Chiebot-Mirror/boringssl - boringssl - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
David Benjamin	549e4e7995	Align with upstream on 'close STDOUT' lines. When upstreaming `c1d8c5b0e0` as https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and then https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930, we ended up diverging slightly: in the upstream version, I ended up applying the same change to the xlate files. Upstream also suggested "error closing STDOUT: $!". Apply the same changes here. Change-Id: I8a8cbc3944432e94a8844f9f628a900edfe77b30 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48725 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Florin Crișan	7a3e801217	fix #415 : Perl scripts fail when building from a path with spaces Because file names are not enclosed in quotation marks in the open call. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/boringssl/issues/detail?id=415 ``` cmake --build "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\." [9/439] Generating rdrand-x86_64.asm FAILED: crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.asm cmd.exe /C "cd /D "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\crypto\fipsmodule" && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E make_directory . && C:\Perl64\bin\perl.exe "C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl" nasm rdrand-x86_64.asm" Can't open perl script "C:/Projects/": No such file or directory error closing STDOUT at C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl line 87. ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. ``` Bug: 415 Change-Id: I83c4a460689b9adeb439425ad390322ae8b2002a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47884 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	597ffef971	Make md32_common.h single-included and use an unsized helper for SHA-256. Similar to https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46405, SHA256_Final and SHA224_Final hit array size warnings in the new GCC. The array sizes are, strictly speaking, purely decoration, but this is a good warning so we should be clean with it on. That same change is difficult to apply to md32_common.h because md32_common.h generates the functions for us. md32_common.h is already strange in that it is multiply-included and changes behavior based on macros defined by the caller. Instead, replace it with inline functions, which are a bit more conventional and typesafe. This allows each hash function to define the function prototype. Use this to add an unsized helper for SHA-256. Bug: 402 Change-Id: I61bc30fb58c54dd40a55c9b1ebf3fb9adde5e038 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47807 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Foley <pefoley@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	4320bc4761	Pull HASH_TRANSFORM out of md32_common.h. The macro isn't doing any work here. Change-Id: Id97dfa4b027407c5e4b3e7eb1586c3c2a2d977d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47806 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	ca4598781a	Move load/store helpers to crypto/internal.h. We have loads of variations of these. Align them in one set. This avoids the HOST_* macros defined by md32_common.h, so it'll be a little easier to make it a more conventional header. Change-Id: Id47fe7b51a8f961bd87839f8146d8a5aa8027aa6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46425 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	a24ab549e6	Use an unsized helper for truncated SHA-512 variants. Although it is strictly fine to call SHA512_Final in SHA384_Final (array sizes in C parameters are purely decorational, according to the language), GCC 11 reportedly checks now and gets upset about the size mismatch. Use an unsized helper function so all our code matches the specified bounds. Unfortunately, the bounds in all the functions are a bit misleading because SHA512_Final really outputs based on sha->md_len (which Init function you called) rather than which Final function. I've fixed this places within a library where we mismatched and added asserts to the smaller functions. SHA512_Final is assert-less because I've seen lots of code use SHA384_Init / SHA512_Update / SHA512_Final. This doesn't fix the SHA256 variant since that is generated by a pile of macros in a multiply-included file. This is probably a good opportunity to make that code less macro-heavy. Update-Note: There is a small chance the asserts will trip something, but hopefully not since I've left SHA512_Final alone. Bug: 402 Change-Id: I4c9d579a63ee0a0dea103c19ef219c13bb9aa62c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46405 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	a6b6b804a0	Align armv8.pl references to OPENSSL_armcap_P. This imports d741debb320bf54e8575d35603a44d4eb40fa1f9 from upstream. We've been managing the shared libraries already because our arm-xlate.pl automatically adds .hidden to .extern lines, but nice to reduce the diff. (This does result in some duplicate .hidden lines in the generated output, but we still want the arm-xlate.pl patch to automatically hide .globl.) Removing .comm lines does change the generated output, but having each asm file define its own copy of OPENSSL_armcap_P as a common symbol always seemed odd. I recall some weird issue where the armv4.pl files subtly rely on it for iOS's strange .indirect_symbol machinery. (Not actually because iOS wants a common symbol but because arm-xlate.pl repurposes .comm to trigger .indirect_symbol.) Fortunately, aarch64 is much better about PC-relative addressing, so it should be a no-op. The .comm lines have also previously caused weird issues (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/32324), so it's generally nice to get rid of them. Update-Note: If aarch64 builds get some weird error about relocations, it's this CL's fault. Change-Id: I763ffa6cda750d99694ded8a5b68d7b27b09cfc9 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44464 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	a0b49d63fd	aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- \| Compiler \| -mbranch-protection \| Feature macros \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| clang \| 9.0.0 \| 11.0.0 \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| gcc \| 9 \| expected in 10.1+ \| ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	5 years ago
Adam Langley	fb0c05cac2	acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	5 years ago