatever, but that'll require fixing some
downstream code.
Bug: 499
Change-Id: I49d250958d40858cb49eeee2aad38a17a63add87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I1cf99586d72ee9c01e99ca6baa6479e5dd2aef5d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53787
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53007
inadvertently changed the semantics of SSL_load_client_CA_file slightly.
The original implementation, by delaying allocating ret, would fail
rather than return an empty list.
Fix this and add a test. We don't have much support for testing
filesystem-related things yet, so I've just used /dev/null and gated it
to Linux + macOS for now. If we need it later, we can add temporary file
support to the test_support library.
Change-Id: If77dd493a433819a65378d76cf400cce48c0abaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This syscall is required by generatekey in keystore.
Signed-off-by: Liu Cunyuan <liucunyuan.lcy@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Han <han_mao@linux.alibaba.com>
Change-Id: I4dd0534daa6cfa52429e5bf398679fccb7d67e7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Tests can now be run either in a local build or on an attached
device. The script tries to infer the correct mode of operation
but it can also be specified on the command line.
Test: Ran break-tests.sh in both modes
Change-Id: I515ac0cede23e2cb775b99e0af8108a3ce0bde37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53585
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The C11 change has survived for three months now. Let's start freely
using static_assert. In C files, we need to include <assert.h> because
it is a macro. In C++ files, it is a keyword and we can just use it. (In
MSVC C, it is actually also a keyword as in C++, but close enough.)
I moved one assert from ssl3.h to ssl_lib.cc. We haven't yet required
C11 in our public headers, just our internal files.
Change-Id: Ic59978be43b699f2c997858179a9691606784ea5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53665
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
We only care about dates within years 0000 to 9999 for
RFC5280. timegm() is only semi-standard. Some things require the
setting awkward defines to get libc to give it to you. Other things
let you have it but make it stop working at year 3000. Still other
things have 32 bit time_t.....
Let's just make our own that actually works. all the time, does
everything with an int64_t, and fails if you want to send something
out that would overflow a 32 bit time_t.
In the process of doing this, we get rid of the old Julian date stuff
from OpenSSL, which while functional was a bit awkward dealing only
with days, and using the Julian calendar as the reference point instead of potentially something more useful. Julian seconds since Jan 1 1970
00:00:00 UCT are much more useful to us than Julian days since a
Julian epoch.
The OS implementations of timegm() and gmtime() also can be pretty
complex, due to the nature of needing multiple timezone, daylight
saving, day of week, and other stuff we simply do not need for
doing things with certificate times. A small microbenchmark of
10000000 of each operation comparing this implementation to
the system version on my M1 mac gives:
bbe-macbookpro:tmp bbe$ time ./openssl_gmtime
real 0m0.152s
user 0m0.127s
sys 0m0.018s
bbe-macbookpro:tmp bbe$ time ./gmtime
real 0m0.422s
user 0m0.403s
sys 0m0.014s
bbe-macbookpro:tmp bbe$ time ./openssl_timegm
real 0m0.041s
user 0m0.015s
sys 0m0.019s
bbe-macbookpro:tmp bbe$ time ./timegm
real 0m30.432s
user 0m30.383s
sys 0m0.040s
Similarly On a glinux machine:
bbe@bbe-glinux1:~$ time ./openssl_gmtime
real 0m0.157s
user 0m0.152s
sys 0m0.008s
bbe@bbe-glinux1:~$ time ./gmtime
real 0m0.336s
user 0m0.336s
sys 0m0.002s
bbe@bbe-glinux1:~$ time ./openssl_timegm
real 0m0.018s
user 0m0.019s
sys 0m0.002s
bbe@bbe-glinux1:~$ time ./timegm
real 0m0.680s
user 0m0.671s
sys 0m0.011s
bbe@bbe-glinux1:~$
Bug: 501
Change-Id: If445272d365f2c9673b5f3264d082af1a342e0a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53245
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This works correctly, but part of implementing SSL_write_ex will, if not
done correctly, regress this. Specifically, if the read_shutdown check
in SSL_get_error were not conditioned on ret == 0, the last
SSL_get_error in the test would mistakenly classify the write error as
SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN.
Add a regression test in advance.
Bug: 507
Change-Id: I8ddb4606e291977506ee81f4ed11427e5b1636d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53626
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We still have our <= 0 return values because anything with BIOs tries to
preserve BIO_write's error returns. (Maybe we can stop doing this?
BIO_read's error return is a little subtle with EOF vs error, but
BIO_write's is uninteresting.) But the rest of the logic is size_t-clean
and hopefully a little clearer. We still have to support SSL_write's
rather goofy calling convention, however.
I haven't pushed Spans down into the low-level record construction logic
yet. We should probably do that, but there are enough offsets tossed
around there that they warrant their own CL.
Bug: 507
Change-Id: Ia0c702d1a2d3713e71b0bbfa8d65649d3b20da9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47544
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This reverts commit 4259ae8198.
Some Android builders perhaps lack getrandom support.
Change-Id: Ic7537c07dacb31a54adb453ddd5f82a789089eaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53625
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When seeding a DRBG for the first time we currently make two reads: one
to start the CRNGT and a second to read the actual seed. These reads can
be merged to save I/O.
Change-Id: I2a83edf7f3c8b9d6cebcde02195845be9fde19b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52526
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This flag is currently set if DRBG entropy is obtained from RDRAND. It
indicates that we should add kernel entropy when seeding the DRBG. But
this might be true for methods other than RDRAND in the future so this
change renames it accordingly.
Change-Id: I91826178a806e3c6dadebbb844358a7a12e0b09b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52525
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Follow-up work will add support for TLS 1.2 ticket decryption.
Bug: 504
Change-Id: Ieaee37d94562040f1d51227216359bd63db15198
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53525
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
b95124305a readded 3DES support in acvptool, but not in
modulewrapper because we don't want it for BoringSSL itself. But without
modulewrapper support, the tests don't work. Support could be backported
into testmodulewrapper but it doesn't seem worthwhile for a few more
months support.
Change-Id: I4e7ace66f9ac1915996db7dfdeeb7e9d4969915f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53607
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
p256-armv8-asm.pl defined ecp_nistz256_[to|from]_mont as global
functions, but p256-nistz.h defined them as static inlines.
Additionally, ecp_nistz256_to_mont was never used.
This change drops the assembly versions and drops ecp_nistz256_to_mont
completely.
Change-Id: Ie2cc5bf4adc423f72f61cf227be0e93c9a6e2031
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53606
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
27ffcc6e19 switched the integrity check to using SHA-256, but the
Aarch64 FIPS build was still passing -sha256 to inject_hash.go.
Change-Id: I641de17d62205c7f127cd2a910d4e98778d492e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This is split out from
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47544 just to
get the bugfixes and tests out of the way of the refactor.
If we trip the SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH check in tls_write_app_data, wnum is set
to zero. But wnum should only be cleared on a successful write. It
tracks the number of input bytes that have been written to the transport
but not yet reported to the caller. Instead, move it to the success
return in that function. All the other error paths already set it to
something else.
Change-Id: Ib22f9cf04454ecdb0062077f183be5070ab7d791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53545
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
On non-ELF platforms, WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC expands to a static variable. On
ASan, we don't use sdallocx. Clang then warns about an unused static
variable. Silence the warning.
Change-Id: I3d53519b669d435f3801f45e4b72c6ca4cd27a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53565
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Nothing calls this function, it doesn't support most key types, and
accesses pkey.rsa without checking the type. Just remove it.
Change-Id: I073dfe74c545c7e08578b85105c88a19bbddf58a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53505
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
CPython uses this function. Our implementation is slightly weird since
it leaks the clamping behavior, but probably not a big deal.
Update-Note: When this is merged into the internal repository, we can
simplify the CPython patches.
Change-Id: I291ddf852fb463bf02998fe04d0d0e8cb358dc55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53485
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Support is still needed for ACVP until 2023
Change-Id: Ia131a85bc06e7c61c823f1b3c021e2625a8769c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53465
Reviewed-by: Corie Pressley <cpressley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Our TLS 1.3 stack predates OpenSSL's. We chose TLS1_TXT_* to align with
the existing names. OpenSSL made a new convention, TLS1_3_RFC_*. Match
them.
Similar to 53425
Change-Id: I8737d98c9c1d5c201c4726739ddcbe96123d9370
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53445
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Our TLS 1.3 stack predates OpenSSL's. We chose TLS1_CK_* to align with
the existing names. OpenSSL made a new convention, TLS1_3_CK_*. Match
them.
This means that, in the likely event that TLS 1.4 uses the same
constants, they'll have weird names, just as several of our constants
still say SSL3_* but it doesn't particularly matter.
Change-Id: I97f29b224d0d282e946344e4b907f2df2be39ce1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53425
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
I haven't done the i2d/d2i functions yet, since we haven't talked about
how extensions can be known to the library. Also X509_REVOKED still
needs a home.
Bug: 407
Change-Id: I19fb600ccfda5528728849a42a957803b350b5c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53337
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Some of these were non-const because dup functions weren't
const-correct, but they are now. Once nuisance is the accessors. Ideally
they'd return non-const pointers, but that'll break OpenSSL consumers.
Bug: 407
Change-Id: I52b939a846b726d1d84dd2d5fdf71a7a7284d49e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53336
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Some don't have sections to go with yet, but will later.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: I903a8bf8c33cdc026a79601a8fd37469c839fa00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53335
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Although it contains an X509_NAME (by way of GENERAL_NAME), the
GENERAL_NAME field does not participate in serialization, so it is
actually const.
Bug: 407
Change-Id: I299815789744597e2b355cb0b996ba90c3b6a72f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53334
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I can't find any users of these APIs. If we remove them, the only
publicly exposed operation on PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO becomes
EVP_PKCS82PKEY. We can then parse it without a dependency on the legacy
ASN.1 stack.
While I'm here, remove the callback on the structure. OPENSSL_free
automatically calls OPENSSL_cleanse in BoringSSL, so the call is
redundant.
Update-Note: Removed some unused accessors.
Change-Id: I400748463abe3c28dfa42ae9de9be59cb76cd2b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53332
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There's a lot of these, so toss them into a corner somewhere.
I've added a note to note to discourage using them with memory BIOs.
Memory BIOs are, by far, the most common use I've seen for i2d_*_bio and
d2i_*_bio. It works, but it's unnecessary.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: I8645207a4ac9f1223d0739b5351c99a55400195f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53331
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
It doesn't hash the SPKI, just the BIT STRING in it.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: Ib5b8f14f530cc8045a60ac1e9780779d90f5a3bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53330
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Update-Note: Suite B flags in the X.509 stack are no longer supported.
This isn't expected to affect anything but bindings wrapping unused
options.
Change-Id: Ia0770e545d34e041ab995e80ea11b4dd4a5e47ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53329
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was originally added for the openssl command-line utility and
otherwise is not very useful. I found no callers, so drop it.
Update-Note: An unused function was removed.
Change-Id: I12aa314fd3d8f1dad79eb5a07e0dea662dd9b4a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53328
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL has a large exported API surface for exporting the policy tree
out of an X509_STORE_CTX. As far as I can tell, no one uses any of these
APIs. Remove them.
Update-Note: It is no longer possibly to see the policy tree after an
X.509 verification. As far as we can tell, this feature is unused.
Change-Id: Ieab374774805e90106555ce4e4155f8451ceb5b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53327
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Unfortunately, these functions are not const-correct, even the
accessors. Document what they should have been, especially since
mutating an X509_NAME_ENTRY directly won't even update the 'modified'
bit correctly.
Do a pass at adding consts to our code internally, but since the
functions return non-const pointers, this isn't checked anywhere. And
since serializing an X509_NAME is not always thread-safe, there's a
limit to how much we can correctly mark things as const.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: Ifa3d8bafb5396fbe7b91416f234de4585284c705
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53326
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The X509_NAME representation is a little odd because it flattens the
RDN sequence, but maintains RDN indices (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set) to recover
the information. add_entry and delete_entry both have logic to maintain
invariants. Test that they work.
Change-Id: I7d4a033db0a82a1f13888bbfca29076b589cc214
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53325
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL calls the timestamp on the CRL lastUpdate, but it's actually
called thisUpdate in RFC 5280.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: I8a34f3de24e1914eda17d300321febe0205b2ec1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53310
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
David Benjamin
Mao Han
Pete Bentley
Adam Langley
Bob Beck
Adam Langley