The representation here is a bit more messy than necessary. In doing so,
clean up the variable names and smooth away two rough edges:
- X509_ALGOR_get0 would leave *out_param_value uninitialized if
*out_param_type is V_ASN1_UNDEF. Instead, set it to NULL, so callers
do not accidentally use an uninitialized pointer.
- X509_PUBKEY_set0_param, if key is NULL, would leave the key alone. No
one calls this function externally and none of the (since removed)
callers in OpenSSL rely on this behavior. A NULL check here adds a
discontinuity at the empty string that seems unnecessary here:
changing the algorithm without changing the key isn't useful.
(Note the API doesn't support changing the key without the algorithm.)
Note for reviewing: the representation of ASN1_TYPE is specified
somewhat indirectly. ASN1_TYPE uses the ASN1_ANY ASN1_ITEM, which has
utype V_ASN1_ANY. Then you look at asn1_d2i_ex_primitive and asn1_ex_c2i
which peel off the ASN1_TYPE layer and parse directly into the value
field, with a fixup for NULL. Hopefully we can rework this someday...
Change-Id: I628c4e20f8ea2fd036132242337f4dcac5ba5015
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46165
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In order to provide evidence to auditors that high-level functions end
up calling into the FIPS module, provide counters that allow for such
monitoring.
Change-Id: I55d45299f3050bf58077715ffa280210db156116
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46124
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN1_OBJECTs are awkward. Sometimes they are static, when returned from
OBJ_nid2obj, and sometimes they are dynamic, when parsed from
crypto/asn1.
Most structures in crypto/asn1 need to support unknown OIDs and thus
must own their ASN1_OBJECTs. But they also may be initialized with
static ones in various APIs, such as X509_ALGOR_set0. To make that work,
ASN1_OBJECT_free detects static ASN1_OBJECTs and is a no-op.
Functions like X509_ALGOR_set0 take ownership, so OpenSSL has them take
a non-const ASN1_OBJECT*. To match, OBJ_nid2obj then returns a non-const
ASN1_OBJECT*, to signal that it is freeable.
However, this means OBJ_nid2obj's mutability doesn't match its return
type. In the fork, we switched OBJ_nid2obj to return const. But, in
doing so, we had to make X509_ALGOR_set0 and X509_PUBKEY_set0_param take
const ASN1_OBJECT, even though they would actually take ownership of
dynamic ASN1_OBJECTs. There are also a few internal casts with a TODO to
be const-correct.
Neither situation is ideal. (Perhaps a more sound model would be to copy
static ASN1_OBJECTs before putting them in most structs. But that would
not match current usage.) But I think aligning with OpenSSL is the
lesser evil here, since it avoids misleading set0 functions. Managing
ownership of ASN1_OBJECTs is much more common than mutating them. To
that end, I've added a note that ASN1_OBJECTs you didn't create must be
assumed immutable[*].
Update-Note: The change to OBJ_nid2obj should be compatible. The changes
to X509_PUBKEY_set0_param and X509_ALGOR_set0 may require fixing some
pointer types.
[*] This is *almost* honored by all of our functions. The exception is
c2i_ASN1_OBJECT, which instead checks the DYNAMIC flag as part of the
object reuse business. This would come up if we ever embedded
ASN1_OBJECTs directly in structs.
Change-Id: I1e6c700645c12b43323dd3887adb74e795c285b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46164
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This will also pull in POLICY_MAPPINGS by way of STACK_OF(T) handling.
Change-Id: I8ddc9547647f8cae3800047eb58e1c83f6ae1085
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46104
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is to help with cryptography.io compatibility. We don't implement
any of the flags (PKCS7_sign checks flags == PKCS7_DETACHED), but
cryptography.io now depends on the constant and PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO type
being available.
(cryptography.io also wants some new functions, but I think it's easier
to stub those out externally for now. If we need to actually enable
those features, we can look at actually implementing more of
PKCS7_sign.)
Change-Id: Id8419e34a68c04d4894417c7d6b13c1952d0bb88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46084
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL classified their behavior as a bug and are fixing it for the
next release. In principle it'd be more compatible to emulate OpenSSL's
bug and undo it when we update OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, but use of
PKCS12_parse is rare and this behavior is confusing, so let's leave it
as-is.
Bug: 250
Change-Id: I5f9825490a8afde67272dfaf476b35dbde94b59c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We aim to eventually make the entire X509 structure opaque, but let's
start small.
Update-Note: I believe this is now safe to do. If there are compile
failures, switch to X509_get0_notBefore, X509_getm_notBefore, and
X509_set1_notBefore, or revert this if I'm wrong and too many callers
still need updating.
Change-Id: I6e9d91630a10ac777e13ebcdeb543b3cbeea6383
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
PKCS#12 is overly general and, among other things, supports disabling
encryption. In practice, the unencrypted form is not widely implemented.
Moreover, even in contexts where cleartext is fine, an unencrypted
PKCS#12 file still requires a password for the mandatory MAC component.
They're not very useful.
However, cryptography.io uses them. Previously, we added support for
parsing these. This CL adds support for creating them too, because now
cryptography.io now also depends on that.
Change-Id: Ib7c4e29615047b6c73f887fea7c80f8844999bb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46045
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: This removes a function that appears to be unused. It also
hardcodes the use of MD5, so please do not use it.
Change-Id: I67909c6360e4737fc22742592f88b907eb818e96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45964
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I got the values flipped around. Also cryptography.io wants
EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag to check a curve's encoding. We (mostly) only
support named curves, so just return OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE.
Change-Id: I544e76b7380ecd8dceb1df3db4dd4cf5cb322352
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46024
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This improves compatibility with cryptography.io. cryptography.io
doesn't actually care what we return, since the code won't run, but
feigning success seems better than failure. If some application does try
to run this function and checks, returning an error will probably crash
it.
Change-Id: I7a8164753a2f1a7b31dbeb10c7030c5e5fea2bc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46004
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per RFC5280, section 5.1.1.2,
[signatureAlgorithm] MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (Section 5.1.2.2).
This aligns with a check we already do on the X.509 side.
Update-Note: Invalid CRLs with inconsistent inner and outer signature
algorithms will now be rejected.
Change-Id: I9ef495a9b26779399c932903871391aacd8f2618
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45946
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This may as well be computed from block_size. This reduces the
per-EVP_CIPHER_CTX memory usage slightly.
Update-Note: It doesn't look like anyone is reading into this field. If
they are, we can ideally fix it, or revert this if absolutely necessary.
Change-Id: Ieef9177bed1671efca23d4f94d3d528f82568fc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45884
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get the up_ref functions and signature accessors.
Change-Id: Ie12e3a48ccc7e4c165ba08001232f5453e3dca11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The X509 version APIs confuse everyone, including our own tests
(v3name_test.cc was using the wrong value). Introduce constants. Also
document which version to use for each type. It is extra confusing that,
although certificates and CRLs use the same Version enum, RFC5280
defines X.509 v3 certificates with X.509 v2 CRLs. (There are no v3
CRLs.)
I'll send a similar patch to OpenSSL to keep upstream aligned.
Change-Id: If096138eb004156d43df87a6d74f695b04f67480
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I85f0364b83440469c0d15c32dd96607be31fc1b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45904
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There are a few places where it is useful to run ECDSA with a specified
nonce:
- An ECDSA KAT in the module self-check
- Unit tests for particular test vectors
- Fuzzing the implementation (requested by the cryptofuzz project)
This replaces the fixed_k machinery with a separate function. Although
they are effectively the same, I've used two different functions.
One is internal and only used in the module self-check. The other is
exported for unit tests and cryptofuzz but marked with a for_testing.
(Chromium's presubmits flag uses of "for_testing" functions outside of
unit tests. The KAT version isn't in a test per se, so it's a separate
function.)
Bug: 391
Change-Id: I0f764d89bf0ac2081307e1079623d508fb0f2df7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45867
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CVE-2021-23840
(Imported from upstream's 6a51b9e1d0cf0bf8515f7201b68fb0a3482b3dc1.)
This differs slightly from upstream's version:
- EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW didn't seem necessary when ERR_R_OVERFLOW
already exists. (Also since we use CIPHER_R_*, it wouldn't have helped
with compatibility anyway. Though there's probably something to be
said for us folding CIPHER_R_* back into EVP_R_*.)
- For simplicity, just check in_len + bl at the top, rather than trying
to predict the exact number of bytes written.
Update-Note: Passing extremely large input lengths into EVP_CipherUpdate
will now fail. Use EVP_AEAD instead, which is size_t-based and has more
explicit output bounds.
Change-Id: I31835c89dcdecb6b112828f57deb798dc7187db5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Update-Note: No one uses this function. It had a NULL dereference in
some error cases. See CVE-2021-23841.
Change-Id: Ie1cc97615ac8b674147715d7d62e62faf218ae65
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45684
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This aligns with OpenSSL's behavior. RFC7301 says servers should return
no_application_protocol if the client supported ALPN but no common
protocol was found. We currently interpret all values as
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK. Instead, implement both modes and give guidance on
whne to use each. (NOACK is still useful because the callback may be
shared across multiple configurations, some of which don't support ALPN
at all. Those would want to return NOACK to ignore the list.)
To match upstream, I've also switched SSL_R_MISSING_ALPN, added for
QUIC, to SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL.
Update-Note: Callers that return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from the
ALPN callback will change behavior. The old behavior may be restored by
returning SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, though see the documentation for new
recommendations on return values.
Change-Id: Ib7917b5f8a098571bed764c79aa7a4ce0f728297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is largely some cleanup so the three features follow the same
patterns and is hopefully cleaner (no more separate static and
non-static paths). The practical impact is probably nil. (Linux-based
ARM builds with crypto extensions as a baseline, if any exist, save
binary size.)
Change-Id: I2214b1a54e2074024b8eeb51799a08b94646cbf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45485
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When a feature is enabled statically in the build config, the compiler
defines __ARM_NEON and also considers itself free to emit NEON code.
In this case, there is no need to check for NEON support at runtime
since the binary will not work without NEON anyway. Moving the check to
compile time lets us drop unused code.
Chrome has required NEON on Android for nearly five years now. However,
historically there was a bad CPU which broke on some NEON code, but not
others. See https://crbug.com/341598 and https://crbug.com/606629. We
worked around that CPU by parsing /proc/cpuinfo and intentionally
dropping the optimization. This is not a stable situation, however, as
we're hoping the compiler is not good enough at emitting NEON to trigger
this bug.
Since then, the number of affected devices has dropped, and Chrome has
raised the minimum Android requirement to L. The Net.HasBrokenNEON
metric from Chrome is now well in the noise.
This CL stops short of removing the workaround altogether because some
consumers of Cronet are unsure whether they needed this workaround.
Those consumers also build without __ARM_NEON, so gating on that works
out. We'll decide what to do with it pending metrics from them.
Update-Note: Builds with __ARM_NEON (-mfpu=neon) will now drop about
30KiB of dead code, but no longer work (if they even did before) on a
particular buggy CPU. Builds without __ARM_NEON are not affected.
Change-Id: Id8f7bccfb75afe0a1594572ea20c51d275b0a256
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
test_fips probably needs to exercise everything that we have self-tests
for.
(The following change will eliminate the duplication of the code to
create the FFDH group. For reasons, that can't be done in this change.)
Change-Id: Ia72064db77381e7cf396a34b4723b2607f26f00b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Our use-case for this does not require optimisation at the current time,
so a clean C implementation is fine.
Change-Id: I8f29572c33e8dbcc37961c099c71c14aafc8d0a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
QUICHE currently does not know to call
SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint, picking up the current default of the
legacy code point. It then assumes that the
TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters constant may be used to extract
transport parameters, so after
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704, it
breaks.
To smooth over the transition, we now define three constants:
TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_legacy,
TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_standard, and the old constant.
The old constant will match whatever the default is (for now, legacy) so
the default is self-consistent. Then plan is then:
1. BoringSSL switches to the state in this CL: the default code point
and constant are the legacy one, but there are APIs to specify the
code point. This will not affect QUICHE, which only uses the
defaults.
2. QUICHE calls SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint and uses the
corresponding _legacy or _standard constant. It should *not* use the
unsuffixed constant at this point.
3. BoringSSL switches the default setting and the constant to the
standard code point. This will not affect QUICHE, which explicitly
configures the code point it wants.
4. Optional: BoringSSL won't switch the default back to legacy, so
QUICHE can switch _standard to unsuffixed and BoringSSL
can remove the _standard alias (but not the function) early.
5. When QUICHE no longer needs both code points, it unwinds the
SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint code and switches back to the
unsuffixed constant.
6. BoringSSL removes all this scaffolding now that it's no longer
needed.
Update-Note: This this fixes a compatibility issue with
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704.
Change-Id: I9f75845aba58ba93e9665cd6f05bcd080eb5f139
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45124
Reviewed-by: David Schinazi <dschinazi@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL has a fixed-width version of DH_compute_key nowadays. Searching
around callers of DH_compute_key, many of them go back and re-pad the
secret anyway. Uses of DH should migrate to modern primitives but, in
the meantime, DH_compute_key_padded seems worthwhile for OpenSSL
compatibility and giving fixed-width users a function to avoid the
timing leak.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION since one of the uses is in wpa_supplicant
and they like to compile against a wide range of Android revisions.
Update-Note: No compatibility impact, but callers that use
DH_compute_key and then fix up the removed leading zeros can switch to
this function. Then they should migrate to something else.
Change-Id: Icf8b2ace3972fa174a0f08ece39710f7599f96f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45004
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Note that when BoringSSL is not in QUIC mode, it
will error if it sees the new codepoint as a server
but it will ignore the legacy codepoint as that could
be a different private usage of that codepoint.
Change-Id: I314f8f0b169cedd96eeccc42b44153e97044388c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I814f55742910c519e9b64aca1b15a4d754adc541
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44944
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
One of the comments in e56dfcf9f4 was worded awkwardly. Thanks to Zi Lin
for fixing this.
Change-Id: I7ee647716e0ee30145bdce5be35128058130e1ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44764
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BER permits lengths to be non-minimal. Previously this was not supported
at all. This change brings greater support, allowing non-minimal lengths
so long as they fit in a uint32_t.
Change-Id: I002ed2375c78fdb326e725eb1c23eca71ef9ba4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44684
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Change-Id: I3bf06ea0710702c0dc45bb3ff2e3d772e9f87f9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44585
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The headers aren't quite interchangeable. stdlib.h defines ::abort()
while cstdlib defines std::abort(). The Google style guide doesn't give
much guidance but says to match the existing style, so I've switched it
to stdlib.h.
See https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-ssl/issues/259
Change-Id: I19feb5213e123a88b381d6d8f8fe9d8e87c81e67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44625
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This involves adding a new function |DH_compute_key_hashed| that
combines the FFDH with the output hashing inside the FIPS module. This
new function uses the padded FFDH output, as newly specified in SP
800-56Ar3.
Change-Id: Iafcb7e276f16d39bf7d25d3b2f163b5cd6f67883
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44504
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change also drops ex_data from DH objects. The global would need
special handling in the FIPS module, which isn't hard, but just dropping
it saves some of the code-size costs of this change and I cannot find
any signs of use of this functionality.
Change-Id: I984bd70698c2ec329f340d294b3b9ec169cd0c4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44524
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than the FIPS module actively collecting entropy from the CPU or
OS, this change configures Android FIPS to passively receive entropy.
See FIPS IG 7.14 section two.
Change-Id: Ibfc5c5042e560718474b89970199d35b67c21296
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44305
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This imports 1ecc76f6746cefd502c7e9000bdfa4e5d7911386 and
41d62636fd996c031c0c7cef746476278583dc9e from upstream. These would have
rejected the mistake in OpenSSL's EDIPartyName sturcture.
Change-Id: I4eb218f9372bea0f7ff302321b9dc1992ef0c13a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44424
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also CVE-2020-1971, f960d81215ebf3f65e03d4d5d857fb9b666d6920, and
aa0ad2011d3e7ad8a611da274ef7d9c7706e289b from upstream OpenSSL.
Unlike upstream's version, this CL opts for a simpler edipartyname_cmp.
GENERAL_NAME_cmp is already unsuitable for ordering, just equality,
which means there's no need to preserve return values from
ASN1_STRING_cmp. Additionally, the ASN.1 structure implies most fields
cannot be NULL.
(The change from other to x400Address is a no-op. They're the same type.
Just x400Address is a little clearer. Historical quirks of the
GENERAL_NAME structure.)
Change-Id: I4b0ffe8e931c8ef916794a486e6a0d6d684c0cc1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
<openssl/base.h> checks for a supported platform, but we don't check
endianness of ARM and MIPS, which are bi-endian. See
https://crbug.com/1153312#c7.
Switch this around. Documentation on which define is "official" is hard
to come by, so I mostly mimicked Chromium. Chromium detects
little-endian ARM and MIPS with __ARMEL__ and __MIPSEL__ respectively,
without looking at __arm__ or __mips__. It uses __aarch64__
instead of __AARCH64EL__, but I think that's an oversight. I can get
Clang to output for aarch64_be and that defines __aarch64__ with
__AARCH64EB__.
<openssl/arm_arch.h> (which we should simplify and align with base.h
once this CL sticks) also normalizes to __ARMEL__ over __BYTE_ORDER__
and friends. Although, interestingly, arm_arch.h defines its own
__ARMEL__ on GNUC aarch64, even though Clang does *not* define __ARMEL__
on aarch64. (I'm guessing this aligned for the benefit of the "armx"
bi-arch asm files.) This value is based on __BYTE_ORDER__, not
__ARMEL__, but it assumes GNUC arm always defines __ARMEL__, so I think
it's reasonable to assume GNUC aarch64 always defines __AARCH64EL__.
Given all this, probably the simplest thing that's most likely to work
is to use __ARMEL__, __MIPSEL__, and __AARCH64EL__. Note this does not
change the _M_* checks. _M_* are Windows's definitions, which I think we
can reasonably assume come with an endianness opinion. (Windows' ARM and
ARM64 ABIs mandate little-endian.) This aligns with Chromium.
Update-Note: CPU processor defines are a mess. If a little-endian ARM or
MIPS build breaks, some of the assumptions above may be wrong. In that
case, the output $CC -dM -E - < /dev/null on the offending toolchain
will be useful to fix it. If a big-endian ARM or MIPS build breaks, this
is working as intended. Any resulting binaries weren't producing the
right outputs.
Change-Id: I2a9e662d09df119a71226e91716d84e7ac3792aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44324
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Almost everything in <openssl/asn1.h> uses ASN1_STRING, and there are a
lot of unspoken assumptions in the library about the type field, so it
needs quite a bit of text.
Change-Id: Ied56c9428069477da8ecb17a174da4320e573fa1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44184
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not even accurate. The term "master key" dates to SSL 2, which we
do not implement. (Starting SSL 3, "key" was replaced with "secret".)
The field stores, at various points, the TLS 1.2 master secret, the TLS
1.3 resumption master secret, and the TLS 1.3 resumption PSK. Simply
rename the field to 'secret', which is as descriptive of a name as we
can get at this point.
I've left SSL_SESSION_get_master_key alone for now, as it's there for
OpenSSL compatibility, as well as references to the various TLS secrets
since those refer to concepts in the spec. (When the dust settles a bit
on rfc8446bis, we can fix those.)
Change-Id: I3c1007eb7982788789cc5db851de8724c7f35baf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44144
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These APIs were used by Chromium to control the carve-out for the TLS
1.3 downgrade signal. As of
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2324170,
Chromium no longer uses them.
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade,
SSL_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade, and SSL_is_tls13_downgrade now do
nothing. Calls sites should be removed. (There are some copies of older
Chromium lying around, so I haven't removed the functions yet.) The
enforcement was already on by default, so this CL does not affect
callers that don't use those functions.
Change-Id: I016af8291cd92051472d239c4650602fe2a68f5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Adam Langley
Yuchen Dai
David Schinazi
Dan McArdle