Also avoid unnecessarily stashing a copy of the serialized old
ClientHello.
Change-Id: I699299f0ce767ba059fbb08e8f2140793a649322
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46628
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
All the comments say the buffer is only needed in TLS 1.2, but this
doesn't match the code. The code uses the buffer in one place, for ECH,
to avoid copying a hash.Hash. Go does support this, albeit in a *very*
roundabout way.
This is ugly but means we can now properly drop the handshake buffer in
TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I4a1559a64fcb98ccfbab54de99402fe6f62725a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46627
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The 'client' and 'server' halves are remnants of SSL 3.0 and Go
(originally) lacking a way to clone hash.Hash. The Go limitation meant
that computing SSL 3.0's proto-HMAC construction mutated the running
hash on Finished, so crypto/tls just maintained two of them.
Without SSL 3.0, this is no longer needed. That, however, leaves us with
having both a crypto.Hash and a hash.Hash, and both can't be named
'hash'. I stepped around this by storing the cipher suite itself and
using cipherSuite.hash().
Change-Id: Ia38880ae446949baa2181d33136c748cf5374664
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46626
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We only need to implement enough of SSL 3.0 to test that the shim does
not.
Change-Id: I25cb48e407f1bc458bbdb3544b9df9fdfbc3d9c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Per the comment in writeClientHash, we should writeClientHash before
writeRecord to get the sequence numbers right. Some of the client HRR
bits are still wrong, but I'll fix those as part of tidying up the HRR
path in a later commit.
(This doesn't actually matter because only DTLS uses sequence numbers,
and we don't support DTLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: I4cbc671f524d56c7f970b5ec0bceeb2641625d15
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46624
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of when we had various pre-standard TLS 1.3 variants.
runner's logic is now built-in.
Change-Id: I72a2fcef9a94e82fa39fe4be9d60ddd329d212ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46604
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In early TLS 1.3 drafts, HelloRetryRequest was a dedicated message type.
Our HelloRetryRequest handling in runner is still based on this. Along
the way, remove the SendServerHelloAsHelloRetryRequest test, since
that's just a generic unexpected message type now.
Change-Id: Idd9c54d0ab66d962657af9a53849c3928f78ce5c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46585
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids looking up and passing around the cipherSuite object
everywhere. We don't serialize ClientSessionState and, if we did, we can
simply do the lookup at parsing time.
Change-Id: Ice06e4da6b23ff32988597100e8aaa11b82f23ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46565
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids duplicating some code in client and server. It should also
clean up some ECH test code, which needs to juggle a pair of transcripts
for a brief window.
Change-Id: I4db11119e34b56453f01b5890060b8d4129a25b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 works, so no need to exclude version negotiation. We also now
only test QUICTransportParams with QUIC, so there is no need to exclude
it manually. Checking the protocol works as well.
Change-Id: Ie9d33095231a1f9eb74145db5147a287e4fdc930
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46527
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is no longer needed.
Change-Id: Ie6dba524ecccd265f7f80a910b40c0fe1800356b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46526
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Omitting the extension means we'll never issue tickets, but if the
client were to offer a ticket anyway, RFC8446 4.2.9 says we MUST reject
the ClientHello. It's not clear on what alert to use, but
missing_extension is probably appropriate.
Thanks to Ben Kaduk for pointing this out.
Change-Id: Ie5c720eac9dd2e1a27ba8a13c59b707c109eaa4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46464
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commit a3437c09c7. There was
a miscommunication and it does not seem like we currently need this. If
that changes later, it's in Git and we can bring it back easily.
Change-Id: Ibbce29df2258a2d893d725ab3ee6fd78c5b6cb00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a little inconvenient for external users of the test suite. It's
also not very helpful to pass -handshaker-path in build configurations
without a handshaker because there won't be a file there anyway.
Change-Id: I6a8fdcfbbf86288876c4c6fda2a46d32663efb69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1-00. The code point is disabled by default
and must be configured in SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs and
SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs. It is also only defined for TLS 1.3
client certificates and otherwise ignored.
This required reworking the tests a bit since this is the first
signature algorithm that's disabled by default, and the first algorithm
that behaves differently between client and server.
Change-Id: Iac4aa96a4963cbc33688c252e958a572c5c3b511
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46187
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already know all the supported curves in runner.go. No sense in
repeating this list in more places than needed. (I'm about to need a
similar construct for -signing-prefs, so I figure it's worth being
consistent.)
This CL also adds a ShimConfig option because others don't support the
same curves we do and will likely run into this quickly.
Change-Id: Id79cea16891802af021b53a33ffd811a5d51c4ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46186
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This flag causes the runner to execute the shim with the RR debugger.
See https://rr-project.org/.
Unlike typical debuggers, the RR workflow is to first record a session
and then replay it. The user cannot interact with the debugger while
recording and they replay the session multiple times. For these reasons,
I've opted not to launch xterm like -gdb and -lldb do.
The other difference is that -rr-record restricts the runner to exactly
one test. Otherwise, it's too easy to accumulate a bunch of unwanted
recordings. Also, `rr replay` uses the most recent recording by default,
so it's not very useful for runner to record multiple tests.
Change-Id: I2d29d64df5c4c832e50833325db3500ec2698e76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46144
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This mirrors a change on the C side. Sessions may store the master
secret (main secret as of draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-01) in TLS 1.2 or
the resumption PSK in TLS 1.3, so giving it any description other than
plain 'secret' isn't even accurate.
(Doing this separately from the rfc8446bis names since it's a bit less
mechanical.)
Change-Id: Iaf2b72fe298f17eeb4f4957cfd78b0015c3a9d89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45824
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This aligns with OpenSSL's behavior. RFC7301 says servers should return
no_application_protocol if the client supported ALPN but no common
protocol was found. We currently interpret all values as
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK. Instead, implement both modes and give guidance on
whne to use each. (NOACK is still useful because the callback may be
shared across multiple configurations, some of which don't support ALPN
at all. Those would want to return NOACK to ignore the list.)
To match upstream, I've also switched SSL_R_MISSING_ALPN, added for
QUIC, to SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL.
Update-Note: Callers that return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from the
ALPN callback will change behavior. The old behavior may be restored by
returning SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, though see the documentation for new
recommendations on return values.
Change-Id: Ib7917b5f8a098571bed764c79aa7a4ce0f728297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The check was happening in code that only ran at TLS 1.2, so we weren't
testing anything. Additionally check the resumption case. While we do
handle it correctly, we only manage it due to the weird OpenSSL quirk
we've carried over from TLS 1.2 tickets where we synthesize a session ID
for TLS 1.3 tickets. (Is that still needed?)
That's subtle enough to warrant a test, and some other implementations
reuse our test suite, so it's worth the coverage there.
Change-Id: I83cc355bd853097ec6edcd2cc40b06b19e3b00e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45324
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A linter was complaining about some instance, so just fix the lot of it.
Change-Id: I7e23cbada6e42da887d740b84a05de9f104a86ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45284
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When offering 0-RTT, the client should check that all carried-over
values are consistent with its preferences. This ensures that parameter
negotiation happens independently of 0-RTT. The ALPS version of this
check was a tad too aggressive: a session without ALPS should be treated
as always compatible.
I'll follow this with a fix to the draft spec to clarify this.
Change-Id: Ia3c2a60449c555d1d91c4e528215f8e551a90a9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45104
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Note that when BoringSSL is not in QUIC mode, it
will error if it sees the new codepoint as a server
but it will ignore the legacy codepoint as that could
be a different private usage of that codepoint.
Change-Id: I314f8f0b169cedd96eeccc42b44153e97044388c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They align exactly with TLS record types, so just use the existing
constants.
Change-Id: I693e7c740458cf73061e6b573eeb466d0fce93cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44990
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This changes the format of the mock QUIC transport to include an
explicit encryption level, matching real QUIC a bit better. In
particular, we need that extra data to properly skip rejected early data
on the shim side. (On the runner, we manage it by synchronizing with the
TLS stack. Still, the levels make it a bit more accurate.)
Testing sending and receiving of actual early data is not very relevant
in QUIC since application I/O is external, but this allows us to more
easily run the same tests in TLS and QUIC.
Along the way, improve error-reporting in mock_quick_transport.cc so
it's easier to diagnose record-level mismatches.
Change-Id: I96175a4023134b03d61dac089f8e7ff4eb627933
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44988
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This originally didn't work because we installed an async BIO, while
QUIC uses the BIO to mock out a QUIC transport. Our QUIC IO callbacks
don't have a meaningful notion of sync vs async, so no-op this portion
of the -async flag.
The immediate motivation is I'd like to make addExtensionTests run over
all protocols, and having the async tests fail is inconvenient. However,
async tests in QUIC is still meaningful anyway to support various
callbacks, so I've removed the workaround in the state machine coverage
tests. (Though most of those async tests are redundant as they're
concerned with IO, not callbacks.) Along the way, the various handshake
record controls are irrelevant to QUIC, so this actually results in a
net decrease in redundant tests.
Change-Id: I67c1ee48cb2d85b47ae3328fecfac86a24aa2ed1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44987
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The state machine around EndOfEarlyData is a bit messy, which caused a
problem introducing the new message in QUIC. We keep waffling on whether
that state junction should no-op the EndOfEarlyData state or skip it.
Since skipping it caused us to miss this spot, let's try no-op-ing it.
As a test, so this CL is easier to cherry-pick, I've just duplicated the
basic server test. Better, however, would be to run all the extensions
tests under QUIC. (In particular, this is missing 0-RTT coverage.) But
this is a large diff and requires improving the mock QUIC transport,
etc., in runner. That work is done in follow-up CLs, which replace this
duplicated test.
Change-Id: I25b6feabdc6e5393ba7f486651986a90e3721667
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was a QUIC-specific ALPS bug, so I'm thinking we should loop
addExtensionTests at all protocols. To do so, we need to fix this bug in
the test expectation.
Change-Id: Ic05a4cb2ea32e7145441a0273cd65966c41534ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44986
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This wasn't the cause of the bug, but I noticed we never tested it, so
fill that in.
Change-Id: Ib38bc08309e69f43c1995ba2a387643c0a7bae99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44984
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This CL implements the backend server behavior described in Section 7.2
of draft-ietf-tls-esni-09.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I2e162673ce564db0cb75fc9b71ef11ed15037f4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43924
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ifef2b94f701ab75755893c2806335b626b655446
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44904
Commit-Queue: Dan McArdle <dmcardle@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These APIs were used by Chromium to control the carve-out for the TLS
1.3 downgrade signal. As of
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2324170,
Chromium no longer uses them.
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade,
SSL_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade, and SSL_is_tls13_downgrade now do
nothing. Calls sites should be removed. (There are some copies of older
Chromium lying around, so I haven't removed the functions yet.) The
enforcement was already on by default, so this CL does not affect
callers that don't use those functions.
Change-Id: I016af8291cd92051472d239c4650602fe2a68f5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In order to skip groups of tests in the cross-version testing (like
ALPS-*), it's useful to be able to match them by pattern.
Change-Id: Ic7e40c04a33b4bcbb08494fa04deb5e862f09d8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43864
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Original CL by svaldez, reworked by davidben.)
Change-Id: I8570808fa5e96a1c9e6e03c4877039a22e73254f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42404
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Add an earlyData and earlyDataRejected flag to configure the standard
0-RTT test options. It's too tedious otherwise. Along the way, I added
an -expect-cipher flag to a few of the tests which could do with them.
This does cause most 0-RTT tests to exchange a quick burst of data, so a
few more fuzzer mode suppressions are needed. I think that's probably
fine. Maybe we should mess with fuzzer mode so it's able to trial
decrypt as this is getting a little tedious.
Change-Id: Ib6490fe006d91294aab1a06d88f7793c6ae840c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43086
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The Go TLS implementation, at the time runner forked, had custom
testing-only equal methods on all the handshake messages. We've since
removed all of them except for ClientHello, where we repurposed the
function to check ClientHello consistency on HelloVerifyRequest and
HelloRetryRequest.
These are tedious to update. Upstream has since replaced them with
reflect.DeepEqual, but the comparison we want is even tighter. Even
unknown extensions aren't allowed to change. Replace the check with a
custom one that works on the byte serialization and remove
clientHelloMsg.equal.
Along the way, I've fixed the HRR PSK identity logic to match the spec a
bit more and check binders more consistently.
Change-Id: Ib39e8791201c42d37e304ae5110c7aeed62c8b3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43364
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This CL replaces clientHelloMsg's npnAfterAlpn and pskBinderFirst fields
with a new field: prefixExtensions. The extensions in prefixExtensions
are tried first when marshalling clientHelloMsg.
The ability to control extensions' marshalling order will make it
simpler to implement the "outer_extensions" behavior defined in
draft-ietf-tls-esni-07.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ib6dcc1e6fa0281f312cb65a9e204415c3f3ef2c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43064
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have an ad-hoc expectResumeVersion, and I'll want to add one for ALPS
(to confirm changing ALPS on resumption works). We probably could have
done with such a test for ALPN too. Wrap all the ConnectionState
expectations into a struct with an optional resumeExpectations field.
Also move the OCSPResponse() method to ConnectionState for consistency.
Change-Id: Icaabf5571c51e78ed078f57de0e04928d3f3fa8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43084
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This will make it less tedious to add new fields later.
Change-Id: I82fe8f1859e4eaf0c72551d4ca5cf9534bee10b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43005
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This version adds signature algorithms to the extension
Change-Id: I91dc78d33ee81cb7a6221c7bdeefc8ea460a2d6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42424
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Update-Note: If an SSL_QUIC_METHOD is set, connections will now fail if
ALPN is not negotiated. This new behavior can be detected by checking
if the value of BORINGSSL_API_VERSION is greater than 10.
Bug: 294
Change-Id: I42fb80aa09268e77cec4a51e49cdad79bd72fa58
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The CI should be set up to retain the Go module and build caches, so
we'll avoid downloading it multiple times. This avoids having to
replicate some code.
Update-Note: The tests now have a golang.org/x/crypto dependency. This
should be fetched transparently with Go modules. Monorepos with
different import path conventions may need to rewrite these imports.
Change-Id: If5ba52e051f180536d72109c2e690bbd13d58e7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
David Benjamin
Dan McArdle
David Schinazi
Adam Langley
Steven Valdez
Watson Ladd
Nick Harper