That we pull a value out of a channel and put it back is pretty weird.
Also we don't need a select in accept(). It's enough to just close the
listener when we learn the child is gone. (That will cancel the
Accept call.)
Change-Id: If520d9f405fa0b1ad6e3cd23e9ba8a35ff39ba75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60887
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's a bit more verbose to set up, but makes the error paths in
Connect() tidier. While I'm here, stick to Windows' actual SOCKET
type until we have to cross into BIO. It doesn't really matter
(Windows cannot use the upper half of that type without badly
breaking backwards compatibility), but it silences some 64/32
truncation warnings.
Change-Id: I7be7c2b543373a7a9fc50711131e5345d84ebb8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60886
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The runner currently tries to listen on IPv6 and then falls back to IPv4
on error. The shim does the same. If they pick different ones, this
breaks down.
Normally, fallback happens because the system doesn't have IPv6, and
both sides will make the same decision. But if binding to IPv6 fails for
other reasons, they may mismatch. We're observing them fail due to what
seems to port exhaustion. When this happens, shim and runner don't
agree on the same address family.
Instead, just tell the shim which address to connect to. This doesn't
fix the underlying port exhaustion problem, but it does seem to fix the
flakes. Although given we are still exhausting ports and falling back to
IPv4, it doesn't truly fix it. Later CLs will address port exhaustion by
using a single server port.
This changes the runner <-> shim protocol, but hopefully in a fairly
obvious way that others using BoGo can easily follow. It shouldn't break
our cross-version tests because we keep runner and shim at the same
versio there.
To avoid needing to make an incompatible change to the shim <->
handshaker protocol, which would impact our cross-version tests, this
introduces a mechanism for the shim omit flags when talking to the
handshaker. The handshaker doesn't need to know how to connect to the
runner.
Also print the error string on Windows. Sadly this is a bit tedious.
Change-Id: Ic8bda9a854a115c206c05a659a2e34f544b844a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60885
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We really should remove these (we only support them in private keys)
but, in the meantime, add some tests for all the curves, not just P-256.
Change-Id: I9c4c0660f082fa1701afe11f51bb157b06befd3c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60925
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This would have made debugging some cross-version test easier.
Change-Id: I7b1bc160b5acf40ec02b9ed5ac2d836e3203cf9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60805
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The compiler already knows that .S means assembler and should define
__ASSEMBLER__ for us. At least on the CQ, it seems this is not
necessary, and some builds are showing a warning about redefining
__ASSEMBLER__, which may be caused by this.
Change-Id: I390bfcb50cefef42df72cd61ead55159b1838771
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60785
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
RSA CRT is tiny bit messier when p < q.
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25263 solved this by
normalizing to p > q. The cost was we sometimes had to compute a new
iqmp.
Modular inversion is expensive. We did it only once per key, but it's
still a performance cliff in per-key costs. When later work moves
freeze_private_key into RSA private key parsing, it will be a
performance cliff in the private key parser.
Instead, just handle p < q in the CRT function. The only difference is
needing one extra reduction before the modular subtraction. Even using
the fully general mod_montgomery function (as opposed to checking p < q,
or using bn_reduce_once when num_bits(p) == num_bits(q)) was not
measurable.
In doing so, I noticed we didn't actually have tests that exercise the
reduction step. I added one to evp_tests.txt, but it is only meaningful
when blinding is disabled. (Another cost of blinding.) When blinding is
enabled, the answers mod p and q are randomized and we hit this case
with about 1.8% probability. See comment in evp_test.txt.
I kept the optimization where we store iqmp in Montgomery form, not
because the optimization matters, but because we need to store a
corrected, fixed-width version of the value anyway, so we may as well
store it in a more convenient form.
M1 Max
Before:
Did 9048 RSA 2048 signing operations in 5033403us (1797.6 ops/sec)
Did 1500 RSA 4096 signing operations in 5009288us (299.4 ops/sec)
After:
Did 9116 RSA 2048 signing operations in 5053802us (1803.8 ops/sec) [+0.3%]
Did 1500 RSA 4096 signing operations in 5008283us (299.5 ops/sec) [+0.0%]
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6154 CPU @ 3.00GHz
Before:
Did 9282 RSA 2048 signing operations in 5019395us (1849.2 ops/sec)
Did 1302 RSA 4096 signing operations in 5055011us (257.6 ops/sec)
After:
Did 9240 RSA 2048 signing operations in 5024845us (1838.9 ops/sec) [-0.6%]
Did 1302 RSA 4096 signing operations in 5046157us (258.0 ops/sec) [+0.2%]
Bug: 316
Change-Id: Icb90c7d5f5188f9b69a6d7bcc63db13d92ec26d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60705
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Setting up Montgomery reduction requires computing RR, a larger power of
2 mod N. When N is secret (RSA primes), we currently start at
2^(n_bits-1), then iteratively double and reduce.
Instead, once we reach 2R = 2^(r_bits+1) or higher, we can switch to a
Montgomery square-and-multiply. (Montgomery reduction only needs n0. RR
is just for conversion.) This takes some tuning because, at low powers
of 2 (in Montgomery form), it is still more efficient to square by
doubling. I ran benchmarks for 32-bit and 64-bit, x86 and Arm, on the
machines I had available and picked a threshold that works decently
well.
(On the hardware I tested, it's the right threshold on all but the Pixel
5A. The 5A would ideally want a slightly higher threshold---it seems to
be worse at multiplying or better at addition, but the gap isn't that
large, and this operation isn't perf-sensitive anyway.)
The result is dramatically faster than the old shift-based approach.
That said, see I06f4a065fdecc1aec3160fe32a41e200538d1ee3 for discussion
on this operation. These speedups are not expected to translate to
increased RSA throughput. They just clear up some initialization work.
This speedup is not quite enough to match the division-based
variable-time one (perf-sensitive for RSA verification), so we'll keep
both codepaths around.
M1 Max
Before:
Did 712000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000454us (355919.2 ops/sec)
Did 440000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001121us (219876.8 ops/sec)
Did 259000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003709us (129260.3 ops/sec)
Did 212000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007033us (105628.6 ops/sec)
Did 107000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2018551us (53008.3 ops/sec)
Did 57000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001027us (28485.4 ops/sec)
Did 37000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2039631us (18140.5 ops/sec)
Did 20000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2041163us (9798.3 ops/sec)
Did 11760 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007195us (5858.9 ops/sec)
After:
Did 3996000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000366us (1997634.4 ops/sec) [+461.3%]
Did 2687000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000464us (1343188.4 ops/sec) [+510.9%]
Did 2615000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000146us (1307404.6 ops/sec) [+911.5%]
Did 1029000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000944us (514257.3 ops/sec) [+386.9%]
Did 1246000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000899us (622720.1 ops/sec) [+1074.8%]
Did 688000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000579us (343900.4 ops/sec) [+1107.3%]
Did 425000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003622us (212115.9 ops/sec) [+1069.3%]
Did 212000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004430us (105765.7 ops/sec) [+979.4%]
Did 125000 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2009677us (62199.0 ops/sec) [+961.6%]
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6154 CPU @ 3.00GHz
Before:
Did 781000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000740us (390355.6 ops/sec)
Did 414000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000180us (206981.4 ops/sec)
Did 258000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001729us (128888.6 ops/sec)
Did 194000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2008814us (96574.4 ops/sec)
Did 79000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2009309us (39317.0 ops/sec)
Did 36000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003945us (17964.6 ops/sec)
Did 21000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2074987us (10120.5 ops/sec)
Did 9040 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003869us (4511.3 ops/sec)
Did 5250 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2067796us (2538.9 ops/sec)
After:
Did 3496000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000542us (1747526.4 ops/sec) [+347.7%]
Did 2466000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000327us (1232798.4 ops/sec) [+495.6%]
Did 2392000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000732us (1195562.4 ops/sec) [+827.6%]
Did 908000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001181us (453732.1 ops/sec) [+369.8%]
Did 1054000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001429us (526623.7 ops/sec) [+1239.4%]
Did 548000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2002417us (273669.3 ops/sec) [+1423.4%]
Did 339000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004127us (169151.0 ops/sec) [+1571.4%]
Did 162000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2008221us (80668.4 ops/sec) [+1688.2%]
Did 94000 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2013848us (46676.8 ops/sec) [+1738.4%]
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6154 CPU @ 3.00GHz, 32-bit mode
Before:
Did 335000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000006us (167499.5 ops/sec)
Did 170000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2010398us (84560.4 ops/sec)
Did 102000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2013510us (50657.8 ops/sec)
Did 88000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2022909us (43501.7 ops/sec)
Did 27000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2063490us (13084.6 ops/sec)
Did 11760 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000600us (5878.2 ops/sec)
Did 6825 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2069343us (3298.1 ops/sec)
Did 2982 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2090651us (1426.3 ops/sec)
Did 1680 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2074824us (809.7 ops/sec)
After:
Did 1559000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000884us (779155.6 ops/sec) [+365.2%]
Did 940000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001511us (469645.2 ops/sec) [+455.4%]
Did 608000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000380us (303942.3 ops/sec) [+500.0%]
Did 439000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004282us (219031.1 ops/sec) [+403.5%]
Did 180000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2005427us (89756.4 ops/sec) [+586.0%]
Did 85000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2017009us (42141.6 ops/sec) [+616.9%]
Did 49000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2035401us (24073.9 ops/sec) [+629.9%]
Did 22000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2047404us (10745.3 ops/sec) [+653.3%]
Did 12642 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2094210us (6036.6 ops/sec) [+645.5%]
Pixel 5A:
Before:
Did 483000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001460us (241323.8 ops/sec)
Did 279000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004682us (139174.2 ops/sec)
Did 198000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003995us (98802.6 ops/sec)
Did 141000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2006305us (70278.4 ops/sec)
Did 62000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2022138us (30660.6 ops/sec)
Did 29000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007150us (14448.3 ops/sec)
Did 17376 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2044894us (8497.3 ops/sec)
Did 7686 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2011537us (3821.0 ops/sec)
Did 4620 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2048780us (2255.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 1187000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000099us (593470.6 ops/sec) [+145.9%]
Did 794000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2002162us (396571.3 ops/sec) [+184.9%]
Did 658000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2002808us (328538.7 ops/sec) [+232.5%]
Did 373000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2005135us (186022.4 ops/sec) [+164.7%]
Did 231000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2008117us (115033.1 ops/sec) [+275.2%]
Did 112000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003151us (55911.9 ops/sec) [+287.0%]
Did 66000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2022295us (32636.2 ops/sec) [+284.1%]
Did 30000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2006199us (14953.7 ops/sec) [+291.4%]
Did 17182 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2017938us (8514.6 ops/sec) [+277.6%]
Pixel 5A, 32-bit mode:
Before:
Did 124000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2013082us (61597.1 ops/sec)
Did 66000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2024604us (32599.0 ops/sec)
Did 40000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2018560us (19816.1 ops/sec)
Did 38000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2043776us (18593.0 ops/sec)
Did 11466 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2010767us (5702.3 ops/sec)
Did 5481 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2061892us (2658.2 ops/sec)
Did 3171 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2075359us (1527.9 ops/sec)
Did 1407 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2032032us (692.4 ops/sec)
Did 819 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2070367us (395.6 ops/sec)
After:
Did 718000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000496us (358911.0 ops/sec) [+482.7%]
Did 424000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000523us (211944.6 ops/sec) [+550.2%]
Did 401000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000933us (200406.5 ops/sec) [+911.3%]
Did 205000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004212us (102284.6 ops/sec) [+450.1%]
Did 153000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2004644us (76322.8 ops/sec) [+1238.5%]
Did 78000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007510us (38854.1 ops/sec) [+1361.6%]
Did 47000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2018015us (23290.2 ops/sec) [+1424.3%]
Did 22848 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2079082us (10989.5 ops/sec) [+1487.1%]
Did 13156 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2067424us (6363.5 ops/sec) [+1508.6%]
Bug: 316
Change-Id: I402df85170cae780442225eaa879884e707ffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
bn_mod_lshift_consttime currently calls bn_mod_lshift1_consttime in a
loop, but between needing a temporary value and having to guard against
some complications in our fixed-width BIGNUM convention, it's actually
picking up a lot of overhead.
This function is currently called to setup Montgomery contexts with
secret moduli (RSA primes). The setup operation is not
performance-sensitive in our benchmarks, because it is amortized away in
RSA private key signing. However, as part of reducing thread contention
with the RSA object, I'm planning to make RSA creation, which we do
benchmark, eagerly fill in the Montgomery context.
We do benchmark RSA parsing, so adding a slow Montgomery setup would
show up in benchmarks. This distinction is mostly artificial. Work done
on creation and work done on first use is still work done once per RSA
key. However, work done on key creation may slow server startup, while
work deferred to first use is amortized but less predictable.
Either way, from this CL, and especially the one to follow it, we have
plenty of low-hanging fruit in this function. As a bonus, this should
help single-use RSA private keys, but that's not something we currently
benchmark.
Modulus sizes below chosen based on:
- Common curve sizes (moot because we use a variable-time setup anyway)
- Common RSA modulus sizes (also variable-time setup)
- Half of common RSA modulus sizes (the secret primes involved)
Of these, only the third category matters. The others can use the
division-based path where it's faster anyway. However, by the end of
this patch series, they'll get a bit closer, so I benchmarked them all
to compare. (Though division still wins in the end.)
Benchmarks on an M1 Max:
Before:
Did 528000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000993us (263869.0 ops/sec)
Did 312000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001281us (155900.1 ops/sec)
Did 246000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001521us (122906.5 ops/sec)
Did 191000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2006336us (95198.4 ops/sec)
Did 98000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001438us (48964.8 ops/sec)
Did 55000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2025306us (27156.4 ops/sec)
Did 35000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2022714us (17303.5 ops/sec)
Did 17640 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2028352us (8696.7 ops/sec)
Did 10290 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2065529us (4981.8 ops/sec)
After:
Did 712000 256-bit mont (constime) operations in 2000454us (355919.2 ops/sec) [+34.9%]
Did 440000 384-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001121us (219876.8 ops/sec) [+41.0%]
Did 259000 512-bit mont (constime) operations in 2003709us (129260.3 ops/sec) [+5.2%]
Did 212000 521-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007033us (105628.6 ops/sec) [+11.0%]
Did 107000 1024-bit mont (constime) operations in 2018551us (53008.3 ops/sec) [+8.3%]
Did 57000 1536-bit mont (constime) operations in 2001027us (28485.4 ops/sec) [+4.9%]
Did 37000 2048-bit mont (constime) operations in 2039631us (18140.5 ops/sec) [+4.8%]
Did 20000 3072-bit mont (constime) operations in 2041163us (9798.3 ops/sec) [+12.7%]
Did 11760 4096-bit mont (constime) operations in 2007195us (5858.9 ops/sec) [+17.6%]
Bug: 316
Change-Id: I06f4a065fdecc1aec3160fe32a41e200538d1ee3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60685
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I forgot a CPU capability check in X25519Test.NeonABI.
Change-Id: Ie2fa4a7b04a7eb152aa3b720687ec529e5dd5b0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60745
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium actually has a checker for unexpected exported symbols, which
caught this.
Change-Id: If1af4c26a3326eea185725f9e84c17f5d9f0f58e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
While EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_DSA, and EVP_PKEY_EC have publicly-exposed
internaly representations, other EVP_PKEY types to not. EVP_PKEY_assign
should not allow callers to manipulate those representations.
As part of this, teach EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA, etc. to find their method
tables directly, rather than indirecting through an integer. This makes
those EVP APIs static-linker-friendly.
Bug: 618, 497
Change-Id: Ic45a7514e9a3adc505759f2327129f13faf03a65
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60645
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
We no longer need to define CRYPTO_MUTEX in public headers. This
simplifies a pile of things. First, we can now use pthread_rwlock_t
without any fuss, rather than trying to guess the size on glibc.
As a result, CRYPTO_MUTEX and CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX can be merged into one
type. We can almost do this to CRYPTO_refcount_t too. BIO is the one
straggler remaining.
Fixed: 325
Change-Id: Ie93c9f553c0f02ce594b959c041b00fc15ba51d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60611
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Three years of updating calling code are finally complete!
Update-Note: Accessing the RSA struct directly is no longer supported.
Use accessors instead.
Bug: 316, 325
Change-Id: I27b4c9899cb96f5807075b8fe351eaf72a9a9d44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60610
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
__builtin_ia32_addcarryx_u64 is, strictly speaking, an ADX intrinsic.
GCC and newer Clang seem to actually implement it without ADX, but
Clang 7 and older will actually try to generate ADX code with it. But
since the caller is not marked target("adx"), this fails to build.
Manually add ADX and BMI2 target attributes to all these functions. The
compiler should be free to use those instructions as these functions all
call into an ADX+BMI2 assembly function anyway. (Though it doesn't do
much with this.)
Note we cannot just annotate fiat_addcarryx_u64. Clang and GCC won't
inline across incompatible targets, so if we tag fiat_addcarryx_u64, we
need to tag the callers up the chain until we're willing to stop
inlining.
Change-Id: I855bb88fea666d92997984836e664292d90df5be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60612
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
rust-openssl uses this function when targetting OpenSSL 1.1.x.
Change-Id: Ifeb1b65be9976358f9ee636ed23c1a931e03b275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60609
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
We had to allow this when parsing certs to remain compatible with some
misissued certificates, but there's no reason to allow it when making
new values.
Update-Note: ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string and ASN1_TIME_set_string will no
longer accept times with timezone offsets, which is forbidden by RFC
5280. These functions are used when minting new certificates, rather
than parsing them. The parsing behavior is unchanged by this CL.
Change-Id: I0860deb44a49e99ce477f8cde847d20edfd29ed9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60608
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
We added SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid to match the other SSL_CIPHER_get_*_nid
functions, but OpenSSL went with returning the EVP_MD instead.
rust-openssl uses this function, and all the callers of
SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid then call EVP_get_digestbynid anyway, so this
version is preferable.
Update-Note: This change is backwards-compatible, but we should update
the QUIC code to use this new function when OPENSSL_API_VERSION is
high enough. It has the benefit of not pulling in random other hash
functions like MD4.
Change-Id: Ied66a6f0adbd5d7d86257d9349c40a2830e3c7e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60606
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
These bits need more work (and possibly some removal) as they're very,
very far from thread-safe, but rust-openssl relies on them being
const-correct when targetting OpenSSL 1.1.x.
Change-Id: I60531c7e90dbdbcb79c09fc440bd7c6b474172df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60607
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
This probably needs a few iterations, but fix the stuff I noticed on a
first pass:
- I don't think it's useful to say this is the BoringSSL implementation
of something. That's all implicit from this crate anyway.
- Rust seems to prefer "Returns ..." rather than "Return ..."
- Algorithm names like "hkdf" or "hmac" should be written "HKDF" or
"HMAC" when referring to the algorithms. Also BoringSSL is styled
"BoringSSL" rather than "boringssl".
- Given Rust overall doesn't try to handle allocation failure, let's
just write that we don't believe in allocation failure once in the
README rather than marking which functions do and don't panic.
Change-Id: I48501717dd0b063a2fa4106c4c140d76a7ef69a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60546
Reviewed-by: Nabil Wadih <nwadih@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
That NULL+0 is forbidden is still an awful language bug in C (fixed in
C++), but this particular instance could have been written without
pointer arithmetic. While I'm here, tidy pointers a bit:
- No need to cast pointers to char* when we're writing to void* anyway
- BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR is technically a strict aliasing violation. The
pointer points to a BUF_MEM*, not a char*, so we should not write to
it as a char**.
- C casts from void* freely and we've usually omitted the cast in that
case. (Though if we ever move libcrypto to C++, that'll all have to
change.)
Bug: b:286384999
Change-Id: I16d7da675d61f726f259fc9a3cc4a6fce2d6d1fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60605
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This fixes the generated Bazel build. Bazel is strict about having all
dependencies declared, which includes files that are #included into
other files. (It also is not particularly pleased about textual
headers and wants them declared in a separate place.)
The new fiat curve25519 assembly is currently split into a BoringSSL
half, and a more generic fiat half. For now, just move the BoringSSL
customizations directly into the fiat half. This isn't ideal, as we'd,
long term, like something where the fiat code can be made standalone.
But, to fix the build, just patch in the changes now and we can ponder
how to do this better later. (Build tools and conventions for assembly
are much less clear than C, sadly.)
Also add the .note.GNU-stack bit at the end.
Change-Id: I04aa733eabf8562dba42dee63a8fd25c86a59db9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60566
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This fixes one of the two build issues triggered by the curve25519
assembly. The new curve25519 assembly is one file that works for both
ELF and Apple targets. This is handy, but breaks the naive concatenation
logic for making the generated file lists. Fix the generation to
deduplicate first.
Convincing Starlark in Bazel to deduplicate is annoyingly difficult, so
we'll just generate both lists. This results in some duplication in the
generated files, but they're generated so this is fine. Hopefully we
can, in time, just remove the per-platform lists when everyone is
migrated over. To that end, this CL adds the combined output to GN so I
can migrate Chromium.
This CL is not sufficient to unbreak the Bazel build. The next change is
also needed.
Bug: 542
Change-Id: Ibe76ff557fc43f7b4d984ccdf298f13c20f3b50c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60565
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also teach update_clang.py how to download Chromium's Clang on macOS. We
don't currently use it in CI, but I've patched this in enough times for
local testing, that having it seems convenient.
This picks up -fsanitize=function, though it wouldn't have caught the
qsort issue anyway. I'm guessing the libc must be built with UBSan too.
Change-Id: I8c396a10b32e69fe7013283b1bb4320bc35756b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60547
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL's API constraints are such that sk_FOO_sort must take a
comparison function of type
int (*cmp)(const FOO *const *a, const FOO *const *b)
However qsort expects a comparison function of type
int (*cmp)(const void *a, const void *b)
In C, it is UB to cast a function pointer to a different type and call
it, even if the underlying calling conventions are the same. Moreover,
as qsort doesn't take a context parameter on its comparisons, we cannot
do the usual convention with closures in C.
qsort_r and qsort_s would avoid this, but they are unusable. Too many
libcs don't have them, and those that do define them inconsistently. See
https://stackoverflow.com/a/39561369
It seems this UB has finally hit a sanitizer in fxbug.dev/128274.
Irritating as it is to not even have a working sort function, I think
the easiest option is to just give up on qsort. As we did with bsearch
in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/35304, just
implement an in-place heap sort ourselves.
Bug: fxbug.dev/128274
Change-Id: I9de6b4018bf635da0d0c5a680bd7811d297b0bb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60507
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
At the public API, the comparison functions are a double pointer to
match qsort. qsort comparators are passed pointers to the list elements,
and our list elements are T*. qsort needs this indirection because it
can sort values of arbitrary size. However, our type-erased versions
have no such constraints. Since we know our all elements are pointers,
we can skip the indirection.
Change-Id: Ibb102b51a5aaf0a68a7318bf14ec8f4f9c7a3daf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60506
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have too many build systems and need to unify the source of truth
between them.
Change-Id: If8a71f400dd478f8890ff56062210295d5e6785e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60545
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL 1.1.x renamed these functions with an OPENSSL_ prefix.
Unfortunately, rust-openssl uses these, losing type-safety, rather than
the type-safe macros. It currently expects the old, unprefixed names due
to a different bug
(https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/issues/1944), but to fix that,
we'll need to align with the OpenSSL names.
To keep the current version of rust-openssl working, I've preserved the
old names that rust-openssl uses, but we should clear these out.
Bug: 499
Change-Id: I3be56a54ef503620b92ce8154fafd46b2906ae63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60505
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
.type seems to be needed for the unwind tester to report symbols
correctly. I assume it does other useful things. .hidden
(.private_extern on macOS) keeps it from being exported out of shared
libraries. I'm not positive what .size does, but if ELF wants to know
the size of the function, we should probably tell it that.
Change-Id: Iaa2e4f8a72e81092ec1d81ee2177504c7dc89c76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60465
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Erbsen <andreser@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Did 75000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1007110us (74470.5 ops/sec) [+26.9%]
Did 72000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1011133us (71207.2 ops/sec) [+25.5%]
Did 78000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1006737us (77478.0 ops/sec) [+27.5%]
Change-Id: I32ca2056f42f9b92af315d8381e1b72be69dd331
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60386
Commit-Queue: Andres Erbsen <andreser@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Update-Note: Accessing the DSA struct directly is no longer supported.
Use accessors instead.
Bug: 325
Change-Id: I73dc20f2e275d48648ca84d2db7806fe155c567d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60425
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Did 29000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1026074us (28263.1 ops/sec) [+31.2%]
Change-Id: I9c7d47a047dc68d37202b6cf40d7d12b5b4936f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60385
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The assembly functions from OpenSSL vary in how the counter overflow
works. The aarch64 implementation uses a mix of 32-bit and 64-bit
counters. This is because, when packing a block into 64-bit
general-purpose registers, it is easier to implement a 64-bit counter
than a 32-bit one. Whereas, on 32-bit general-purpose registers, or when
using vector registers with 32-bit lanes, it is easier to implement a
32-bit counter.
Counters will never overflow with the AEAD, which sets the length limit
so it never happens. (Failing to do so will reuse a key/nonce/counter
triple.) RFC 8439 is silent on what happens on overflow, so at best one
can say it is implicitly undefined behavior.
This came about because pyca/cryptography reportedly exposed a ChaCha20
API which encouraged callers to randomize the starting counter. Wrapping
with a randomized starting counter isn't inherently wrong, though it is
pointless and goes against how the spec recommends using the initial
counter value.
Nonetheless, we would prefer our functions behave consistently across
platforms, rather than silently give ill-defined output given some
inputs. So, normalize the behavior to the wrapping version in
CRYPTO_chacha_20 by dividing up into multiple ChaCha20_ctr32 calls as
needed.
Fixed: 614
Change-Id: I191461f25753b9f6b59064c6c08cd4299085e172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60387
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Did 59000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1004188us (58753.9 ops/sec) [+8.3%]
Did 57000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1005649us (56679.8 ops/sec) [+7.9%]
Did 19000 Ed25519 verify operations in 1054380us (18020.1 ops/sec) [-2.0%]
Did 61000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1007401us (60551.9 ops/sec) [+8.3%]
Did 22000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1022882us (21507.9 ops/sec) [+0.5%]
Change-Id: I14668f658b1ae99850cb0f8938f90f988d0edd0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60107
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BN_nnmod() can deal with the situation that the first and the second
arguments are the same, but it cannot deal with the first and the
second argument being equal. In that situation, if BN_mod(x, y, x, ctx)
results in a negative x, then the result of BN_nnmod() is zero. This
breaks the strange BN_mod_inverse(m, a, m, ctx).
Reported by Guido Vranken in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/21110
Change-Id: I8584720660f214f172b3b33716a5e3b29e8f2fd8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60365
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Andres Erbsen noticed we didn't actually have tests to catch when the
format macros were wrong.
In doing so, remove BN_DEC_FMT2. It was unused and only makes sense in
the context of the bignum-to-decimal conversion, where we no longer use
it anyway. None of these macros are exported in OpenSSL at all, so it
should be safe to remove it. (We possibly can remove the others too. I
see one use outside the library, and that use would probably be better
written differently anyway.)
Change-Id: I4ffc7f9f7dfb399ac060af3caff0778000010303
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60325
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
NGINX requires this constant if SSL_get_negotiated_group is defined.
OpenSSL returns this to indicate a named group constant it doesn't
understand, which doesn't make sense out of SSL_get_negotiated_group
because the library wouldn't negotiate a group it doesn't know about.
Nonetheless, define it for compatibility.
Fixed: 615
Change-Id: I05a6d607912bb8507be9ac6ff5fe1699b4715f6b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60326
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
All inputs are marked as secret. This is not to support a use case for
calling X25519 with a secret *point* as the input, but rather to ensure
that the choice of the point cannot influence whether the scalar is
leaked or not. Same for the initial contents of the output buffer.
This is a conservative choice and may be revised in the future.
Change-Id: I595d454a8e1fdc409912aee751bb0b3cf46f5430
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60186
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Many of our point addition functions internally check for the doubling
case and branch because the addition formulas are incomplete. This
branch is fine because the multiplication formulas are arranged to not
hit this case. However, we don't want to leak the couple of intermedate
values that determine whether to branch. Previously, we ran into this
with https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/36465.
This wasn't sufficient. The compiler understands if (a & b) enough to
compile into two branches. Thanks to Moritz Schneider, Nicolas Dutly,
Daniele Lain, Ivan Puddu, and Srdjan Capkun for reporting this!
Fix the leak by adding a value barrier on the final value. As we're also
intentionally leaking the result of otherwise secret data flow, I've
used the constant_time_declassify functions, which feed into our
valgrind-based constant-time validation and double as barriers.
Accordingly, I've also added some CONSTTIME_SECRET markers around the
ECDSA nonce value, so we can check with valgrind the fix worked. The
marker really should be at a lower level, at ec_random_nonzero_scalar or
further (maybe RAND_bytes?), but for now I've just marked the nonce.
To then clear valgrind, add constant_time_declassify in a few other
places, like trying to convert infinity to affine coordinates. (ECDH
deals with secret points, but it is public that the point isn't
infinity.)
Valgrind now says this code is constant-time, at least up to compilation
differences introduced by the annotations. I've also inspected the
compiler output. This seems to be fine, though neither test is quite
satisfying. Ideally we could add annotations in ways that don't
influence compiler output.
Change-Id: Idfc413a75d92514717520404a0f5424903cb4453
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60225
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Right now we use NIDs to configure the group list, but group IDs (the
TLS codepoints) to return the negotiated group. The NIDs come from
OpenSSL, while the group ID was original our API. OpenSSL has since
added SSL_get_negotiated_group, but we don't implement it.
To add Kyber to QUIC, we'll need to add an API for configuring groups to
QUICHE. Carrying over our inconsistency into QUICHE's public API would
be unfortunate, so let's use this as the time to align things.
We could either align with OpenSSL and say NIDs are now the group
representation at the public API, or we could add a parallel group ID
API. (Or we could make a whole new SSL_NAMED_GROUP object to pattern
after SSL_CIPHER, which isn't wrong, but is even more new APIs.)
Aligning with OpenSSL would be fewer APIs, but NIDs aren't a great
representation. The numbers are ad-hoc and even diverge a bit between
OpenSSL and BoringSSL. The TLS codepoints are better to export out to
callers. Also QUICHE has exported the negotiated group using the
codepoints, so the natural solution would be to use codepoints on input
too.
Thus, this CL adds SSL_CTX_set1_group_ids and SSL_set1_group_ids. It
also rearranges the API docs slightly to put the group ID ones first,
and leaves a little note about the NID representation before introducing
those.
While I'm here, I've added SSL_get_negotiated_group. NGINX seems to use
it when available, so we may as well fill in that unnecessary
compatibility hole.
Bug: chromium:1442377
Change-Id: I47ca8ae52c274133f28da9893aed7fc70f942bf8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60208
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds "group" versions of our codepoint-based APIs. This is mostly
because it looks weird to switch terminology randomly in the
implementation. See I7a356793d36419fc668364c912ca7b4f5c6c23a2 for
additional context.
I've not bothered renaming the bssl_shim flags. That seems a waste of
time.
Change-Id: I566ad132f5a33d99efd8cb2bb8b76d9a6038c825
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60207
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We're this awkward mix of "group" and "curve" right now. On the spec
side, this is because they used to be "curves", but then RFC 7919
renamed to "group" in an attempt to generalize FFDH and ECDH. The
negotiated FFDH stuff never really went anywhere (the way it used cipher
suite values in TLS 1.2 made it unusable), but the name change stuck.
In our implementation and API, we originally called it "curve". In
preparation for TLS 1.3, we renamed the internals to "group" to match
the spec in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/7955, but the
public API was still "curve".
Then we exported a few more things in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/8565, but I left
it at "curve" to keep the public API self-consistent.
Then we added OpenSSL's new "group" APIs in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54306, but
didn't go as far to deprecate the old ones yet.
Now I'd like to add new APIs to clear up the weird mix of TLS codepoints
and NIDs that appear in our APIs. But our naming is a mess, so either
choice of "group" or "curve" for the new API looks weird.
In hindsight, we probably should have left it at "curve". Both terms are
equally useless for the future post-quantum KEMs, but at least "curve"
is more unique of a name than "group". But at this point, I think we're
too far through the "group" rename to really backtrack:
- Chromium says "group" in its internals
- QUICHE says "group" in its internals and public API
- Our internals say "group"
- OpenSSL has switched to "group" and deprecated "curve", so new APIs
will be based on "group"
So align with all this and say "group". This CL handles set1_curves and
set1_curves_list APIs, which already have "group" replacements from
OpenSSL. A follow-up CL will handle our APIs. This is a soft deprecation
because I don't think updating things is particularly worth the churn,
but get the old names out of the way, so new code can have a simpler API
to target.
Also rewrite the documentation for that section accordingly. I don't
think we need to talk about how it's always enabled now. That's a
reference to some very, very old OpenSSL behavior where ECDH negotiation
needed to be separately enabled.
Change-Id: I7a356793d36419fc668364c912ca7b4f5c6c23a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60206
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Update-Note: SSL_CIPHER_get_value was our original name for the
function. OpenSSL later called it SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id. I believe
all external callers have since been updated to use the new function.
(If I missed a few stragglers, replace with SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id
to fix.)
Change-Id: I956fb49bf2d13a898eed73177493d2c8d50778ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60205
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Change-Id: I7458b1d7aa1736d586dc80660d59c07fa2ac1c8a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/59805
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also add some tests for X25519_public_from_private, as we apparently
weren't directly testing it with test vectors.
Change-Id: I1b73a9655323d507a8e022c62530ddd4610db4b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60109
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CONF supports a variable expansion feature, which allows a config file
to easily grow exponentially.
2d05568a7b (upstream's
6a6213556a80ab0a9eb926a1d6023b8bf44f2afd) capped the expansion to 65536
bytes, but this still allows a small input to produce a fairly large
output. (Once we have one large value, it only takes five characters
make a new key that references it, which is an expansion factor of
around 13,000.) This, combined with the string-based extensions
machinery's many quadratic behaviors (see
b92fcfdc17), means fuzzers hit timeouts.
We have very few uses of these APIs left, and none of them use this
feature. Just remove it. While none of these super-linear behaviors are
DoS bugs per se (they should never be passed untrusted input), there's
no sense in carrying an unused feature that only frustrates the fuzzers.
Update-Note: NCONF_load and NCONF_load_bio no longer support the $foo
variable expansion syntax. If you are using these functions in your
project, remove them.
Bug: oss-fuzz:59049
Change-Id: I85832ae1d05373ee420f4fb68197786736ca8272
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60105
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Maurice Lam
Andres Erbsen
Theo Buehler
Nabil Wadih
Ilya Tokar