Upstream ultimately preferred a different naming convention, and
type-specific constants. Align with them.
Update-Note: This renames some BoringSSL-specific constants that we
recently added. It doesn't look like anyone's used them yet.
Change-Id: I580e0872a5f09fb1c5bab9127c35f1ed852680c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions are not in any released version of OpenSSL. The history
is they were added to 1.0.2 beta for CT, but then removed in favor of
i2d_re_X509_tbs. We forked in between the two events.
I'm not sure what the reasoning was upstream's end. I'm thinking:
- X509 currently only captures the serialized TBSCertificate. It might
be nice to capture the whole Certificate to avoid needing a
serialization in X509_cmp and make it easier to interop with other
stacks. (Unclear.) That would require not exporting the X509_CINF
standalone for serialization.
- The modified bit means, without locking, i2d_X509 is not const or
thread-safe. We *might* be able to shift the re-encoding to
i2d_re_X509_tbs, which is already inherently non-const. That requires
not having X509_CINF_set_modified.
I'm not sure how feasible either of these are, but between that,
upstream alignment, and X509_CINF otherwise being absent from public
accessors, it seems worth removing.
Update-Note: X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, and
X509_CINF_get_signature are removed. I believe all callers have been
updated. Callers should use i2d_re_X509_tbs, i2d_X509_tbs, and
X509_get0_tbs_sigalg instead.
Change-Id: Ic1906ba383faa7903973cb498402518985dd838c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is mostly to confirm the STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) was created the right
number of times.
Change-Id: I30c32f91cb6091e63bfcaebb0fe966270e503d93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46984
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes a bug in ASN1_TYPE_get. Partly imported from upstream's
261ec72d58af64327214a78ca1c54b169ad93c28, though I don't believe
ASN1_TYPE_set was broken per se. There's also a lot more than in that
commit.
I've added a test to ensure we maintain the unused bits invariant
anyway, in case external code relies on it. (The invariant comes from
the pointer being NULL-initialized and from ASN1_primitive_free zeroing
*pval on free.)
Change-Id: I4c0c57519a7628041d81c26cd850317e01409556
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46324
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per RFC5280, section 5.1.1.2,
[signatureAlgorithm] MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (Section 5.1.2.2).
This aligns with a check we already do on the X.509 side.
Update-Note: Invalid CRLs with inconsistent inner and outer signature
algorithms will now be rejected.
Change-Id: I9ef495a9b26779399c932903871391aacd8f2618
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45946
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The X509 version APIs confuse everyone, including our own tests
(v3name_test.cc was using the wrong value). Introduce constants. Also
document which version to use for each type. It is extra confusing that,
although certificates and CRLs use the same Version enum, RFC5280
defines X.509 v3 certificates with X.509 v2 CRLs. (There are no v3
CRLs.)
I'll send a similar patch to OpenSSL to keep upstream aligned.
Change-Id: If096138eb004156d43df87a6d74f695b04f67480
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commit 4251d0d3f6, except
that the reland dates have been updated to not be in the past.
Change-Id: I7812c0e36d87ed1e049ec0a7d92a23efec881a81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I accidentally lost these lines juggling patches around.
Change-Id: I35551eeb0f1bb26dee74344048198a318c55209b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44624
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also CVE-2020-1971, f960d81215ebf3f65e03d4d5d857fb9b666d6920, and
aa0ad2011d3e7ad8a611da274ef7d9c7706e289b from upstream OpenSSL.
Unlike upstream's version, this CL opts for a simpler edipartyname_cmp.
GENERAL_NAME_cmp is already unsuitable for ordering, just equality,
which means there's no need to preserve return values from
ASN1_STRING_cmp. Additionally, the ASN.1 structure implies most fields
cannot be NULL.
(The change from other to x400Address is a no-op. They're the same type.
Just x400Address is a little clearer. Historical quirks of the
GENERAL_NAME structure.)
Change-Id: I4b0ffe8e931c8ef916794a486e6a0d6d684c0cc1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
x509_rsa_ctx_to_pss returns an error when trying to make an X509_ALGOR
for an arbitrary RSA-PSS salt length. This dates to the initial commit
and isn't in OpenSSL, so I imagine this was an attempt to ratchet down
on RSA-PSS parameter proliferation.
If the caller explicitly passes in md_size, rather than using the -1
convenience value, we currently fail. Allow those too and add an error
to the error queue so it is easier to diagnose.
Change-Id: Ia738142e48930ef5a916cad5326f15f64d766ba5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43824
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When generating a signature with some external signing process, the
caller needs to fill in the TBSCertificate (including the signature
algorithms), serialize the TBSCertificate, and then fill in the
signature.
We have i2d_re_X509_tbs (originally from CT I believe), but there are no
setters for the signature algorithms or the signature. Add
X509_set1_signature_algo, which mirrors upstream's
X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo, and X509_set1_signature_value, which is
new. Upstream has X509_REQ_set0_signature, but that requires the caller
manually assemble an ASN1_BIT_STRING. Taking the byte string seems less
error-prone.
Additionally, add i2d_X509_tbs and i2d_X509_CRL_tbs, for the non-"re"
variants of those APIs. Conscrypt needs to extract the TBS portion of a
certificate and a CRL, to implement X509Certificate.getTBSCertificate()
and X509CRL.getTBSCertList(). There, the aim is to get the data to
verify on an existing immutable certificate. OpenSSL has avoided
exporting the X509_CINF type, which I think is correct, so instead this
mirrors i2d_re_X509_tbs. (This does mean mirroring the confusing i2d
calling convention though.)
These new functions should unblock getting rid of a bunch of direct
struct accesses.
Later on, we should reorganize this header into immutable APIs for
verification and mutable APIs for generation. Even though we're stuck
the mistake of a common type for both use cases, I think splitting up
them up will let us rationalize the caches in the X509 objects a bit.
Change-Id: I96e6ab5cee3608e07b2ed7465c449a72ca10a393
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43784
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already support this, but there wasn't a test for it.
Change-Id: I14304b99b312fcf729703cf175ec41e3e60db363
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43704
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a looser reland of
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41804, which was
reverted in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42804.
Enforcing that the ECDSA parameters were omitted rather than NULL hit
some compatibility issues, so instead allow either forms for now. To
align with the Chromium verifier, we'll probably want to later be
stricter with a quirks flag to allow the invalid form, and then add a
similar flag to Chromium. For now, at least try to reject the completely
invalid parameter values.
Update-Note: Some invalid certificates will now be rejected at
verification time. Parsing of certificates is unchanged.
Bug: b/167375496,342
Change-Id: I1cba44fd164660e82a7a27e26368609e2bf59955
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's a lot easier to copy certificates to and from x509_test.cc when
there isn't an indent to worry about. Note this does stick a newline in
front of each string, but the PEM parsers don't care.
Change-Id: I06aff263a2470596e8c50564c198693cfdbf9c59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Expect to reenable in January 2021.
Change-Id: I364ffcf235901398196c60c45ff1c07fcac3f801
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43024
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Conscrypt will need these functions. Also fix a bug in
X509_get_extension_flags's error-handling. While I'm here, add
X509_CRL_get0_extensions for completeness. Nothing uses this yet, but
this could later be an alternative to avoid Conscrypt's mess with
templates.
Change-Id: I9393b75fcf53346535e6a4712355be081baa630d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42744
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X509_STORE_CTX_init is documented upstream to allow a NULL store and has
logic to account for it. However, attempting to use such an
X509_STORE_CTX crashes in X509_verify_cert due to the
additional_untrusted logic we added.
Moreover, before that change, it still crashes because
X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer (the default get_issuer hook) assumes
ctx->ctx (the store) is non-null. This was also true in upstream but
later fixed in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6001. However,
without a store, there is no trust anchor, so this is not very useful.
Reject NULL stores in X509_STORE_CTX_init and remove the logic allowing
for a NULL one.
Thanks to Danny Halawi for catching this.
Update-Note: X509_STORE_CTX_init will now fail when the store is NULL,
rather than report success, only to crash later in X509_verify_cert.
Breakage should thus be limited to code which was passing in a NULL
store but never used the resulting X509_STORE_CTX.
Change-Id: I9db0289612cc245a8d62d6fa647d6b56b2daabda
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42728
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commit 9dd9d4fc24.
BUG=b/167375496,342
Original change's description:
> Check AlgorithmIdentifier parameters for RSA and ECDSA signatures.
>
> This aligns with the Chromium certificate verifier, which allows NULL or
> empty for RSA and requires empty for ECDSA.
>
> Bug: 342
> Change-Id: I34acf68f63b4d133dd47b73144b2f27224c499ee
> Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41804
> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TBR=agl@google.com,davidben@google.com
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Change-Id: If8f136a09fea68e64c9f4f9ffae88b6209ede124
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42804
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Sadly, we need to roll this one back for now, at least until we've
cleared all the test failures it causes. This retains the other checks
in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41746. We're
only rolling back enforcement of the DEFAULT v1 encoding.
Bug: 348, 364
Change-Id: I6a290311f5a5714ff4d5add3ae35ec4550398b32
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42104
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Adam Langley