This makes it slightly clearer which ints are lengths and which are
substituting for T*. (ASN1_BOOLEAN is weird. It is the one non-pointer
representation in crypto/asn1.)
Change-Id: I93ff87264835e64c9f8613edae63e93731e77548
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/asn1 represents an ASN.1 NULL value as a non-null ASN1_NULL*
pointer, (ASN1_NULL*)1. It is a non-null pointer because a null pointer
represents an omitted OPTIONAL NULL. It is an opaque pointer because
there is no sense in allocating anything.
This pointer cannot be dereferenced, yet ASN1_NULL is a typedef for int.
This is confusing and probably undefined behavior. (N1548, 6.3.2.3,
clause 7 requires pointer conversions between two pointer types be
correctly aligned, even if the pointer is never dereferenced. Strangely,
clause 5 above does not impose the same requirement when converting from
integer to pointer, though it mostly punts to the implementation
definition.) Of course, all of tasn_*.c is a giant strict aliasing
violation anyway, but an opaque struct pointer is a slightly better
choice here.
(Note that, although ASN1_BOOLEAN is also a typedef for int, that
situation is different: the ASN1_BOOLEAN representation is a plain
ASN1_BOOLEAN, not ASN1_BOOLEAN*, while the ASN1_NULL representation is a
pointer. ASN1_NULL could have had the same treatment and even used a
little less memory, but changing that would break the API.)
Update-Note: Code that was assuming ASN1_NULL was an int typedef will
fail to compile. Given this was never dereferencable, it is hard to
imagine anything relying on this.
Bug: 438
Change-Id: Ia0c652eed66e76f82a3843af1fc877f06c8d5e8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49805
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The two headers already circularly import each other, and even have to
inspect each others' header guards to manage this. Keeping them
separate does not reduce include sizes. Fold them together so their
header guards are more conventional.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: Iaf96f5b2c8adb899d9c4a5b5094ed36fcb16de16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is a little awkward. It mutates global data, so if two
libraries in the address space both attempt to define a custom OID, they
will conflict. But some existing code uses it so, as long as it does so,
we should make it thread-safe.
Along the way, I've switched it to a hash table and removed the ability
to overwrite existing entries. Previously, overwriting a built-in table
would crash (on platforms where const structures are write-protected).
Overwriting a dynamic table implemented this weird merging algorithm.
The one caller I've seen does not appear to need this feature.
I've also switched ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup to a no-op, matching our
other global cleanup functions. This function is not safe to call
without global knowledge of all other uses of the library.
Update-Note: ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add no longer allows overwrite existing
entries. In most cases, this would crash or trigger a race condition
anyway.
Bug: 426
Change-Id: Ie024cca87feaef3ff10064b452f3a860844544da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49769
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was added in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/12980/, but does
not appear to be used anymore. The corresponding function does not exist
in OpenSSL.
This simplifies the tests slightly, some of which were inadvertently
specifying the boolean and some weren't.
Change-Id: I9b956dcd9f7151910f93f377d207c88273bd9ccf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49747
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In upstream, these functions take file and line number arguments. Update
ours to match. Guessing almost no one uses these, or we'd have caught
this earlier.
Change-Id: Ic09f8d8274065ac02efa78e70c215b87fa765b9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Brittain <bwb@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Node seems uncommonly sensitive to this, so let's write these functions
in a way that stays in sync and test this. See also
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49585
This does incur a cost across all BoringSSL consumers that use these
functions: as a result of Node indiscriminately exposing every cipher,
we end up pulling more and more ciphers into these getters. But that
ship sailed long ago, so, instead, document that EVP_get_cipherby*
should not be used by size-conscious callers.
EVP_get_digestby* probably should have the same warning, but I've left
it alone for now because we don't quite have the same proliferation of
digests as ciphers. (Though there are things in there, like MD4, that
ought to be better disconnected.)
Change-Id: I61ca406c146279bd05a52bed6c57200d1619c5da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Linux module signing uses PKCS#7 / CMS because everything is awful and
broken. In order to make the lives of kernel developers easier, support
the calling pattern that the kernel uses to sign modules.
The kernel utility was written at a time when PKCS#7 was hard coded to
use SHA-1 for signing in OpenSSL and it reflects this: you can only
specify “sha1” on the command line, for example. As of OpenSSL 1.1.1, at
least, OpenSSL uses SHA-256 and thus so does this change.
Change-Id: I32b036123a0d8b272ec9e1c0130c45bf3ed0d2c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49545
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Having APIs named "session" and "ID" appears to be far too tempting for
developers, mistaking it as some application-level notion of session.
Update the documentation, in hopes of discouraging this mistake.
Change-Id: Ifd9516287092371d4701114771eff6640df1bcb0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49405
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This doesn't affect RSA key generation, which uses
BN_prime_checks_for_generation.
Change-Id: Ibf32c0c4bc9fed369e8f8a1efea72c5bd39185a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49426
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These are a little odd with the ASN1_ENCODING paths. And there were some
bugs previously around CHOICE types. Nothing defines them, inside or
outside BoringSSL, so remove them.
Change-Id: Id2954fef8ee9637f36f7511b51dc0adc2557e3ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49352
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Later CLs will clean up the ClientHello construction a bit (draft-12
avoids computing ClientHelloOuter twice). I suspect the transcript
handling on the client can also be simpler, but I'll see what's
convenient after I've changed how ClientHelloOuter is constructed.
Changes of note between draft-10 and draft-13:
- There is now an ECH confirmation signal in both HRR and SH. We don't
actually make much use of this in our client right now, but it
resolves a bunch of weird issues around HRR, including edge cases if
HRR applies to one ClientHello but not the other.
- The confirmation signal no longer depends on key_share and PSK, so we
don't have to work around a weird ordering issue.
- ech_is_inner is now folded into the main encrypted_client_hello code
point. This works better with some stuff around HRR.
- Padding is moved from the padding extension, computed with
ClientHelloInner, to something we fill in afterwards. This makes it
easier to pad up the whole thing to a multiple of 32. I've accordingly
updated to the latest recommended padding construction, and updated
the GREASE logic to match.
- ech_outer_extensions is much easier to process because the order is
required to be consistent. We were doing that anyway, and now a simple
linear scan works.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD now uses an all zero placeholder payload of the
same length. This lets us simplify the server code, but, for now, I've
kept the client code the same. I'll follow this up with a CL to avoid
computing ClientHelloOuter twice.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD is allowed to contain a placeholder PSK. I haven't
filled that in and will do it in a follow-up CL.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I7464345125c53968b2fe692f9268e392120fc2eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48912
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Hopefully it's a little clearer that this may be called whether or not
ECH is offered. (And whether or not it's a server.)
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I39c8ce5758543a0cfda84652b3fc0a5b9669fd0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49165
Reviewed-by: Matt Mueller <mattm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This unexports X509, X509_CINF, X509_NAME_ENTRY, X509_NAME, X509_OBJECT,
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_STORE_CTX.
Note this means X509_STORE_CTX can no longer be stack-allocated.
Update-Note: Patch cl/390055173 into the roll that includes this. This
unexports most of the X.509 structs, aligning with OpenSSL. Use the
accessor APIs instead.
Bug: 425
Change-Id: I53e915bfae3b8dc4b67642279d0e54dc606f2297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE has been discouraged by OpenSSL since 2000:
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blob;f=CHANGES;h=824f421b8d331ba2a2009dbda333a57493bedb1e;hb=fb047ebc87b18bdc4cf9ddee9ee1f5ed93e56aff#l10848
Instead, upstream recommends an MBSTRING_* constant.
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID.html
This function is a bit overloaded:
MBSTRING_* means "Decode my input from this format and then re-encode it
using whatever string type best suits the NID (usually UTF8String, but
some NIDs require PrintableString)".
V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE means "This is a Latin-1 string. Without looking at
the NID, pick one of PrintableString, IA5String, or T61String".
The latter is almost certainly not what callers want. If they want a
particular type, they can always force it by passing a particular
V_ASN1_* constant. This removes the only use of ASN1_PRINTABLE_type
within the library, though there is one external use still.
Update-Note: V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE is removed. I only found one use, which
has been fixed.
Change-Id: Id36376dd0ec68559bbbb366e2305d42be5ddac67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49067
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old loop read one byte past the length. It also stopped the loop
too early on interior NUL. See also upstream's
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16433, though I've opted to
rewrite the function entirely rather than use their fix.
Also deduplicate the PrintableString check.
Change-Id: Ia8bd282047c2a2ed1d5e71a68a3947c7c108df95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49066
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although we defined a CBS -> Span<const uint8_t> conversion, MSVC 2015
keeps trying to call the Span(const Container&) constructor. It seems to
not correctly SFINAE the existence of data() and size() members unless
the expression is inlined into the default template argument.
Change-Id: I4e88f820b78ce72ad1b014b5bae0830bc7d099d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48945
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See upstream commits:
32f3b98d1302d4c0950dc1bf94b50269b6edbd95
432f8688bb72e21939845ac7a69359ca718c6676
7bb50cbc4af78a0c8d36fdf2c141ad1330125e2f
8c74c9d1ade0fbdab5b815ddb747351b8b839641
Change-Id: Iff614260c1b1582856edb4ae7a226f2e07537698
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49045
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subsequent CLs will add some fuzzers, etc., that'll help with catching
this.
Change-Id: I10a8e4b2f23ffd07b124e725c1f7454e7ea6f2dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also 8393de42498f8be75cf0353f5c9f906a43a748d2 from upstream and
CBS-2021-3712. But rather than do that, I've rewritten it with CBS, so
it's a bit clearer. The previous commit added tests.
Change-Id: Ie52e28f07b9bf805c8730eab7be5d40cb5d558b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49008
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also 174ba8048a7f2f5e1fca31cfb93b1730d9db8300 from upstream. This
differs from the upstream CL in that:
- We don't silently drop trailing NULs.
- As a NUL-terminated C string, the empty string is a non-NULL pointer
to an array containing a zero byte. Use the latter consistently.
Change-Id: I99c6c4c26be5a1771c56c6ab356425f1b85be41d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49006
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We fill in placeholder values of all zeros fairly often in TLS now,
as workarounds for messages being constructed in the wrong order.
draft-12 of ECH adds even more of these. Add a helper so we don't need
to interrupt an || chain with a memset.
Change-Id: Id4f9d988ee67598645a01637cc9515b475c1aec2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48909
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
absl::Span, base::span, and std::span have first() and last() methods
which give prefixes and suffixes. first() just saves 5 characters, but
last() is nicer to write than subspan() for suffixes.
Unlike subspan(), they also do not have clipping behavior, so we're
guaranteed the length is correct. The clipping behavior comes from
absl::Span::subspan() and is not present in std::span or base::span.
I've left it in, in case we switch to absl::Span in the future, but I
imagine absl::Span will need to migrate this at some point.
Change-Id: I042dd6c566b6d753ec6de9d84e8c09ac7c270267
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48905
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In writing the tests, I noticed that the documentation was wrong. First,
the maximum lengths are measured in codepoints, not bytes.
Second, the TODO was wrong. We actually do handle this correctly,
*almost*. Rather, the bug is that the function assumes |mask| contains
no extraneous bits. If it does, all extraneous bits are interpreted as
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING. This seems like a bug, so I've gone ahead and fixed
that, with a test.
Change-Id: I7ba8fa700a8e21e6d25cb7ce879dace685eecf7e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48825
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER was used in OpenSSL's CMS and PKCS#7
implementations, which we've removed. Fields that use it not only get
the DER SET sorting but, when serialized, go back and mutate the
original object to match.
This is unused, so remove it. This removes one of the sources of
non-const behavior in i2d functions.
Bug: 407
Change-Id: I6b2bf8d11c30a41b53d14ad475c26a1a30dfd31f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48786
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_STRING_print_ex is extremely complex and attempting to implement
RFC2253, so write some tests for it. Along the way, unexport
CHARTYPE_*, which are internal book-keeping used in
ASN1_STRING_print_ex.
Change-Id: Idb27cd40fb66dc099d1fd6d039a00404608c2063
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48776
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We've never tested this and plenty of files depend on FILE* APIs without
ifdefs.
Change-Id: I8c51c043e068b30bdde1723c3810d3e890eabfca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This matches OpenSSL and the name. Also accessors like X509_ALGOR_get0
are in x509.h.
Change-Id: Ic7583edcf04627cbfae822df11e75eebdd9ad7aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These constants aren't suitably namespaced and, moreover, are redefined
in a_strnid.c. (The constants aren't especially useful because an
X509_NAME doesn't check the upper bound.)
Update-Note: Removed some unnamespaced constants.
Change-Id: I7d15ae731628d3665119081289947600e7f38065
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48768
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID is very complex and depends on a "global mask"
for most NIDs. (Some NIDs use a single type and use STABLE_NO_MASK to
disable the global mask.) Historically, it defaulted to allowing all
types, but it switched to UTF8String in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
Updating the global mask is not thread-safe, and it's 2021. Let's just
always use UTF-8. The only callers I found set it to UTF-8 anyway (with
the exception of some test script we don't use, and some code that
wasn't compiled). No-op writes in the C/C++ memory model are still race
conditions, so this CL fixes some bugs in those callers.
Update-Note: The global mask for ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID is now always
UTF-8. Callers that want another type should reconsider and, if UTF-8 is
still unsuitable, just pass the actual desired type into
ASN1_mbstring_copy, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data, etc
Change-Id: I679e99c57da9a48c805460abcb3af5b2f938c93f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48766
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This flag is set when an ASN1_STRING is created from a codepath that is
aware it is an "mstring" (CHOICE of multiple string or string-like
types). With setters like X509_set_notBefore, it is very easy to
accidentally lose the flag on some field that normally has it.
The only place the flag is checked is X509_time_adj_ex. X509_time_adj_ex
usually transparently picks UTCTime vs GeneralizedTime, as in the X.509
CHOICE type. But if writing to an existing object AND if the object
lacks the flag, it will lock to whichever type the object was
previously. It is likely any caller hitting this codepath is doing so
unintentionally and has a latent bug that won't trip until 2050.
In fact, one of the ways callers might accidentally lose the
ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING flag is by using X509_time_adj_ex!
X509_time_adj_ex(NULL) does not use an mstring-aware constructor. This
CL avoids needing such a notion in the first place.
Looking through callers, the one place that wants the old behavior is a
call site within OpenSSL, to set the producedAt field in OCSP. That
field is a GeneralizedTime, rather than a UTCTime/GeneralizedTime
CHOICE. We dropped that code, but I'm making a note of it to remember
when filing upstream.
Update-Note: ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING is no longer defined and
X509_time_adj_ex now behaves more predictably. Callers that actually
wanted to lock to a specific type should call ASN1_UTCTIME_adj or
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj instead.
Change-Id: Ib9e1c9dbd0c694e1e69f938da3992d1ffc9bd060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48668
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This covers most of the ASN.1 time functions and a handful more of
x509.h. Also remove some code under #if 0.
I'm running out of a easy ones to do, which is probably a good thing.
Change-Id: I085b1e2a54d191a7a5f18c801b3c135cfda7bd88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It is not obvious from "It does not take ownership of |buf|" whether the
function makes a copy or not. It does not make a copy (maybe it
should...), so callers are obligated to manage their lifetimes.
Change-Id: I7df9a5814321fd833fcb8d009d9e0318d6668dd4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48669
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some callers want the value to be heap-allocated. It's a little annoying
that this returns an empty value (if we only supported heap-allocated
ones, I'd have merged init into new), but since we have multiple
constructor functions, this is probably the least fuss.
Change-Id: I42f586e39850954fb6743f8be50a7cfffa0755ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48526
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The stack consumption of the HRSS functions is causing issues in
stack-constrained environments. Therefore allocate many variables on the
heap. This means that several HRSS_ functions now allocate, and thus can
fail, where they couldn't before. Callers that ignore the return value
and don't have crash-on-failure mallocs will still be safe, although
things will fail to decrypt later on.
Somehow, this actually makes key generation _faster_ on my machine. (I
don't know. Better alignment? Fewer L1 collisions?) The other operations
are slightly slower, as expected.
Before:
Did 17390 HRSS generate operations in 3054088us (5694.0 ops/sec)
Did 225000 HRSS encap operations in 3000512us (74987.2 ops/sec)
Did 87000 HRSS decap operations in 3014525us (28860.3 ops/sec)
After:
Did 21300 HRSS generate operations in 3026637us (7037.5 ops/sec)
Did 221000 HRSS encap operations in 3008911us (73448.5 ops/sec)
Did 84000 HRSS decap operations in 3007622us (27929.0 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I2312df8909af7d8d250c7c483c65038123f21ad9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48345
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I've switched a few things to the accessors where it was easy, but
X509_EXTENSION is, in us and upstream, not const-correct right now, so
it's a little goofy.
Update-Note: Use X509_EXTENSION_get_* instead.
Change-Id: Ife9636051a924a950b1c739b7720baf12e35f9c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48505
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is not used anywhere inside or outside the library.
Update-Note: Removed unused field in struct.
Change-Id: I244d8af819e84412956fecb929678404fdfcc38f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48427
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function's behavior differs from all the other lastpos functions.
It does not appear to be used anywhere, so remove it. (lastpos = -1
returns the first match, lastpos = -2 additionally fails if there are
duplicates, lastpos = -3 additionally fails if the attribute is
multiply-valued.)
Update-Note: X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ is removed. We found no callers of
this function.
Change-Id: I8547bac6626623e43827e2490f04850eb148e317
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48367
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
jakemas
Shelley Vohr