These are a bit of a mess. Callers almost never handle the error
correctly.
Change-Id: I85ea6d4c03cca685f0be579459efb66fea996c9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When generating a signature with some external signing process, the
caller needs to fill in the TBSCertificate (including the signature
algorithms), serialize the TBSCertificate, and then fill in the
signature.
We have i2d_re_X509_tbs (originally from CT I believe), but there are no
setters for the signature algorithms or the signature. Add
X509_set1_signature_algo, which mirrors upstream's
X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo, and X509_set1_signature_value, which is
new. Upstream has X509_REQ_set0_signature, but that requires the caller
manually assemble an ASN1_BIT_STRING. Taking the byte string seems less
error-prone.
Additionally, add i2d_X509_tbs and i2d_X509_CRL_tbs, for the non-"re"
variants of those APIs. Conscrypt needs to extract the TBS portion of a
certificate and a CRL, to implement X509Certificate.getTBSCertificate()
and X509CRL.getTBSCertList(). There, the aim is to get the data to
verify on an existing immutable certificate. OpenSSL has avoided
exporting the X509_CINF type, which I think is correct, so instead this
mirrors i2d_re_X509_tbs. (This does mean mirroring the confusing i2d
calling convention though.)
These new functions should unblock getting rid of a bunch of direct
struct accesses.
Later on, we should reorganize this header into immutable APIs for
verification and mutable APIs for generation. Even though we're stuck
the mistake of a common type for both use cases, I think splitting up
them up will let us rationalize the caches in the X509 objects a bit.
Change-Id: I96e6ab5cee3608e07b2ed7465c449a72ca10a393
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43784
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For FIPS reasons, one might wish to ensure that a random AES-GCM nonce
was generated entirely within the FIPS module. If so, then these are the
AEADs for you.
Change-Id: Ic2b7864b089f446401f700d7d55bfa6336c61e23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43686
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
QUICHE has a switch-case converting ssl_early_data_reason_t to a string
for logging. This causes a lot of churn when we add a new value.
Instead, add a function for this. Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION so we can
easily land a CL in QUICHE to start using the function without
coordinating repositories.
Change-Id: I176ca07b4f75a3ea7153a387219459665062aad9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43724
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
With -Wundef one could get warnings of undefined symbols.
This patch tries to fix this issue.
Furthermore, the case where there is BTI but no Pointer Authentication
now uses GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI in the check which should correctly
reflect that feature's enabled state.
Change-Id: I14902a64e5f403c2b6a117bc9f5fb1a4f4611ebf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43524
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Original CL by svaldez, reworked by davidben.)
Change-Id: I8570808fa5e96a1c9e6e03c4877039a22e73254f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42404
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL synchronizes bio->next_bio and ssl->rbio with a variety of
callbacks, so BIO_copy_next_retry worked. We do not, so attempting to
flush the BIO crashed.
The SSL BIO is a compatibility hack and intentionally much more limited,
so start by just copying things from the right BIO directly. Add a basic
unit test for SSL BIOs. If we need to, we can implement a more complex
synchronization later.
Additionally reject reconfiguring an SSL BIO because that will leak the
object right now.
Change-Id: I724c95ab6f1a3a1aa1889b0483c81ce3bdc534ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43424
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
DES being deprecated is hopefully well-established enough that no one is
going start complaining our implementation isn't constant-time. But I
think this is the only non-constant-time code left without a warning, so
add one for completeness.
(It is possible to implement DES with bitslicing, but 3DES TLS ciphers
are too slow as it is and hopefully not long for the world.)
Change-Id: I6b0de915e89ffe2d11372f7109642fcff44b11bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See b/169780122. This CL should be a no-op (the only other OPENSSL_LINUX
defines are in urandom/getrandom logic, which Trusty doesn't use), but
should be easier to work for future code.
Change-Id: I7676ce234a20ddaf54a881f2da1e1fcd680d1c78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Bumping OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.1 pulled in a few more to
define for compatibility.
Change-Id: I596c537d230f126dd53e8abe32c5132968a54826
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In upstream, this returns a const pointer, so we should match.
Update-Note: Callers may need to update their calls of
X509_get0_extensions, but I believe everything affected has been fixed.
Change-Id: Ic92660e18868cc681399ba4fc3f47ea1796fb164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.1, and wpa_supplicant expects us to
have it. We had this same function as SSL_CIPHER_get_value (to match
SSL_get_cipher_by_value). Align with upstream's name.
It seems we also had a ssl_cipher_get_value lying around, so fold them
together. (I've retained the assert in ssl_cipher_get_value as it seems
reasonable enough; casting a hypothetical SSLv2 cipher ID to uint16_t
would not behave correctly.)
Change-Id: Ifbec460435bbc483f2c3de988522e321f2708172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42966
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Changes:
- Remove point prefixes.
- Don't verify SRR on the client.
TODO:
- Replace SRR generation with RR generation on issuer.
- Add finalized PrivacyPass version.
Change-Id: Ibfb04aaba2cf669639af77299da22ab668175edb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42824
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Conscrypt will need these functions. Also fix a bug in
X509_get_extension_flags's error-handling. While I'm here, add
X509_CRL_get0_extensions for completeness. Nothing uses this yet, but
this could later be an alternative to avoid Conscrypt's mess with
templates.
Change-Id: I9393b75fcf53346535e6a4712355be081baa630d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42744
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is needed to fix all the config APIs to take const char *. I've
split it out as it's the only incompatible half of the change.
Update-Note: External definitions of X509V3_CONF_METHOD will need fix
the types of their functions. There should not be any of these (probably
hide this struct), but if there are, this aligns with upstream OpenSSL.
Change-Id: I6e760cfbca5d3f408215b8f3744acd1fd7f31391
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42727
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With TLS 1.3 and Ed25519 support, we're much closer to OpenSSL 1.1.1
these days than OpenSSL 1.1.0. I've also added a test to keep
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER and OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT in sync.
Update-Note: Some OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL checks may
need to be updated. Hopefully even more can go away.
Bug: 367
Change-Id: Idaa238b74f35993c9c03fec31f1346c15cf82968
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42864
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is unused and quite unsafe.
Update-Note: Use ASN1_STRING_set instead, though this function appears
to be unused.
Change-Id: Ie6f4dec4b9e11ebde95b322ef91e1b8d63fbb8af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although extensions are accessible via X509_get_ext_d2i, OpenSSL's X509
object carries caches of a number of extensions. OpenSSL added accessors
for some of these in 1.1.0 (X509_get0_subject_key_id) and 1.1.1d (the
others), so mirror this. Note that, although they look like simpler
getters, the error-handling is tricky.
(For now I'm just looking to mirror OpenSSL's accessors and finally make
the structs opaque. Go's x509.Certificate structure also recognizes a
collection of built-in certificate fields, but error-handling is in the
parser. That could be one path out of this cached fields mess, at the
cost of making the parse operation do more work.)
Change-Id: I051512aa296bd103229ba6eb2b5639d79e9eb63f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42624
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These aren't used within the verifier and no one ever extracts them.
Update-Note: Parsers for these two extensions are removed. Parsing the
types directly or passing NID_sxnet and NID_pkey_usage_period into
X509V3_get_d2i, or *_get_ext_d2i will no longer work.
Change-Id: I359e64466fd0c042eda45c41cbc0843ebb04df9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42585
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Actually making crypto/asn1 and crypto/x509 const-correct will be a tall
order, between all the hidden caches, non-const ASN.1 macros, and
ambiguity between mutable and immutable getters. But upstream
const-corrected a number of things, so align with them. (In particular,
it is not currently possible to usefully use a non-const X509_NAME.)
I think I've gotten most of x509.h. I started going through x509v3.h,
but all the conf bits take non-const char* pointers, which shows up in
the public (but probably unused) X509V3_CONF_METHOD, so I've left it
alone in this CL.
For some reason, OpenSSL made X509_get_subject_name a const-to-non-const
function but kept X509_get_serialNumber uniformly non-const while adding
a uniformly const X509_get0_serialNumber. I've just mirrored this for
compatibility's sake.
Change-Id: Ia33a7576165cf2da5922807fc065f1f114b0f84c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most asymmetric operations scale superlinearly, which makes them
potential DoS vectors. This (and other problems) are mitigated with
fixed sizes, like RSA-2048, P-256, or curve25519.
In older algorithms like RSA and DSA, these sizes are conventions rather
than well-defined algorithms. "Everyone" uses RSA-2048, but code which
imports an RSA key may see an arbitrary key size, possibly from an
untrusted source. This is commonly a public key, so we bound RSA key
sizes in check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes.
However, some applications import external private keys, and may need
tighter bounds. These typically parse the key then check the result.
However, parsing itself can perform superlinear work (RSA_check_key or
recovering the DSA public key).
This CL does the following:
- Rename check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes to rsa_check_public_key and
additionally call it from RSA_check_key.
- Fix a bug where RSA_check_key, on CRT-less keys, did not bound d, and
bound p and q before multiplying (quadratic).
- Our DSA verifier had stricter checks on q (160-, 224-, and 256-bit
only) than our DSA signer (multiple of 8 bits). Aligner the signer to
the verifier's checks.
- Validate DSA group sizes on parse, as well as priv_key < q, to bound
the running time.
Ideally these invariants would be checked exactly once at construction,
but our RSA and DSA implementations suffer from some OpenSSL's API
mistakes (https://crbug.com/boringssl/316), which means it is hard to
consistently enforce invariants. This CL focuses on the parser, but
later I'd like to better rationalize the freeze_private_key logic.
Performance of parsing RSA and DSA keys, gathered on my laptop.
Did 15130 RSA-2048 parse operations in 5022458us (3012.5 ops/sec)
Did 4888 RSA-4096 parse operations in 5060606us (965.9 ops/sec)
Did 354 RSA-16384 parse operations in 5043565us (70.2 ops/sec)
Did 88 RSA-32768 parse operations in 5038293us (17.5 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Did 35000 DSA-1024/256 parse operations in 5030447us (6957.6 ops/sec)
Did 11316 DSA-2048/256 parse operations in 5094664us (2221.1 ops/sec)
Did 5488 DSA-3072/256 parse operations in 5096032us (1076.9 ops/sec)
Did 3172 DSA-4096/256 parse operations in 5041220us (629.2 ops/sec)
Did 840 DSA-8192/256 parse operations in 5070616us (165.7 ops/sec)
Did 285 DSA-10000/256 parse operations in 5004033us (57.0 ops/sec)
Did 74 DSA-20000/256 parse operations in 5066299us (14.6 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Update-Note: Some invalid or overly large RSA and DSA keys may
previously have been accepted that are now rejected at parse time. For
public keys, this only moves the error from verification to parsing. In
some private key cases, we would previously allow signing with those
keys, but the resulting signatures would not be accepted by BoringSSL
anyway. This CL makes us behave more consistently.
Bug: oss-fuzz:24730
Change-Id: I4ad2003ee61138b693e65d3da4c6aa00bc165251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL renamed the preferred spelling of X509_set_notBefore to
X509_set1_notBefore, etc., in 568ce3a583a17c33feacbf5028ece9f7f0680478.
Add the set1 names and update uses within the library.
Change-Id: Ib211e356da9de963990ad2b330249383ccfef7e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42524
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-modelshttps://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This version adds signature algorithms to the extension
Change-Id: I91dc78d33ee81cb7a6221c7bdeefc8ea460a2d6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42424
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Update-Note: If an SSL_QUIC_METHOD is set, connections will now fail if
ALPN is not negotiated. This new behavior can be detected by checking
if the value of BORINGSSL_API_VERSION is greater than 10.
Bug: 294
Change-Id: I42fb80aa09268e77cec4a51e49cdad79bd72fa58
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reason codes 1000+N correspond to receiving an alert N from the peer,
rather than observing the corresponding error condition locally. This
has generally been a source of confusion for folks.
They were originally named like SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED, but
OpenSSL introduced a few without the "ALERT" token in
739a543ea863682f157e9aa0ee382367eb3d187c.
We then inadvertently carried the mistake over in
SSL_R_TLSV1_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY and SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED.
Fix all these to include the "ALERT" for consistency and make it
slightly less confusing. (Although perhaps it should have been
RECEIVED_ALERT or so.) Add compatibility #defines for the original
OpenSSL ones and SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED. The latter can be
removed when downstream code is fixed. The OpenSSL ones we'll probably
just leave around.
Update-Note: The renamed alerts will log slightly different strings, but
the constants used by external code are still there.
Bug: 366
Change-Id: I30c299c4ad4b2bed695bd71d0831fbe6755975a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is partially imported from upstream's
54dbf42398e23349b59f258a3dd60387bbc5ba13 which does something similar.
In doing so, remove the pkcs8->broken field, which is a remnant of some
parsing hacks we long since removed (PKCS8_set_broken). The immediate
motivation is, if this sticks, this would make it easier to detach
i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO and d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO from the old ASN.1
code.
Update-Note: Direct accesses of PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO now need to use the
accessors. Code search suggests no one uses the fields. Even the
accessors are virtually unused (the one thing which uses it doesn't need
it).
Bug: chromium:1102458
Change-Id: I57054de3fe412079f7387dc99291250e873b1471
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42006
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Code which targets OpenSSL won't use EVP_parse_public_key. X509_PUBKEY
is fairly deeply tied to the old ASN.1 stack, but there's no reason for
i2d_PUBKEY and friends to be. Move them to crypto/evp and reimplement as
wrappers over our functions.
Bug: chromium:1102458
Change-Id: Ic11766acdac797602e4abe1253b0efe33faef298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42005
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: This gets rid of TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v0. Existing callers
should be updated to call TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v1.
Change-Id: I8ec9b808cbd35546425690d1548db671ff033e14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41524
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: I9dde27f4a6b492d5a3f49041c8cdcac642c58335
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42004
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Steven Valdez
Tamas Petz
Daniel McArdle
Watson Ladd
Nick Harper