https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504 aligned
RSA private key checks, but I missed the public key ones. We have two
different sets of RSA public key checks right now. One in the parser
just checks for e = 1 and even e. The other, when using the key, checks
for overly large e and n.
Align the two. Now parsing RSA public keys calls RSA_check_key and the
extra checks on e are added to RSA_check_key. Note RSA private key
parsing already called RSA_check_key. The consequences are:
First, RSA public keys with large n, large e, or n < e will be rejected
at parse time. Previously, they would be parsed but all operations on
them would fail. This aligns with our existing behavior for parsing
private keys.
Second, operations on RSA public keys with even e will fail. They
already failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such
a key. Previously, operations wouldn't explicitly fail, but they
wouldn't do anything useful because even exponents are not invertible.
(Encrypting would produce something undecryptable and the private key
would have a hard time reliably producing signatures we'd accept.) There
is no change to RSA private keys with even e. Those would already fail
the (e, d) consistency check and the fault check.
Third, operations on RSA public keys with e = 1 will fail. They already
failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such a key
and "verify" signatures or "encrypt" messages. However, with e = 1,
those operations are no-ops.
Finally, RSA private keys with e = d = 1 will be rejected at parse and
use. This is the only case that affects private keys because e = d = 1
are inverses, just pointless. Uses paired with RSA public key parsing
(e.g. our TLS library checks consistency with a certificate public key)
are not affected. Those already rejected such keys because we rejected
them in the public key parser. This CL aligns the private half.
This doesn't close https://crbug.com/boringssl/316, but we won't be able
to resolve that without a consistent story for what keys are valid.
Update-Note: See above.
Bug: 316
Change-Id: Ic27df18c4f48e5e3e57a17d6fe39399e2f8d5c68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47524
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's sometimes hpke and sometimes ctx. Our other EVP_FOO_CTX types are
usually called ctx, so use ctx.
Bug: 410
Change-Id: Ib1c6d8018ffd8fd180b89f5be58283f3f098e44b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This introduces an EVP_HPKE_KEM, to capture the KEM choice, and
EVP_HPKE_KEY, to capture the key import (and thus avoids asking
receivers to pass in the full keypair). It is a bit more wordy now, but
we'll be in a better place when some non-TLS user inevitably asks for a
P-256 version.
Bug: 410
Change-Id: Icb9cc8b028e6d1f86e6d8adb31ebf1f975181675
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47329
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I meant to grab more interesting types this round, but I missed a few
spots. We should be able to get these out of the way though.
Update-Note: Direct access of these structs should be replaced by
accessors.
Change-Id: I43cb8f949d53754cfebef2f84be66e89d2b96f96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a little tedious but aligns with some of our other
variable-length parameters. This is in preparation for making the HPKE
APIs KEM-agnostic, so we don't need to make so many variations on the
HPKE functions for each KEM. (Especially if we ever need to implement
SetupPSK*, SetupAuth*, or SetupAuthPSK*.)
Bug: 410
Change-Id: I0625580b15358ab1f02b7835122256e8f058a779
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47328
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This replaces the ID-based API with one that is more static linker
friendly. For ECH, it doesn't make a difference because we currently
pull in all the options we've implemented. But this means other HPKE
uses need not pull in everything ECH needs and vice versa.
Along the way, fix an inconsistency: we prefixed all the AEAD constants
with "AEAD", but not the others. Since the rest of the name already
determines everything, go with the shorter version.
Bug: 410
Change-Id: I56e46c13b43c97e15eeb45204cde7019dd21e250
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47327
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although we only support X25519 right now, we may need to support other
KEMs in the future. In the general case, a public/private keypair is
less meaningful. (If something like NTRU-HRSS even goes here, I guess
it'd be the entropy passed to HRSS_encap.)
Instead of taking an entire keypair, just take the private key. Perhaps
we call it the "seed"?
Bug: 410
Change-Id: Ifd6b6ea8ea36e6eca60d303706d6d2620f8c42d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47326
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 65b88a75921533ada8b465bc8d5c0817ad927947 and
7c65179ad95d0f6f598ee82e763fce2567fe5802.)
Change-Id: Id6a9604231d3cacc5e20af07e40d09e20dc9d3c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47332
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can always add it back later, but nothing's using it right now.
Looking at all references to draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke in the IETF tracker,
there are zero uses of any of the modes beyond SetupBase.
Bug: 410
Change-Id: I23deb27554d36152776417d86e7759cb2c22e4eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47325
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can add them if we need them, but we're only using HKDF-SHA256 in
ECH. Keep the set small to encourage a common set of parameters.
Bug: 410
Change-Id: I5b9ddf3daa1d0c7f35df473470998369e9882553
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
PKCS#7 stores certificates and CRLs in (implicitly-tagged) SET OF
types. This means they're unordered and, in DER, must be sorted.
We currently sort neither. OpenSSL upstream sorts CRLs but doesn't sort
certificates. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13143 reports that
Microsoft has a stricter parser that checks this. This CL fixes both
fields in our serializer.
This does not change the parsing code, which still preserves whatever
order we happened to find, but I've updated the documentation to clarify
that callers should not rely on the ordering.
Based on [0] and the odd order in kPKCS7NSS, I believe this aligns with
NSS's behavior.
Update-Note: It is no longer the case that constructing a PKCS#7 file
and parsing them back out will keep the certificates and CRLs in the
same order.
[0] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:chrome/common/net/x509_certificate_model_nss_unittest.cc;drc=c91b0c37b5ddf31cffd732c661c0c5930b0740f4;l=286
Change-Id: If776bb78476557af2c4598f1b6dc10e189adab5d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47304
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I8096070386af7d2b5020875ea09bcc0c04ebc8cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47245
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Upstream ultimately preferred a different naming convention, and
type-specific constants. Align with them.
Update-Note: This renames some BoringSSL-specific constants that we
recently added. It doesn't look like anyone's used them yet.
Change-Id: I580e0872a5f09fb1c5bab9127c35f1ed852680c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The implementation is a little goofy, but OBJ_dup internally makes a
copy of all the data.
Change-Id: I58e6804ede00100211ac112f03e26a34a2d29b5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions are not in any released version of OpenSSL. The history
is they were added to 1.0.2 beta for CT, but then removed in favor of
i2d_re_X509_tbs. We forked in between the two events.
I'm not sure what the reasoning was upstream's end. I'm thinking:
- X509 currently only captures the serialized TBSCertificate. It might
be nice to capture the whole Certificate to avoid needing a
serialization in X509_cmp and make it easier to interop with other
stacks. (Unclear.) That would require not exporting the X509_CINF
standalone for serialization.
- The modified bit means, without locking, i2d_X509 is not const or
thread-safe. We *might* be able to shift the re-encoding to
i2d_re_X509_tbs, which is already inherently non-const. That requires
not having X509_CINF_set_modified.
I'm not sure how feasible either of these are, but between that,
upstream alignment, and X509_CINF otherwise being absent from public
accessors, it seems worth removing.
Update-Note: X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, and
X509_CINF_get_signature are removed. I believe all callers have been
updated. Callers should use i2d_re_X509_tbs, i2d_X509_tbs, and
X509_get0_tbs_sigalg instead.
Change-Id: Ic1906ba383faa7903973cb498402518985dd838c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is mostly to confirm the STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) was created the right
number of times.
Change-Id: I30c32f91cb6091e63bfcaebb0fe966270e503d93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46984
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The X509_ATTRIBUTE structure includes a hack to tolerate malformed
attributes that encode the value directly instead of a set of values.
This form is never created by OpenSSL and shouldn't be needed any more.
(Imported from upstream's e20b57270dece66ce2c68aeb5d14dd6d9f3c5d68.)
This also changes X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data slightly. Previously,
set1_data would override whatever was previously in the X509_ATTRIBUTE,
but leak memory. Now set1_data appends to the set. (PKCS#10 attributes
use SET OF ANY as value.) It's unclear to me if this was intentional on
upstream's part. (The attrtype == 0 case only makes sense in the old
behavior.) Since there is no other way to create a two-element SET and
upstream has long since released this behavior, I left it matching
upstream.
Update-Note: Given OpenSSL hasn't accepted these for five years, it's
unlikely anything depends on it. If something breaks, we can revert this
and revisit. No one calls X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data on a non-empty
X509_ATTRIBUTE, so the behavior change there should be safe.
Change-Id: Ic03c793b7d42784072ec0d9a7b6424aecc738632
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
x509_req.c changes imported from upstream's
9b0a453190efc9b14cc04e74ce2e8e35af45fb39.
Update-Note: Direct accesses of X509_ATTRIBUTE should be replaced with
one of the accessors. I couldn't find any direct accesses, so hopefully
this is fine.
Change-Id: I7eab6375d5dcf366ef72e5ce059f3558c947f35b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I stopped short of documenting the add1_attr_by functions because the
type parameter is a bit of a mess. It appears to be several enums put
together. To that end, I've updated the documentation on
V_ASN1_MAX_UNIVERSAL to note that we also need to avoid MBSTRING_FLAG.
As a preview of what I'm putting off to later, see
X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data for how the type parameter is used. set1_data
is extra fun because PKCS#10 attributes are set-valued. Plus there's
upstream's e20b57270dece66ce2c68aeb5d14dd6d9f3c5d68, which we should
import first.
Change-Id: I3453a0b224e42c6e22828c7d332ee133e09e6173
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: Direct accesses of X509_PUBKEY should be replaced with one
of the accessors. I believe all callers have been fixed at this point.
Change-Id: Ib325782867478fb548da1bf5ef0023cf989f125b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ASN1_BOOLEAN representation is a mess. ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int
and if non-negative (negative values mean omitted or default), gets cast
to uint8_t and encoded as the value. This means callers are simply
expected to know true is 0xff, not 1. Fix this by only encoding 0 or
0xff.
This also fixes a bug where values like 0x100 are interpreted as true
(e.g. in the tasn_enc.c logic to handle default values), but encoded as
false because the cast only looks at the least significant byte.
This CL does not change the parsing behavior, which is to allow any BER
encoding and preserve the value in the in-memory representation (though
we should tighten that). However the BER encode will no longer be
preserved when re-encoding.
Update-Note: Callers setting ASN1_BOOLEANs to a positive value other
than 0xff will now encode 0xff. This probably fixes a bug, but if anyone
was attaching significance to incorrectly-encoded booleans, that will
break.
Change-Id: I5bb53e068d5900daca07299a27c0551e78ffa91d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46924
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See go/handshake-hints (internal).
CL originally by Bin Wu <wub@google.com>. I just reworked the tests and
tidied it up a bit. This is the start of a replacement for the split
handshakes API. For now, only TLS 1.3 is supported. It starts with an
initial set of hints, but we can add more later. (In particular, we
should probably apply the remote handshaker's extension order to avoid
needing to capability protect such changes.)
Change-Id: I7b6a6dfaa84c6c6e3436d2a4026c3652b8a79f0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46535
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They still need to be Python-2-compatible until I figure out how to
switch the version used in the CI.
I've left out make_curve25519_tables.py because it's some bytes vs
unicode mess I don't care to figure out. We should just rewrite that in
Go which should also be much faster anyway.
Change-Id: I4446641815315a84c2979b1be1e1949f88cbacf8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See also 86a90dc749af91f8a7b8da6628c9ffca2bae3009 from upstream. This
differs from upstream's which treats {NULL, 2} as a valid way to spell
the empty list. (I think this is a mistake and have asked them about
it.)
Upstream's CL also, for them, newly makes the empty list disable ALPN,
when previously they'd disable it but misread it as a malloc failure.
For us, we'd already fixed the misreading due to our switch to
bssl::Array and bssl::Span, but the documentation was odd. This CL
preserves that behavior, but updates the documentation and writes a
test.
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos and SSL_set_alpn_protos will now
reject invalud inputs. Previously, they would accept them, but silently
send an invalid ALPN extension which the server would almost certainly
error on.
Change-Id: Id5830b2d8c3a5cee4712878fe92ee350c4914367
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than computing kVarianceBlocks, which is hard to reason about,
use a sha1_final_with_secret_suffix abstraction. This lets us separate
reasoning in bytes about the minimum and maximum values of |data_size|
and the interaction with HMAC, separately from the core constant-time
SHA-1 update.
It's also faster. I'm guessing it's the more accurate block counts.
Before:
Did 866000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 2000697us (6.9 MB/sec)
Did 616000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (256 bytes) open operations in 2001403us (78.8 MB/sec)
Did 432000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 2003898us (291.0 MB/sec)
Did 148000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 2006042us (604.4 MB/sec)
Did 83000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16384 bytes) open operations in 2010885us (676.3 MB/sec)
After:
Did 2089000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 2000049us (16.7 MB/sec) [+141.3%]
Did 851000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (256 bytes) open operations in 2000034us (108.9 MB/sec) [+38.2%]
Did 553000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 2002169us (372.9 MB/sec) [+28.1%]
Did 178000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 2008596us (726.0 MB/sec) [+20.1%]
Did 98000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16384 bytes) open operations in 2001509us (802.2 MB/sec) [+18.6%]
Confirmed with valgrind tooling that this is still constant-time. In
doing so, I ran into a new nuisance with GCC. In loops where we run
constant_time_lt with a counter value, GCC sometimes offsets the loop
counter by the secret. It cancels it out before dereferencing memory,
etc., but valgrind does not know that x + uninit - uninit = x and gets
upset. I've worked around this with a barrier for now.
Change-Id: Ieff8d2cad1b56c07999002e67ce4e6d6aa59e0d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This CL adds an initial implementation of the ECH server, with pieces of
the client in BoGo as necessary for testing. In particular, the server
supports ClientHelloInner compression with ech_outer_extensions. When
ECH decryption fails, it can send retry_configs back to the client.
This server passes the "ech-accept" and "ech-reject" test cases in
tls-interop-runner[0] when tested against both the cloudflare-go and nss
clients. For reproducibility, I started with the main branch at commit
707604c262d8bcf3e944ed1d5a675077304732ce and updated the endpoint's
script to pass the server's ECHConfig and private key to the boringssl
tool.
Follow-up CLs will update HPKE to the latest draft and catch us up to
draft-10.
[0]: https://github.com/xvzcf/tls-interop-runner
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I49be35af46d1fd5dd9c62252f07d0bae179381ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45285
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This removes the now unnecessary virtual calls. Benchmark differences are
mostly positive but probably noise.
Before:
Did 839000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 2000497us (6.7 MB/sec)
Did 623000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (256 bytes) open operations in 2000409us (79.7 MB/sec)
Did 434000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 2002909us (292.5 MB/sec)
Did 146000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 2000785us (597.8 MB/sec)
Did 82000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16384 bytes) open operations in 2014268us (667.0 MB/sec)
After:
Did 866000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 2000697us (6.9 MB/sec) [+3.2%]
Did 616000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (256 bytes) open operations in 2001403us (78.8 MB/sec) [-1.2%]
Did 432000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 2003898us (291.0 MB/sec) [-0.5%]
Did 148000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 2006042us (604.4 MB/sec) [+1.1%]
Did 83000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16384 bytes) open operations in 2010885us (676.3 MB/sec) [+1.4%]
Change-Id: I735e99296ca9a1771518c622b8e7e6979a0d30bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
AES_128_GCM is more common than AES_GCM_128 and matches the
specification.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: If3446a38f7bfbe0250d9646e363db29b93e4d231
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46666
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan McArdle <dmcardle@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have loads of variations of these. Align them in one set. This avoids
the HOST_* macros defined by md32_common.h, so it'll be a little easier
to make it a more conventional header.
Change-Id: Id47fe7b51a8f961bd87839f8146d8a5aa8027aa6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46425
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's a little confusing to have load_word_le but actually use size_t
instead of crypto_word_t.
NOTE: on some platforms, notably NaCl, crypto_word_t is larger than
size_t. (Do we still need to support this?) We don't have a good testing
story here, so I tested it by hacking up a 32-bit x86 build to think it
was OPENSSL_64_BIT.
Change-Id: Ia0ce469e86803f22655fe2d9659a6a5db766429f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46424
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSAN doesn't like the counters starting at whatever value malloc
found to be free.
Change-Id: I0968e61e0025db35b82291fde5d1e193aef77c1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46444
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's now a year past the February 2020 deadline for removing it. Judging
from b/72831885, it looks like the root cause was addressed.
Change-Id: I8c8b358ef4f4146b41aab2a7163c000fa7306025
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46407
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although it is strictly fine to call SHA512_Final in SHA384_Final
(array sizes in C parameters are purely decorational, according to the
language), GCC 11 reportedly checks now and gets upset about the size
mismatch. Use an unsized helper function so all our code matches the
specified bounds.
Unfortunately, the bounds in all the functions are a bit misleading
because SHA512_Final really outputs based on sha->md_len (which Init
function you called) rather than which Final function. I've fixed this
places within a library where we mismatched and added asserts to the
smaller functions. SHA512_Final is assert-less because I've seen lots of
code use SHA384_Init / SHA512_Update / SHA512_Final.
This doesn't fix the SHA256 variant since that is generated by a pile of
macros in a multiply-included file. This is probably a good opportunity
to make that code less macro-heavy.
Update-Note: There is a small chance the asserts will trip something,
but hopefully not since I've left SHA512_Final alone.
Bug: 402
Change-Id: I4c9d579a63ee0a0dea103c19ef219c13bb9aa62c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46405
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's now 2021. Hopefully we can at least assume anyone building with
-std=c11 also has a corresponding set of headers. Plus, even if you
don't, Clang seems to provide a header. (So C11 atomics work in
clang-cl.) Also apparently atomics are optional, so this checks
__STDC_NO_ATOMICS__.
This does *not* set C11 as the minimum version. If you build with
-std=c99, we'll silently use the non-atomics implementation. That's a
little magical, so I've kept OPENSSL_C11_ATOMIC as a way to assert that
you really want C11 atomics. Mostly it turns into a -std=c11 && !MSVC
self-assert.
Update-Note: If something fails to compile, we'll revert this and adjust
the check, or add an opt-out, or give up. Also, if building with
-std=c99, consider -std=c11.
Change-Id: I1a8074c367a765c5a0f087db8c250e050df2dde8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PKCS#10 CSRs don't contain extensions but attributes, which are kind of
like extensions, but defined separately. There is an attribute type from
PKCS#9 to embed a list of X.509 extensions inside an attribute, as well
as a Microsoft variant.
X509_REQ_set_extension_nids allowed callers globally reconfigure the set
of attributes recognized as aliases of this extensions attribute. This
is not used by anyone and not thread-safe. Remove it and only support
the two default attribute types.
From there, document the remaining functions.
Update-Note: This removes a pair of unused functions.
Change-Id: Ic1fc41163996c0c980ba8320b417e444d484aa39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46326
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes a bug in ASN1_TYPE_get. Partly imported from upstream's
261ec72d58af64327214a78ca1c54b169ad93c28, though I don't believe
ASN1_TYPE_set was broken per se. There's also a lot more than in that
commit.
I've added a test to ensure we maintain the unused bits invariant
anyway, in case external code relies on it. (The invariant comes from
the pointer being NULL-initialized and from ASN1_primitive_free zeroing
*pval on free.)
Change-Id: I4c0c57519a7628041d81c26cd850317e01409556
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46324
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This API does not come from OpenSSL, but OpenSSL does not appear to have
any way to get this information. There is X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr, but
that only works for X509 objects, not X509_PUBKEY.
Change-Id: Ifc8be554a4d8cbf830c32b95b953f092980804df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46304
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See also 8129ac6ac4c0ca3a488c225cde580ede7dabe874 and
81198bf323ea9deda907714170d329ca7d2ff01f from upstream.
In trying to figure out why ASan (which normally catches overlapping
memcpys) didn't flag this, I noticed that we actually don't have tests
for empty inputs. I've added them to cipher_tests.txt where missing and
fixed a bad assert in ofb.c.
ASan still doesn't flag this because LLVM even requires memcpy handle
dst == src. Still, fixing it is less effort than getting a clear answer
from GCC and MSVC. Though this puts us in the frustrating position of
trying to follow a C rule that our main toolchain and sanitizer disavow.
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11763https://reviews.llvm.org/D86993
Change-Id: I53c64a84834ddf5cddca0b3d53a29998f666ea2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46285
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All our EVP_CIPHERs are deterministic, so there's usually no point in
testing only one direction. Some of the ECB tests were missing free
decryption tests. CTR is the same in both directions, but we ought to
test the API agrees. OFB vectors are doubled up, so we can merge them
together. Plus there are typos in the OFB-AES192.Decrypt tests, also
present upstream, so we weren't actually testing everything we should.
(I haven't removed the direction-specific logic altogether since the
tests imported from nist_cavp rely on it. Though there may be something
to be said for running them both ways since they don't actually double
them up...)
Change-Id: I36a77d342afa436e89ad244a87567e1a4c6ee9dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46284
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In doing so, this switches make_errors.go to take library names as
parameters rather than detecting it from the CWD. (I considered
detecting it, but then we'd need to map evp -> crypto/whatever and
crypto/whatever -> evp in both directions.)
Since crypto/hpke currently sits in the EVP namespace, I've gone ahead
and added that, so it should be easier to define new errors in
crypto/hpke. I've not added crypto/cipher, etc., yet. Moving those will
be a breaking change (consumers that put ERR_LIB_CIPHER and ERR_LIB_EVP
in a switch/case need patches).
Bug: 398
Change-Id: Ibae2afd46e076891fa517c377b540b2e492516f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46264
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Steven Valdez
Adam Langley
Daniel McArdle
Adam Langley