Chiebot-Mirror/boringssl - boringssl - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
David Benjamin	1e15682f1a	Enable SHA-512 ARM acceleration when available. This imports the changes to sha512-armv8.pl from upstream's af0fcf7b4668218b24d9250b95e0b96939ccb4d1. Tweaks needed: - Add an explicit .text because we put .LK$BITS in .rodata for XOM - .LK$bits and code are in separate sections, so use adrp/add instead of plain adr - Where glibc needs feature flags to enable pthread_rwlock, Apple interprets _XOPEN_SOURCE as a request to disable Apple extensions. Tighten the condition on the _XOPEN_SOURCE check. Added support for macOS and Linux, tested manually on an ARM Mac and a VM, respectively. Fuchsia and Windows do not currently have APIs to expose this bit, so I've left in TODOs. Benchmarks from an Apple M1 Max: Before: Did 4647000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000103us (74.3 MB/sec) Did 1614000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000379us (413.0 MB/sec) Did 439000 SHA-512 (1350 bytes) operations in 1001694us (591.6 MB/sec) Did 76000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1011821us (615.3 MB/sec) Did 39000 SHA-512 (16384 bytes) operations in 1024311us (623.8 MB/sec) After: Did 10369000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000088us (165.9 MB/sec) [+123.1%] Did 3650000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000079us (934.3 MB/sec) [+126.2%] Did 1029000 SHA-512 (1350 bytes) operations in 1000521us (1388.4 MB/sec) [+134.7%] Did 175000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1001874us (1430.9 MB/sec) [+132.5%] Did 89000 SHA-512 (16384 bytes) operations in 1010314us (1443.3 MB/sec) [+131.4%] (This doesn't seem to change the overall SHA-256 vs SHA-512 performance question on ARM, when hashing perf matters. SHA-256 on the same chip gets up to 2454.6 MB/s.) In terms of build coverage, for now, we'll have build coverage everywhere and test coverage on Chromium, which runs this code on macOS CI. We should request a macOS ARM64 bot for our standalone CI. Longer term, we need a QEMU-based builder to test various features. QEMU seems to have pretty good coverage of all this, which will at least give us Linux. I haven't added an OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_SHA512 for now. Instead, we just look at the standard __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 define. Strangely, the corresponding -march tag is not sha512. Neither GCC and nor Clang have -march=armv8-a+sha512. Instead, -march=armv8-a+sha3 implies both __ARM_FEATURE_SHA3 and __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512! Yet everything else seems to describe the SHA512 extension as separate from SHA3. https://developer.arm.com/architectures/system-architectures/software-standards/acle Update-Note: Consumers with a different build setup may need to limit -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=700 to Linux or non-Apple platforms. Otherwise, <sys/types.h> won't define some typedef needed by <sys/sysctl.h>. If you see a build error about u_char, etc., being undefined in some system header, that is probably the cause. Change-Id: Ia213d3796b84c71b7966bb68e0aec92e5d7d26f0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50807 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	3 years ago
David Benjamin	af561c221d	Sync sha512-armv8.pl up to 753316232243ccbf86b96c1c51ffcb41651d9ad5. This imports 753316232243ccbf86b96c1c51ffcb41651d9ad5, 46f4e1bec51dc96fa275c168752aa34359d9ee51, and 32bbb62ea634239e7cb91d6450ba23517082bab6. The last commit fixes a detection of big-endian aarch64 in the kernel, which we do not support at all, but is imported to reduce the upstream diff. Though it points out a messy part of arm_arch.h: __ARMEL__ and __ARMEB__ are specific to 32-bit ARM. __AARCH64EB__ and __AARCH64EL__ are the 64-bit ones. But OpenSSL's arm_arch.h defines __ARME[LB]__ for aarch64 and uses it in perlasm. We should fix the files upstream to look at the aarch64 ones. (Indeed our own base.h assumes __ARMEL__ implies 32-bit ARM.) Change-Id: I6c2241e103a97e8c3599cdfa43dcc6f30d4a2581 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50806 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	3 years ago
David Benjamin	e90cf82acc	Import sha512-armv8.pl transforms from upstream NEON code. We currently have two aarch64 SHA-256 implementations: one using general-purpose registers and one using the SHA-256 extensions. Upstream's 866e505e0d663158b0fe63a7fb7455eebacc6470 added a NEON version. This CL syncs the transforms at the bottom of the file, to avoid potential mistranslations in future imports. It doesn't change the output for our current assembly. Skips the NEON implementation itself for now. It only helps processors without SHA-256 instructions. While Android does not actually mandate the cryptography extensions on ARMv8, most devices have it. Additionally, this file does CPU dispatch in assembly, without taking advantage of static information. We'd end up shipping both fallback SHA-256 implementations. This is particularly silly because NEON is mandatory in ARMv8-A anyway. (Does anyone build us on -R or -M? Probably not?) (If we later have a reason to import it, the binary size cost isn't that significant. Moreover, the NEON fallback is actually slightly smaller than the non-NEON fallback, so if we move CPU dispatch to C, importing may even be worthwhile.) Change-Id: I3c8ca6e77e4e6d1299f975c407cbcf4c9c240523 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50805 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	3 years ago
David Benjamin	549e4e7995	Align with upstream on 'close STDOUT' lines. When upstreaming `c1d8c5b0e0` as https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and then https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930, we ended up diverging slightly: in the upstream version, I ended up applying the same change to the xlate files. Upstream also suggested "error closing STDOUT: $!". Apply the same changes here. Change-Id: I8a8cbc3944432e94a8844f9f628a900edfe77b30 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48725 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Florin Crișan	7a3e801217	fix #415 : Perl scripts fail when building from a path with spaces Because file names are not enclosed in quotation marks in the open call. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/boringssl/issues/detail?id=415 ``` cmake --build "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\." [9/439] Generating rdrand-x86_64.asm FAILED: crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.asm cmd.exe /C "cd /D "C:\Projects\ Extern\Visual C++ 2015\x64 Debug\Build\BoringSSL\crypto\fipsmodule" && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E make_directory . && C:\Perl64\bin\perl.exe "C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl" nasm rdrand-x86_64.asm" Can't open perl script "C:/Projects/": No such file or directory error closing STDOUT at C:/Projects/ Extern/Source/BoringSSL/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl line 87. ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. ``` Bug: 415 Change-Id: I83c4a460689b9adeb439425ad390322ae8b2002a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47884 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	a6b6b804a0	Align armv8.pl references to OPENSSL_armcap_P. This imports d741debb320bf54e8575d35603a44d4eb40fa1f9 from upstream. We've been managing the shared libraries already because our arm-xlate.pl automatically adds .hidden to .extern lines, but nice to reduce the diff. (This does result in some duplicate .hidden lines in the generated output, but we still want the arm-xlate.pl patch to automatically hide .globl.) Removing .comm lines does change the generated output, but having each asm file define its own copy of OPENSSL_armcap_P as a common symbol always seemed odd. I recall some weird issue where the armv4.pl files subtly rely on it for iOS's strange .indirect_symbol machinery. (Not actually because iOS wants a common symbol but because arm-xlate.pl repurposes .comm to trigger .indirect_symbol.) Fortunately, aarch64 is much better about PC-relative addressing, so it should be a no-op. The .comm lines have also previously caused weird issues (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/32324), so it's generally nice to get rid of them. Update-Note: If aarch64 builds get some weird error about relocations, it's this CL's fault. Change-Id: I763ffa6cda750d99694ded8a5b68d7b27b09cfc9 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44464 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	a0b49d63fd	aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- \| Compiler \| -mbranch-protection \| Feature macros \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| clang \| 9.0.0 \| 11.0.0 \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| gcc \| 9 \| expected in 10.1+ \| ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	5 years ago
Adam Langley	fb0c05cac2	acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	5 years ago