We usually call the parameter 'digest', but people sometimes think they
can skip the hashing for short inputs are short. I also suspect the term
'digest' is less common. Add warnings about this.
There were also some cases where we called it 'in' and even 'msg'. This
CL fixes those to say 'digest'. Finally, RSA_{sign,verify}_raw are
documented to be building blocks of signature schemes, rather than
signature schemes themselves.
It's unfortunate that EVP_PKEY_sign means "sign a digest", while
EVP_DigestSign means "sign, likely internally digesting it as the first
step", but we're a bit stuck there.
Change-Id: I4c38afff9b6196e2789cf27653fe5e5e8c68c1bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504 aligned
RSA private key checks, but I missed the public key ones. We have two
different sets of RSA public key checks right now. One in the parser
just checks for e = 1 and even e. The other, when using the key, checks
for overly large e and n.
Align the two. Now parsing RSA public keys calls RSA_check_key and the
extra checks on e are added to RSA_check_key. Note RSA private key
parsing already called RSA_check_key. The consequences are:
First, RSA public keys with large n, large e, or n < e will be rejected
at parse time. Previously, they would be parsed but all operations on
them would fail. This aligns with our existing behavior for parsing
private keys.
Second, operations on RSA public keys with even e will fail. They
already failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such
a key. Previously, operations wouldn't explicitly fail, but they
wouldn't do anything useful because even exponents are not invertible.
(Encrypting would produce something undecryptable and the private key
would have a hard time reliably producing signatures we'd accept.) There
is no change to RSA private keys with even e. Those would already fail
the (e, d) consistency check and the fault check.
Third, operations on RSA public keys with e = 1 will fail. They already
failed to parse, but it was possible to manually construct such a key
and "verify" signatures or "encrypt" messages. However, with e = 1,
those operations are no-ops.
Finally, RSA private keys with e = d = 1 will be rejected at parse and
use. This is the only case that affects private keys because e = d = 1
are inverses, just pointless. Uses paired with RSA public key parsing
(e.g. our TLS library checks consistency with a certificate public key)
are not affected. Those already rejected such keys because we rejected
them in the public key parser. This CL aligns the private half.
This doesn't close https://crbug.com/boringssl/316, but we won't be able
to resolve that without a consistent story for what keys are valid.
Update-Note: See above.
Bug: 316
Change-Id: Ic27df18c4f48e5e3e57a17d6fe39399e2f8d5c68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47524
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have loads of variations of these. Align them in one set. This avoids
the HOST_* macros defined by md32_common.h, so it'll be a little easier
to make it a more conventional header.
Change-Id: Id47fe7b51a8f961bd87839f8146d8a5aa8027aa6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46425
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's a little confusing to have load_word_le but actually use size_t
instead of crypto_word_t.
NOTE: on some platforms, notably NaCl, crypto_word_t is larger than
size_t. (Do we still need to support this?) We don't have a good testing
story here, so I tested it by hacking up a 32-bit x86 build to think it
was OPENSSL_64_BIT.
Change-Id: Ia0ce469e86803f22655fe2d9659a6a5db766429f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46424
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSAN doesn't like the counters starting at whatever value malloc
found to be free.
Change-Id: I0968e61e0025db35b82291fde5d1e193aef77c1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46444
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Although it is strictly fine to call SHA512_Final in SHA384_Final
(array sizes in C parameters are purely decorational, according to the
language), GCC 11 reportedly checks now and gets upset about the size
mismatch. Use an unsized helper function so all our code matches the
specified bounds.
Unfortunately, the bounds in all the functions are a bit misleading
because SHA512_Final really outputs based on sha->md_len (which Init
function you called) rather than which Final function. I've fixed this
places within a library where we mismatched and added asserts to the
smaller functions. SHA512_Final is assert-less because I've seen lots of
code use SHA384_Init / SHA512_Update / SHA512_Final.
This doesn't fix the SHA256 variant since that is generated by a pile of
macros in a multiply-included file. This is probably a good opportunity
to make that code less macro-heavy.
Update-Note: There is a small chance the asserts will trip something,
but hopefully not since I've left SHA512_Final alone.
Bug: 402
Change-Id: I4c9d579a63ee0a0dea103c19ef219c13bb9aa62c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46405
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also 8129ac6ac4c0ca3a488c225cde580ede7dabe874 and
81198bf323ea9deda907714170d329ca7d2ff01f from upstream.
In trying to figure out why ASan (which normally catches overlapping
memcpys) didn't flag this, I noticed that we actually don't have tests
for empty inputs. I've added them to cipher_tests.txt where missing and
fixed a bad assert in ofb.c.
ASan still doesn't flag this because LLVM even requires memcpy handle
dst == src. Still, fixing it is less effort than getting a clear answer
from GCC and MSVC. Though this puts us in the frustrating position of
trying to follow a C rule that our main toolchain and sanitizer disavow.
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11763https://reviews.llvm.org/D86993
Change-Id: I53c64a84834ddf5cddca0b3d53a29998f666ea2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46285
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The build scripts distinguish between normal files and bcm.c fragments
based on whether code is in a subdirectory inside crypto/fipsmodule.
Bug: 401
Change-Id: Ieba88178e4f8e19f020e56e2567d5736a34bb43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In order to provide evidence to auditors that high-level functions end
up calling into the FIPS module, provide counters that allow for such
monitoring.
Change-Id: I55d45299f3050bf58077715ffa280210db156116
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46124
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I got the values flipped around. Also cryptography.io wants
EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag to check a curve's encoding. We (mostly) only
support named curves, so just return OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE.
Change-Id: I544e76b7380ecd8dceb1df3db4dd4cf5cb322352
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46024
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This may as well be computed from block_size. This reduces the
per-EVP_CIPHER_CTX memory usage slightly.
Update-Note: It doesn't look like anyone is reading into this field. If
they are, we can ideally fix it, or revert this if absolutely necessary.
Change-Id: Ieef9177bed1671efca23d4f94d3d528f82568fc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45884
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are a few places where it is useful to run ECDSA with a specified
nonce:
- An ECDSA KAT in the module self-check
- Unit tests for particular test vectors
- Fuzzing the implementation (requested by the cryptofuzz project)
This replaces the fixed_k machinery with a separate function. Although
they are effectively the same, I've used two different functions.
One is internal and only used in the module self-check. The other is
exported for unit tests and cryptofuzz but marked with a for_testing.
(Chromium's presubmits flag uses of "for_testing" functions outside of
unit tests. The KAT version isn't in a test per se, so it's a separate
function.)
Bug: 391
Change-Id: I0f764d89bf0ac2081307e1079623d508fb0f2df7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45867
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The extra computation in the "setup" half is a remnant of
ECDSA_sign_setup, which was designed to amortize the message-independent
portion of the signature. We don't care about this amortization, but we
do want some control over k for testing. Instead, have ecdsa_sign_impl
take k and do the rest.
In doing so, this lets us compute m and kinv slightly later, which means
fewer temporaries are needed.
Bug: 391
Change-Id: I398004a5388ce5b7e839db6c36edf8464643d16f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45866
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In FIPS mode, we maintain a lock in order to implement clearing DRBG
state on process shutdown. This lock serves two purposes:
1. It protects the linked list of all DRBG states, which needs to be
updated the first time a thread touches RAND_bytes, when a thread
exits, and on process exit.
2. It ensures threads alive during process shutdown do not accidentally
touch DRBGs after they are cleared, by way of taking a ton of read
locks in RAND_bytes across some potentially time-consuming points.
This means that when one of the rare events in (1) happens, it must
contend with the flurry of read locks in (2). Split these uses into two
locks. The second lock now only ever sees read locks until process
shutdown, and the first lock is only accessed in rare cases.
Change-Id: Ib856c7a3bb937bbfa5d08534031dbf4ed3315cab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45844
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a very very basic sanity check on k generation, but it helps
make sure we haven't *completely* disconnected the RNG.
Change-Id: If7ae5dd6be3d0866962cd966b8c1ed1cdedffb50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CVE-2021-23840
(Imported from upstream's 6a51b9e1d0cf0bf8515f7201b68fb0a3482b3dc1.)
This differs slightly from upstream's version:
- EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW didn't seem necessary when ERR_R_OVERFLOW
already exists. (Also since we use CIPHER_R_*, it wouldn't have helped
with compatibility anyway. Though there's probably something to be
said for us folding CIPHER_R_* back into EVP_R_*.)
- For simplicity, just check in_len + bl at the top, rather than trying
to predict the exact number of bytes written.
Update-Note: Passing extremely large input lengths into EVP_CipherUpdate
will now fail. Use EVP_AEAD instead, which is size_t-based and has more
explicit output bounds.
Change-Id: I31835c89dcdecb6b112828f57deb798dc7187db5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
test_fips probably needs to exercise everything that we have self-tests
for.
(The following change will eliminate the duplication of the code to
create the FFDH group. For reasons, that can't be done in this change.)
Change-Id: Ia72064db77381e7cf396a34b4723b2607f26f00b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes the build for folks not using bcm.c.
Change-Id: I47935d8af7cb5a12ff2918ee2a8774182681d930
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45384
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This invovles a |2048|^|225| modexp, which is far from ideal, but is now
required in FIPS mode.
Change-Id: Id7384b4ba92aa74e971231bc44fa0f10434d18e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45085
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In order to support cross-compiling:
1) inject-hash needs to know to use SHA-256 for the hash function
on Android. Since that's a good idea on Aarch64 in general
(due to common hardware support), do it for all Aarch64.
2) We need to use the compiler to run the preprocessor, not plain
cpp, because the compiler will get the built-in #defines right.
Change-Id: Ie00d46e9e6d489fcb9e3f3e5e625aa289c7e0d73
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45044
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We clear all heap memory on free now, thus the difference between these
functions is quite small. There are some differences though:
Firstly, BN_clear_free will attempt to zero out static limb data. But
static data is probably read-only and thus trying to zero it will crash.
Secondly it will try to zero out the BIGNUM structure itself. But either
it's on the heap, and will be zeroed anyway, or else it's on the stack,
and we don't try and clear the stack in general because the compiler is
duplicating bits of it at will anyway.
Change-Id: I8a07385a102cfd308b555432942225c25eb7c12d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45084
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL has a fixed-width version of DH_compute_key nowadays. Searching
around callers of DH_compute_key, many of them go back and re-pad the
secret anyway. Uses of DH should migrate to modern primitives but, in
the meantime, DH_compute_key_padded seems worthwhile for OpenSSL
compatibility and giving fixed-width users a function to avoid the
timing leak.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION since one of the uses is in wpa_supplicant
and they like to compile against a wide range of Android revisions.
Update-Note: No compatibility impact, but callers that use
DH_compute_key and then fix up the removed leading zeros can switch to
this function. Then they should migrate to something else.
Change-Id: Icf8b2ace3972fa174a0f08ece39710f7599f96f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45004
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Aarch64 perlasm outputs need to be run via the C preprocessor before
being parsed by delocate.
Change-Id: Ie420388e0e1707cb064d696ee8f87728cab9a36e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44847
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows on Arm (WoA) builds are currently using the C implementations
of the various functions within BoringSSL. This patch enables feature
detection for the Neon and hardware crypto optimizations, and updates
the perl script to generate AArch64 .S files for WoA.
Note these files use GNU assembler syntax (specifically tested with
Clang assembler), not armasm.
Change-Id: Id8841f4db0498ec16215095a4e6bd60d427cd54b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I814f55742910c519e9b64aca1b15a4d754adc541
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44944
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change eliminates an Aarch64 assembly pattern that only appears
in this case. It's easier to change this code than to pile more things
on top of the delocate parser.
Change-Id: I6bbbe9df744ec2ad4178d74456d8f4fecc3a2dae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44845
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Newer versions of LLVM may use profile information to put code in
sections named .text.unlikely.*. Make sure those sections end up in
our .text section.
Change-Id: Ia0224fd8e683f5e77c60dd3ad34d59b33f9b41ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44804
Commit-Queue: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This moved, en masse, into the FIPS module in e7f08827d2. But we want to
minimise the amount that's in the FIPS module and it doesn't appear that
we need this at the current time.
Change-Id: Ib2c243aad461b716314eeeb6a460955818a7aa22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44605
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If using precompiled headers then this is needed otherwise bn/internal.h
doesn't have a definition for BN_ULONG etc.
Change-Id: I41b331465abae7108f255722a156d2ffb3016ba3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44604
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This involves adding a new function |DH_compute_key_hashed| that
combines the FFDH with the output hashing inside the FIPS module. This
new function uses the padded FFDH output, as newly specified in SP
800-56Ar3.
Change-Id: Iafcb7e276f16d39bf7d25d3b2f163b5cd6f67883
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44504
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change also drops ex_data from DH objects. The global would need
special handling in the FIPS module, which isn't hard, but just dropping
it saves some of the code-size costs of this change and I cannot find
any signs of use of this functionality.
Change-Id: I984bd70698c2ec329f340d294b3b9ec169cd0c4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44524
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than the FIPS module actively collecting entropy from the CPU or
OS, this change configures Android FIPS to passively receive entropy.
See FIPS IG 7.14 section two.
Change-Id: Ibfc5c5042e560718474b89970199d35b67c21296
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44305
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
8846533744 added a “power-on” test for the TLS KDF, but omitted to add
it to the documented list of these tests.
Change-Id: I13dbad4b9359e7dae0938d02ac53e5e011f50824
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44505
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This imports d741debb320bf54e8575d35603a44d4eb40fa1f9 from upstream.
We've been managing the shared libraries already because our
arm-xlate.pl automatically adds .hidden to .extern lines, but nice to
reduce the diff. (This does result in some duplicate .hidden lines in
the generated output, but we still want the arm-xlate.pl patch to
automatically hide .globl.)
Removing .comm lines does change the generated output, but having each
asm file define its own copy of OPENSSL_armcap_P as a common symbol
always seemed odd. I recall some weird issue where the armv4.pl files
subtly rely on it for iOS's strange .indirect_symbol machinery. (Not
actually because iOS wants a common symbol but because arm-xlate.pl
repurposes .comm to trigger .indirect_symbol.) Fortunately, aarch64 is
much better about PC-relative addressing, so it should be a no-op.
The .comm lines have also previously caused weird issues
(https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/32324), so
it's generally nice to get rid of them.
Update-Note: If aarch64 builds get some weird error about relocations,
it's this CL's fault.
Change-Id: I763ffa6cda750d99694ded8a5b68d7b27b09cfc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's insufficient to signal an error when the PWCT fails. We
additionally need to ensure that the invalid key material is not
returned.
Change-Id: Ic5ff719a688985a61c52540ce6d1ed279a493d27
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44306
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Iba527924a79733b28b12b65d8e1f613d7819eb34
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44345
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are affected
by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1], respectively, where the
second instruction of a AES instruction pair may execute twice if an
interrupt is taken right after the first instruction consumes an input
register of which a single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it
was modified.
Shuffle the counter assignments around a bit so that the most recent
updates when the AES instruction pair executes are 128-bit wide.
[0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
[1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
(This is imported from upstream's
409c59e8f44ae56f2587cdd8a7ce611d0e3d91d9.)
The change is applied to both 32-bit and 64-bit for simplicity, but there
was no measurable performance difference, so leaving them aligned is
easiest.
Change-Id: Ic8e5f656f59ae8c2ecb2762a066c2c9064bb34c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44284
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This covers the use of EVP_sha256() added in 8846533744.
Change-Id: I8cd4c8e271de6a0b9a926e7186c7b24ffe849d67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44224
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I08cc198f326f02b3f38234b938208ea49a13fab6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44164
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For FIPS reasons, one might wish to ensure that a random AES-GCM nonce
was generated entirely within the FIPS module. If so, then these are the
AEADs for you.
Change-Id: Ic2b7864b089f446401f700d7d55bfa6336c61e23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43686
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We use this constant a lot in e_aes.c, but we write it out every time.
Change-Id: Iaa92efb391def6640349940c682d9f70ddaa23d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43685
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Adam Langley
Bradley Hess
Anthony Roberts
Peter Collingbourne
Tamas Petz