There are a lot of d2i and i2d functions, and there will be even more
once asn1.h and x509.h are properly documented. We currently replicate
the text in each, but as a result a miss a few points:
- The i2d outp != NULL, *outp == NULL case isn't documented at all.
- We should call out what to do with *inp after d2i.
- Unlike our rewritten functions, object reuse is still quite rampant
with the asn1.h functions. I hope we can get rid of that but, until we
can, it would be nice to describe it in one place.
While I'm here, update a few references to the latest PKCS#1 RFC, and
try to align how we reference ASN.1 structures a bit. The d2i/i2d
functions say "ASN.1, DER-encoded RSA private key" while the CBS/CBB
functions say "DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey structure".
Bug: 426
Change-Id: I8d9a7b0aef3d6d9c8240136053c3b1704b09fd41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49906
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EVP_MD_nid, in OpenSSL, is the same as EVP_MD_type. EVP_MD_type seems to
be the preferred spelling, so put EVP_MD_nid in the deprecated bucket.
Also add an EVP_MD_do_all alias to EVP_MD_do_all_sorted.
Change-Id: I4e7b800902459ac5cb9ef0df65d73da94afdf927
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48365
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Node.js uses EVP_PKEY_get0, which is present in OpenSSL but which
BoringSSL currently does not export. This CL adds an implementation
for it, which Electron is currently floating as a patch.
See
6a7eb32c5b
from Node.
Change-Id: I2474cacbd22882355a8037e2033739f7496b21f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47824
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We usually call the parameter 'digest', but people sometimes think they
can skip the hashing for short inputs are short. I also suspect the term
'digest' is less common. Add warnings about this.
There were also some cases where we called it 'in' and even 'msg'. This
CL fixes those to say 'digest'. Finally, RSA_{sign,verify}_raw are
documented to be building blocks of signature schemes, rather than
signature schemes themselves.
It's unfortunate that EVP_PKEY_sign means "sign a digest", while
EVP_DigestSign means "sign, likely internally digesting it as the first
step", but we're a bit stuck there.
Change-Id: I4c38afff9b6196e2789cf27653fe5e5e8c68c1bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In doing so, this switches make_errors.go to take library names as
parameters rather than detecting it from the CWD. (I considered
detecting it, but then we'd need to map evp -> crypto/whatever and
crypto/whatever -> evp in both directions.)
Since crypto/hpke currently sits in the EVP namespace, I've gone ahead
and added that, so it should be easier to define new errors in
crypto/hpke. I've not added crypto/cipher, etc., yet. Moving those will
be a breaking change (consumers that put ERR_LIB_CIPHER and ERR_LIB_EVP
in a switch/case need patches).
Bug: 398
Change-Id: Ibae2afd46e076891fa517c377b540b2e492516f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46264
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most asymmetric operations scale superlinearly, which makes them
potential DoS vectors. This (and other problems) are mitigated with
fixed sizes, like RSA-2048, P-256, or curve25519.
In older algorithms like RSA and DSA, these sizes are conventions rather
than well-defined algorithms. "Everyone" uses RSA-2048, but code which
imports an RSA key may see an arbitrary key size, possibly from an
untrusted source. This is commonly a public key, so we bound RSA key
sizes in check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes.
However, some applications import external private keys, and may need
tighter bounds. These typically parse the key then check the result.
However, parsing itself can perform superlinear work (RSA_check_key or
recovering the DSA public key).
This CL does the following:
- Rename check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes to rsa_check_public_key and
additionally call it from RSA_check_key.
- Fix a bug where RSA_check_key, on CRT-less keys, did not bound d, and
bound p and q before multiplying (quadratic).
- Our DSA verifier had stricter checks on q (160-, 224-, and 256-bit
only) than our DSA signer (multiple of 8 bits). Aligner the signer to
the verifier's checks.
- Validate DSA group sizes on parse, as well as priv_key < q, to bound
the running time.
Ideally these invariants would be checked exactly once at construction,
but our RSA and DSA implementations suffer from some OpenSSL's API
mistakes (https://crbug.com/boringssl/316), which means it is hard to
consistently enforce invariants. This CL focuses on the parser, but
later I'd like to better rationalize the freeze_private_key logic.
Performance of parsing RSA and DSA keys, gathered on my laptop.
Did 15130 RSA-2048 parse operations in 5022458us (3012.5 ops/sec)
Did 4888 RSA-4096 parse operations in 5060606us (965.9 ops/sec)
Did 354 RSA-16384 parse operations in 5043565us (70.2 ops/sec)
Did 88 RSA-32768 parse operations in 5038293us (17.5 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Did 35000 DSA-1024/256 parse operations in 5030447us (6957.6 ops/sec)
Did 11316 DSA-2048/256 parse operations in 5094664us (2221.1 ops/sec)
Did 5488 DSA-3072/256 parse operations in 5096032us (1076.9 ops/sec)
Did 3172 DSA-4096/256 parse operations in 5041220us (629.2 ops/sec)
Did 840 DSA-8192/256 parse operations in 5070616us (165.7 ops/sec)
Did 285 DSA-10000/256 parse operations in 5004033us (57.0 ops/sec)
Did 74 DSA-20000/256 parse operations in 5066299us (14.6 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Update-Note: Some invalid or overly large RSA and DSA keys may
previously have been accepted that are now rejected at parse time. For
public keys, this only moves the error from verification to parsing. In
some private key cases, we would previously allow signing with those
keys, but the resulting signatures would not be accepted by BoringSSL
anyway. This CL makes us behave more consistently.
Bug: oss-fuzz:24730
Change-Id: I4ad2003ee61138b693e65d3da4c6aa00bc165251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Code which targets OpenSSL won't use EVP_parse_public_key. X509_PUBKEY
is fairly deeply tied to the old ASN.1 stack, but there's no reason for
i2d_PUBKEY and friends to be. Move them to crypto/evp and reimplement as
wrappers over our functions.
Bug: chromium:1102458
Change-Id: Ic11766acdac797602e4abe1253b0efe33faef298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42005
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Shelley Vohr
Daniel McArdle
Adam Langley