Chiebot-Mirror/boringssl - boringssl - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
David Benjamin	c65543b7a9	Make RSA_check_key more than 2x as fast. The bulk of RSA_check_key is spent in bn_div_consttime, which is a naive but constant-time long-division algorithm for the few places that divide by a secret even divisor: RSA keygen and RSA import. RSA import is somewhat performance-sensitive, so pick some low-hanging fruit: The main observation is that, in all but one call site, the bit width of the divisor is public. That means, for an N-bit divisor, we can skip the first N-1 iterations of long division because an N-1-bit remainder cannot exceed the N-bit divisor. One minor nuisance is bn_lcm_consttime, used in RSA keygen has a case that does not have a public bit width. Apply the optimization there would leak information. I've implemented this as an optional public lower bound on num_bits(divisor), which all but that call fills in. Before: Did 5060 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 1058526us (4780.2 ops/sec) Did 1551 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 1082343us (1433.0 ops/sec) After: Did 11532 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 1084145us (10637.0 ops/sec) [+122.5%] Did 3542 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 1036374us (3417.7 ops/sec) [+138.5%] Bug: b/192484677 Change-Id: I893ebb8886aeb8200a1a365673b56c49774221a2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49106 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	940475da0c	Be clearer which signing inputs are digests. We usually call the parameter 'digest', but people sometimes think they can skip the hashing for short inputs are short. I also suspect the term 'digest' is less common. Add warnings about this. There were also some cases where we called it 'in' and even 'msg'. This CL fixes those to say 'digest'. Finally, RSA_{sign,verify}_raw are documented to be building blocks of signature schemes, rather than signature schemes themselves. It's unfortunate that EVP_PKEY_sign means "sign a digest", while EVP_DigestSign means "sign, likely internally digesting it as the first step", but we're a bit stuck there. Change-Id: I4c38afff9b6196e2789cf27653fe5e5e8c68c1bf Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47504 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	29507b8184	Validate RSA public keys more consistently. https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504 aligned RSA private key checks, but I missed the public key ones. We have two different sets of RSA public key checks right now. One in the parser just checks for e = 1 and even e. The other, when using the key, checks for overly large e and n. Align the two. Now parsing RSA public keys calls RSA_check_key and the extra checks on e are added to RSA_check_key. Note RSA private key parsing already called RSA_check_key. The consequences are: First, RSA public keys with large n, large e, or n < e will be rejected at parse time. Previously, they would be parsed but all operations on them would fail. This aligns with our existing behavior for parsing private keys. Second, operations on RSA public keys with even e will fail. They already failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such a key. Previously, operations wouldn't explicitly fail, but they wouldn't do anything useful because even exponents are not invertible. (Encrypting would produce something undecryptable and the private key would have a hard time reliably producing signatures we'd accept.) There is no change to RSA private keys with even e. Those would already fail the (e, d) consistency check and the fault check. Third, operations on RSA public keys with e = 1 will fail. They already failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such a key and "verify" signatures or "encrypt" messages. However, with e = 1, those operations are no-ops. Finally, RSA private keys with e = d = 1 will be rejected at parse and use. This is the only case that affects private keys because e = d = 1 are inverses, just pointless. Uses paired with RSA public key parsing (e.g. our TLS library checks consistency with a certificate public key) are not affected. Those already rejected such keys because we rejected them in the public key parser. This CL aligns the private half. This doesn't close https://crbug.com/boringssl/316, but we won't be able to resolve that without a consistent story for what keys are valid. Update-Note: See above. Bug: 316 Change-Id: Ic27df18c4f48e5e3e57a17d6fe39399e2f8d5c68 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47524 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Adam Langley	455b78d5f9	PWCT failures should clear the generated key. It's insufficient to signal an error when the PWCT fails. We additionally need to ensure that the invalid key material is not returned. Change-Id: Ic5ff719a688985a61c52540ce6d1ed279a493d27 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44306 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
Adam Langley	80e3f957e4	Support 4096-bit keys in FIPS mode. Change-Id: I9aa66109bd0f6acc0c30a505eef6d85b6972132d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43624 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	9372f38cd0	Bound RSA and DSA key sizes better. Most asymmetric operations scale superlinearly, which makes them potential DoS vectors. This (and other problems) are mitigated with fixed sizes, like RSA-2048, P-256, or curve25519. In older algorithms like RSA and DSA, these sizes are conventions rather than well-defined algorithms. "Everyone" uses RSA-2048, but code which imports an RSA key may see an arbitrary key size, possibly from an untrusted source. This is commonly a public key, so we bound RSA key sizes in check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes. However, some applications import external private keys, and may need tighter bounds. These typically parse the key then check the result. However, parsing itself can perform superlinear work (RSA_check_key or recovering the DSA public key). This CL does the following: - Rename check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes to rsa_check_public_key and additionally call it from RSA_check_key. - Fix a bug where RSA_check_key, on CRT-less keys, did not bound d, and bound p and q before multiplying (quadratic). - Our DSA verifier had stricter checks on q (160-, 224-, and 256-bit only) than our DSA signer (multiple of 8 bits). Aligner the signer to the verifier's checks. - Validate DSA group sizes on parse, as well as priv_key < q, to bound the running time. Ideally these invariants would be checked exactly once at construction, but our RSA and DSA implementations suffer from some OpenSSL's API mistakes (https://crbug.com/boringssl/316), which means it is hard to consistently enforce invariants. This CL focuses on the parser, but later I'd like to better rationalize the freeze_private_key logic. Performance of parsing RSA and DSA keys, gathered on my laptop. Did 15130 RSA-2048 parse operations in 5022458us (3012.5 ops/sec) Did 4888 RSA-4096 parse operations in 5060606us (965.9 ops/sec) Did 354 RSA-16384 parse operations in 5043565us (70.2 ops/sec) Did 88 RSA-32768 parse operations in 5038293us (17.5 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL] Did 35000 DSA-1024/256 parse operations in 5030447us (6957.6 ops/sec) Did 11316 DSA-2048/256 parse operations in 5094664us (2221.1 ops/sec) Did 5488 DSA-3072/256 parse operations in 5096032us (1076.9 ops/sec) Did 3172 DSA-4096/256 parse operations in 5041220us (629.2 ops/sec) Did 840 DSA-8192/256 parse operations in 5070616us (165.7 ops/sec) Did 285 DSA-10000/256 parse operations in 5004033us (57.0 ops/sec) Did 74 DSA-20000/256 parse operations in 5066299us (14.6 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL] Update-Note: Some invalid or overly large RSA and DSA keys may previously have been accepted that are now rejected at parse time. For public keys, this only moves the error from verification to parsing. In some private key cases, we would previously allow signing with those keys, but the resulting signatures would not be accepted by BoringSSL anyway. This CL makes us behave more consistently. Bug: oss-fuzz:24730 Change-Id: I4ad2003ee61138b693e65d3da4c6aa00bc165251 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	5 years ago
Adam Langley	fb0c05cac2	acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	5 years ago