Chiebot-Mirror/boringssl - boringssl - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
David Benjamin	ca4598781a	Move load/store helpers to crypto/internal.h. We have loads of variations of these. Align them in one set. This avoids the HOST_* macros defined by md32_common.h, so it'll be a little easier to make it a more conventional header. Change-Id: Id47fe7b51a8f961bd87839f8146d8a5aa8027aa6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46425 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	8d4c8fc41b	Make words in crypto/fipsmodule/modes actually words. It's a little confusing to have load_word_le but actually use size_t instead of crypto_word_t. NOTE: on some platforms, notably NaCl, crypto_word_t is larger than size_t. (Do we still need to support this?) We don't have a good testing story here, so I tested it by hacking up a 32-bit x86 build to think it was OPENSSL_64_BIT. Change-Id: Ia0ce469e86803f22655fe2d9659a6a5db766429f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46424 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
David Benjamin	502fceede9	Test empty EVP_CIPHER inputs and fix exact memcpy overlap. See also 8129ac6ac4c0ca3a488c225cde580ede7dabe874 and 81198bf323ea9deda907714170d329ca7d2ff01f from upstream. In trying to figure out why ASan (which normally catches overlapping memcpys) didn't flag this, I noticed that we actually don't have tests for empty inputs. I've added them to cipher_tests.txt where missing and fixed a bad assert in ofb.c. ASan still doesn't flag this because LLVM even requires memcpy handle dst == src. Still, fixing it is less effort than getting a clear answer from GCC and MSVC. Though this puts us in the frustrating position of trying to follow a C rule that our main toolchain and sanitizer disavow. https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11763 https://reviews.llvm.org/D86993 Change-Id: I53c64a84834ddf5cddca0b3d53a29998f666ea2f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46285 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	b67732a163	aarch64: Remove some flavour conditionals This change is expected to be a non-functional change. Original request: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Change-Id: Ifbf85eb6cafebabf0cf063b7dd147417d01c280c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43584 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	4 years ago
Tamas Petz	a0b49d63fd	aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- \| Compiler \| -mbranch-protection \| Feature macros \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| clang \| 9.0.0 \| 11.0.0 \| +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ \| gcc \| 9 \| expected in 10.1+ \| ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>	5 years ago
Adam Langley	fb0c05cac2	acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>	5 years ago