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3 Commits (77dc23983f004056dbcd95ae96922be107365190)
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
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|
8bbefbfeee |
Document that |EC_KEY_generate_fips| works for both cases.
Our FIPS module only claims support for RSA signing/verification, and |RSA_generate_key_fips| already performs a sign/verify pair-wise consistency test (PCT). For ECDSA, |EC_KEY_generate_fips| performs a sign/verify PCT too. But when |EC_KEY_generate_fips| is used for key agreement a sign/verify PCT may not be correct. The FIPS IG[1], page 60, says: > Though not a CAST, a pairwise consistency test (PCT) shall be > conducted for every generated public and private key pair for the > applicable approved algorithm (per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section > 7.10.3.3). To further clarify, at minimum, the PCT that is required by > the underlying algorithm standard (e.g. SP 800- 56Arev3 or SP > 800-56Brev2) shall be performed. SP 800-56Ar3, page 36, says: > For an ECC key pair (d, Q): Use the private key, d, along with the > generator G and other domain parameters associated with the key pair, > to compute dG (according to the rules of elliptic-curve arithmetic). > Compare the result to the public key, Q. If dG is not equal to Q, then > the pair-wise consistency test fails But |EC_KEY_generate_fips| has always done that via |EC_KEY_check_key|. So I believe that |EC_KEY_generate_fips| works for either case. This change documents that. [1] FIPS 140-3 IG dated 2022-03-14 and with SHA-256 2f232f7f5839e3263284d71c35771c9fdf2e505b02813be999377030c56b37e4 Change-Id: I4b4e2ed92ae3d59e2f2404c41694abeb3eb283f4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51988 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> |
3 years ago |
|
cfafcd454f |
Deduplicate d2i and i2d documentation.
There are a lot of d2i and i2d functions, and there will be even more once asn1.h and x509.h are properly documented. We currently replicate the text in each, but as a result a miss a few points: - The i2d outp != NULL, *outp == NULL case isn't documented at all. - We should call out what to do with *inp after d2i. - Unlike our rewritten functions, object reuse is still quite rampant with the asn1.h functions. I hope we can get rid of that but, until we can, it would be nice to describe it in one place. While I'm here, update a few references to the latest PKCS#1 RFC, and try to align how we reference ASN.1 structures a bit. The d2i/i2d functions say "ASN.1, DER-encoded RSA private key" while the CBS/CBB functions say "DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey structure". Bug: 426 Change-Id: I8d9a7b0aef3d6d9c8240136053c3b1704b09fd41 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49906 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> |
3 years ago |
|
fb0c05cac2 |
acvp: add CMAC-AES support.
Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> |
5 years ago |