This checks validity for UTF8String, BMPString, and UniversalString.
When we detach the core types from ASN1_ITEM, this will likely also be
reshuffled around, probably into type-specific functions. But for now
just get the checks in place.
Update-Note: Invalid strings in X.509 certificates and other ASN.1
structures will now be rejected. This change is less risky than it seems
because most strings in X.509 are in X509_NAME, which already rejected
invalid instances of these string types (but not other string types)
during canonicalization. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/412 for a
discussion of that mess.
Bug: 427
Change-Id: I0d7e24dfd841703d2a8581ec4e78ed5bc3862d75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This CL is the result of the following commands:
for d in asn1 x509 x509v3 pem; do
go run util/convert_comments.go crypto/$d/*.h
go run util/convert_comments.go crypto/$d/*.c
done
Change-Id: If78433f68cb2f913b0de06ded744a5a65540e1cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53087
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This CL runs the same command as in the preceding CL, but with
'IncludeBraces: true' added to .clang-format. I've split this out
separately because the documentation says:
> Setting this option to true could lead to incorrect code formatting
> due to clang-format’s lack of complete semantic information. As such,
> extra care should be taken to review code changes made by this option.
I've also kept InsertBraces out of .clang-format for now because it's a
fairly recent option, and clang-format fails when it sees unrecognized
options.
Change-Id: I305ea7bb2633704053a1f8de1e11b037b9fc8a76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53086
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Previously, we did not clang-format a few directories because we had
left them largely untouched. clang-format them now so we're finally more
uniform.
This CL is the result of the following commands:
for d in asn1 x509 x509v3 pem; do
clang-format -i crypto/$d/*.h
clang-format -i crypto/$d/*.c
done
(Written in this funny way because crypto/pem/*.h doesn't match
anything.)
Change-Id: I7f4ca9b3a9c8f07d6556e00e9e84b3c0880ee12e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53085
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Refuse to parse times that are invalid according to RFC 5280, with
a few exceptions for compatibility. This can affect test code that
relies on making and parsing certificates that contain invalid times.
Update-Note: Certificates containing invalid ASN.1 times will no longer parse.
Bug: 491, 427
Change-Id: I2a3fe3a4d359ac662340a225d05b360718eb8c29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52665
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
clang-format gets very confused by the comments in these tables. (The
comments seem to have already gotten a little messed up from upstream's
reformatted.) Reformat them ahead of time. I removed the tag2str number
comments as they aren't really doing much good at this point.
Also remove the last entry in tag2bits because it's not actually used.
ASN1_tag2bit only reads the first 31 entries.
Change-Id: If50770fd79b9d6ccab5558d24b0ee3a27c81a452
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52731
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Inspired by Joel Sing's work in libre.
Change-Id: I17267af926b7d42472f7dae3205fda9aabdfa73d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52385
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[UNIVERSAL 0] is reserved by X.680 for the encoding to use. BER uses
this to encode indefinite-length EOCs, but it is possible to encode it
in a definite-length element or in a non-EOC form (non-zero length, or
constructed).
Whether we accept such encodings is normally moot: parsers will reject
the tag as unsuitable for the type. However, the ANY type matches all
tags. Previously, we would allow this, but crypto/asn1 has some ad-hoc
checks for unexpected EOCs, in some contexts, but not others.
Generalize this check to simply rejecting [UNIVERSAL 0] in all forms.
This avoids a weird hole in the abstraction where tags are sometimes
representable in BER and sometimes not. It also means we'll preserve
this check when migrating parsers from crypto/asn1.
Update-Note: There are two kinds of impacts I might expect from this
change. The first is BER parsers might be relying on the CBS DER/BER
element parser to pick up EOCs, as our ber.c does. This should be caught
by the most basic unit test and can be fixed by detecting EOCs
externally.
The second is code might be trying to parse "actual" elements with tag
[UNIVERSAL 0]. No actual types use this tag, so any non-ANY field is
already rejecting such inputs. However, it is possible some input has
this tag in a field with type ANY. This CL will cause us to reject that
input. Note, however, that crypto/asn1 already rejects unexpected EOCs
inside sequences, so many cases were already rejected anyway. Such
inputs are also invalid as the ANY should match some actual, unknown
ASN.1 type, and that type cannot use the reserved tag.
Fixed: 455
Change-Id: If42cacc01840439059baa0e67179d0f198234fc4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52245
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This simplifies the ASN1_get_object calling convention and removes
another significant source of tasn_dec.c complexity. This change does
not affect our PKCS#7 and PKCS#12 parsers.
Update-Note: Invalid certificates (and the few external structures using
asn1t.h) with BER indefinite lengths will now be rejected.
Bug: 354
Change-Id: I723036798fc3254d0a289c77b105fcbdcda309b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Constructed strings are a BER mechanism where a string type can be
represented as a tree of constructed nodes and primitive leaves, that
then have to be concatenated by the parser. This is prohibited in DER
and a significant source of complexity in our parser.
Note this change does not affect our PKCS#7 and PKCS#12 parsers (where
BER is sadly necessary for interop) because those use CBS.
Update-Note: Invalid certificates (and the few external structures using
asn1t.h) with BER constructed strings will now be rejected.
Bug: 354
Change-Id: I5a8ee028ec89ed4f2d5c099a0588f2029b864580
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
it->funcs is only an ASN1_AUX for ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE and
ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE. Fortunately, the other possible types for it->funcs
are larger than ASN1_AUX and we don't touch the result when we
shouldn't, so this is merely a strict aliasing violation.
Change-Id: I29e94249e0b137fe8df0b16254366ae6705c8784
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49351
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports 1ecc76f6746cefd502c7e9000bdfa4e5d7911386 and
41d62636fd996c031c0c7cef746476278583dc9e from upstream. These would have
rejected the mistake in OpenSSL's EDIPartyName sturcture.
Change-Id: I4eb218f9372bea0f7ff302321b9dc1992ef0c13a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44424
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A few can be made static. Move the rest of asn1_locl.h.
Update-Note: Code search says these are unused. If someone's using them,
we can reexport them.
Change-Id: Ib41fd15792b59e7a1a41fa6b7ef5297dc19f3021
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43893
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was used to register custom primitive types, namely some INTEGER
variations. We have since removed them all.
Change-Id: Id3f5b15058bc3be1cef5e0f989d2e7e6db392712
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43891
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Sadly we need to keep ASN1_put_eoc. Ruby uses it.
OpenSSL's PKCS#7 implementation generated an "ndef" variant of the
encoding functions, to request indefinite-length encoding. Remove the
support code for this.
Update-Note: Types that use one of the NDEF macros in asn1t.h will fail
to compile. This CL should not affect certificate parsing.
Change-Id: I6e03f6927ea4b7a6acd73ac58bf49512b39baab8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43889
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of an older incarnation of OpenSSL's ASN.1 code.
Update-Note: Types using IMPLEMENT_COMPAT_ASN1 from openssl/asn1t.h will
fail to compile. This CL should not affect certificate parsing.
Change-Id: I59e04f7ec219ae478119b77ce3f851a16b6c038f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43888
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is never used. Remove the logic so we can gradually simply the
legacy ASN.1 code.
Update-Note: Types using ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE from openssl/asn1t.h will
fail to compile. This CL should not affect certificate parsing.
Change-Id: I06b61ae2656a657aed81cd467051a494155b0963
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43887
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This entire function is assuming all the STACK_OF(T) types are secretly
the same type, but best to consistently use the sk_ASN1_VALUE_*
wrappers. The raw sk_foo functions are an implementation detail of the
macros and we probably should rename them to be better prefixed (as
upstream did).
Change-Id: I62d910b93ca6be5e1c83ae269c7df6a437ffb316
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Bob Beck
Adam Langley