We use unsigned, but we actually assume it is 32-bit for the bit-packing
strategy. But also introduce a typedef to hint that callers shouldn't
treat it as an arbitrary 32-bit integer. A typedef would also allow us
to extend to uint64_t in the future, if we ever need to.
Update-Note: Some APIs switch from unsigned * to uint32_t * out
pointers. This is only source-compatible if unsigned and uint32_t are
the exact same type. The CQ suggests this is indeed true. If they are
not, replace unsigned with CBS_ASN1_TAG to fix the build.
Bug: 525
Change-Id: I45cbe127c1aa252f5f6a169dca2e44d1e6e1d669
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54986
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have a number of APIs that cannot migrate to size_t because OpenSSL
used negative numbers as some special indicator. This makes it hard to
become size_t-clean.
However, in reality, the largest buffer size is SSIZE_MAX, or, more
accurately PTRDIFF_MAX. But every platform I've ever seen make ptrdiff_t
and size_t the same size. malloc is just obligated to fail allocations
that don't fit in ssize_t. ssize_t itself is not portable (Windows
doesn't have it), but we can define ossl_ssize_t to be ptrdiff_t.
OpenSSL also has an ossl_ssize_t (though they don't use it much), so
we're also improving compatibility.
Start this out with ASN1_STRING_set. It still internally refuses to
construct a string bigger than INT_MAX; the struct can't hold this and
even if we fix the struct, no other code, inside or outside the library,
can tolerate it. But now code which passes in a size_t (including our
own) can do so without overflow.
Bug: 428, 516
Change-Id: I17aa6971733f34dfda7d971882d0f062e92340e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54953
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This is a mechanical change generated from the following command:
find crypto/{asn1,pem,x509,x509v3} -name '*.c' -o -name '*.h' | xargs sed -i -e 's/return (\([^;()]*\));/return \1;/'
Change-Id: I957295af96c4aa08d6006e27093fd3a07fb6fe75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53089
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This CL is the result of the following commands:
for d in asn1 x509 x509v3 pem; do
go run util/convert_comments.go crypto/$d/*.h
go run util/convert_comments.go crypto/$d/*.c
done
Change-Id: If78433f68cb2f913b0de06ded744a5a65540e1cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53087
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This CL runs the same command as in the preceding CL, but with
'IncludeBraces: true' added to .clang-format. I've split this out
separately because the documentation says:
> Setting this option to true could lead to incorrect code formatting
> due to clang-format’s lack of complete semantic information. As such,
> extra care should be taken to review code changes made by this option.
I've also kept InsertBraces out of .clang-format for now because it's a
fairly recent option, and clang-format fails when it sees unrecognized
options.
Change-Id: I305ea7bb2633704053a1f8de1e11b037b9fc8a76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53086
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Previously, we did not clang-format a few directories because we had
left them largely untouched. clang-format them now so we're finally more
uniform.
This CL is the result of the following commands:
for d in asn1 x509 x509v3 pem; do
clang-format -i crypto/$d/*.h
clang-format -i crypto/$d/*.c
done
(Written in this funny way because crypto/pem/*.h doesn't match
anything.)
Change-Id: I7f4ca9b3a9c8f07d6556e00e9e84b3c0880ee12e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53085
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Now we only have one BER/DER TLV parser. Annoyingly, this uses the CBS
BER function, not the DER one. This is because Android sometimes needs
allow a non-minimal length in certificate signature fields (see
b/18228011).
For now, this CL calls CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element. This is still an
improvement over the old parser because we'll reject non-minimal tags
(which are actually even forbidden in BER). Later, we should move the
special case to just the signature field, and ultimately to a
preprocessing step specific to that part of Android.
Update-Note: Invalid certificates (and the few external structures using
asn1t.h) with incorrectly-encoded tags will now be rejected.
Bug: 354
Change-Id: I56a7faa1ffd51ee38cc315ebaddaef98079fd90e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51626
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This simplifies the ASN1_get_object calling convention and removes
another significant source of tasn_dec.c complexity. This change does
not affect our PKCS#7 and PKCS#12 parsers.
Update-Note: Invalid certificates (and the few external structures using
asn1t.h) with BER indefinite lengths will now be rejected.
Bug: 354
Change-Id: I723036798fc3254d0a289c77b105fcbdcda309b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the header is valid, but the body is truncated, ASN1_get_object
intentionally preserves the indefinite-length and constructed output
bits. This means callers who check for error with == 0x80 may read off
the end of the buffer on accident.
This is unlikely to break callers: 0x80 was already a possible error
value, so callers already needed to handle it. The original function's
aim in returning more information is unlikely to matter because callers
cannot distinguish 0x80 (could not parse header) and 0x80 (header was
valid, definite-length, and primitive, but length was too long).
Update-Note: ASN1_get_object's calling convention is slightly
simplified.
Bug: 451
Change-Id: If2b45c47e6b8864aef9fd5e04f313219639991ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The comparison should notice differences in bit count.
Update-Note: ASN1_STRING_cmp no longer incorrectly treats BIT STRINGs
with different padding bits as equal.
Bug: 446
Change-Id: I22b3fcc5d369540d029ca234e9b3b02402cec4c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49928
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The representation here is a bit more messy than necessary. In doing so,
clean up the variable names and smooth away two rough edges:
- X509_ALGOR_get0 would leave *out_param_value uninitialized if
*out_param_type is V_ASN1_UNDEF. Instead, set it to NULL, so callers
do not accidentally use an uninitialized pointer.
- X509_PUBKEY_set0_param, if key is NULL, would leave the key alone. No
one calls this function externally and none of the (since removed)
callers in OpenSSL rely on this behavior. A NULL check here adds a
discontinuity at the empty string that seems unnecessary here:
changing the algorithm without changing the key isn't useful.
(Note the API doesn't support changing the key without the algorithm.)
Note for reviewing: the representation of ASN1_TYPE is specified
somewhat indirectly. ASN1_TYPE uses the ASN1_ANY ASN1_ITEM, which has
utype V_ASN1_ANY. Then you look at asn1_d2i_ex_primitive and asn1_ex_c2i
which peel off the ASN1_TYPE layer and parse directly into the value
field, with a fixup for NULL. Hopefully we can rework this someday...
Change-Id: I628c4e20f8ea2fd036132242337f4dcac5ba5015
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46165
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This still needs some overall documentation describing ASN1_STRING's
relationship to all the other types, but start with the easy bits.
Change-Id: I968d4b1b3d57a9b543b3db489d14cf0789e30eb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Not especially important, but leaving the input unchanged on malloc
failure is a little tidier.
Change-Id: Ia001260edcc8d75865d0d75ac0fe596205f83c48
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44048
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
At one point in the SSLeay days, all the ASN1_STRING typedefs were
separate structs (but only in debug builds) and the M_ASN1_* macros
included type casts to handle this.
This is long gone, but we still have the M_ASN1_* macros. Remove the
casts and switch code within the library to call the macros. Some
subtleties:
- The "MSTRING" types (what OpenSSL calls its built-in CHOICEs
containing some set of string types) are weird because the M_FOO_new()
macro and the tasn_new.c FOO_new() function behave differently. I've
split those into a separate CL.
- ASN1_STRING_type, etc., call into the macro, which accesses the field
directly. This CL inverts the dependency.
- ASN1_INTEGER_new and ASN1_INTEGER_free, etc., are generated via
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS in tasn_typ.c. I've pointed
M_ASN1_INTEGER_new and M_ASN1_INTEGER_free to these fields. (The free
function is a no-op, but consistent.)
- The other macros like M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_dup largely do not have
corresponding functions. I've aligned with OpenSSL in just using the
generic ASN1_STRING_dup function. But some others, like
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup have a corresponding ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup
function. OpenSSL retained these, so I have too.
Update-Note: Some external code uses the M_ASN1_* macros. This should
remain compatible, but some type errors may have gotten through
unnoticed. This CL restores type-checking.
Change-Id: I8656abc7d0f179192e05a852c97483c021ad9b20
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44045
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Sadly we need to keep ASN1_put_eoc. Ruby uses it.
OpenSSL's PKCS#7 implementation generated an "ndef" variant of the
encoding functions, to request indefinite-length encoding. Remove the
support code for this.
Update-Note: Types that use one of the NDEF macros in asn1t.h will fail
to compile. This CL should not affect certificate parsing.
Change-Id: I6e03f6927ea4b7a6acd73ac58bf49512b39baab8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43889
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is unused and quite unsafe.
Update-Note: Use ASN1_STRING_set instead, though this function appears
to be unused.
Change-Id: Ie6f4dec4b9e11ebde95b322ef91e1b8d63fbb8af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley