GCC has a warning that complains about even more type mismatches in
printf. Some of these are a bit messy and will be fixed in separate CLs.
This covers the easy ones.
The .*s stuff is unfortunate, but printf has no size_t-clean string
printer. ALPN protocol lengths are bound by uint8_t, so it doesn't
really matter.
The IPv6 printing one is obnoxious and arguably a false positive. It's
really a C language flaw: all types smaller than int get converted to
int when you do arithmetic. So something like this first doesn't
overflow the shift because it computes over int, but then the result
overall is stored as an int.
uint8_t a, b;
(a << 8) | b
On the one hand, this fixes a "missing" cast to uint16_t before the
shift. At the same time, the incorrect final type means passing it to
%x, which expects unsigned int. The compiler has forgotten this value
actually fits in uint16_t and flags a warning. Mitigate this by storing
in a uint16_t first.
The story doesn't quite end here. Arguments passed to variadic functions
go through integer promotion[0], so the argument is still passed to
snprintf as an int! But then va_arg allows for a signedness mismatch[1],
provided the value is representable in both types. The combination means
that %x, though actually paired with unsigned, also accept uint8_t and
uint16_t, because those are guaranteed to promote to an int that meets
[1]. GCC recognizes [1] applies here.
(There's also PRI16x, but that's a bit tedious to use and, in glibc, is
defined as plain "x" anyway.)
[0] https://en.cppreference.com/w/c/language/conversion#Default_argument_promotions
[1] https://en.cppreference.com/w/c/variadic/va_arg
Bug: 450
Change-Id: Ic1d41356755a18ab922956dd2e07b560470341f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This unexports X509, X509_CINF, X509_NAME_ENTRY, X509_NAME, X509_OBJECT,
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_STORE_CTX.
Note this means X509_STORE_CTX can no longer be stack-allocated.
Update-Note: Patch cl/390055173 into the roll that includes this. This
unexports most of the X.509 structs, aligning with OpenSSL. Use the
accessor APIs instead.
Bug: 425
Change-Id: I53e915bfae3b8dc4b67642279d0e54dc606f2297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If a client offers ECH, but the server rejects it, the client completes
the handshake with ClientHelloOuter in order to authenticate retry keys.
Implement this flow. This is largely allowing the existing handshake to
proceed, but with some changes:
- Certificate verification uses the other name. This CL routes this up to
the built-in verifier and adds SSL_get0_ech_name_override for the
callback.
- We need to disable False Start to pick up server Finished in TLS 1.2.
- Client certificates, notably in TLS 1.3 where they're encrypted,
should only be revealed to the true server. Fortunately, not sending
client certs is always an option, so do that.
Channel ID has a similar issue. I've just omitted the extension in
ClientHelloOuter because it's deprecated and is unlikely to be used
with ECH at this point. ALPS may be worth some pondering but, the way
it's currently used, is not sensitive.
(Possibly we should change the draft to terminate the handshake before
even sending that flight...)
- The session is never offered in ClientHelloOuter, but our internal
book-keeping doesn't quite notice.
I had to replace ech_accept with a tri-state ech_status to correctly
handle an edge case in SSL_get0_ech_name_override: when ECH + 0-RTT +
reverify_on_resume are all enabled, the first certificate verification
is for the 0-RTT session and should be against the true name, yet we
have selected_ech_config && !ech_accept. A tri-state tracks when ECH is
actually rejected. I've maintained this on the server as well, though
the server never actually cares.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ie55966ca3dc4ffcc8c381479f0fe9bcacd34d0f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48135
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although not permitted by the TLS specification, systems sometimes
ossify TLS extension order, or byte offsets of various fields. To
keep the ecosystem healthy, add an API to reorder ClientHello
extensions.
Since ECH, HelloRetryRequest, and HelloVerifyRequest are sensitive to
extension order, I've implemented this by per-connection permutation of
the indices in the kExtensions structure. This ensures that all
ClientHellos within a connection are consistently ordered. As follow-up
work, permuting the other messages would also be nice, though any server
messages would need to be incorporated in handshake hints.
Change-Id: I18ce39b4df5ee376c654943f07ec26a50e0923a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48045
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Based on an initial implementation by Dan McArdle at
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46784
This CL contains most of a client implementation for
draft-ietf-tls-esni-10. The pieces missing so far, which will be done in
follow-up CLs are:
1. While the ClientHelloInner is padded, the server Certificate message
is not. I'll add that once we resolve the spec discussions on how to
do that. (We were originally going to use TLS record-level padding,
but that doesn't work well with QUIC.)
2. The client should check the public name is a valid DNS name before
copying it into ClientHelloOuter.server_name.
3. The ClientHelloOuter handshake flow is not yet implemented. This CL
can detect when the server selects ClientHelloOuter, but for now the
handshake immediately fails. A follow-up CL will remove that logic
and instead add the APIs and extra checks needed.
Otherwise, this should be complete, including padding and compression.
The main interesting point design-wise is that we run through
ClientHello construction multiple times. We need to construct
ClientHelloInner and ClientHelloOuter. Then each of those has slight
variants: EncodedClientHelloInner is the compressed form, and
ClientHelloOuterAAD just has the ECH extension erased to avoid a
circular dependency.
I've computed ClientHelloInner and EncodedClientHelloInner concurrently
because the compression scheme requires shifting the extensions around
to be contiguous. However, I've computed ClientHelloOuterAAD and
ClientHelloOuter by running through the logic twice. This probably can
be done better, but the next draft revises the construction anyway, so
I'm thinking I'll rework it then. (In the next draft, we use a
placeholder payload of the same length, so we can construct the
ClientHello once and fill in the payload.)
Additionally, now that we have a client available in ssl_test, this adds
a threading test to confirm that SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys is properly
synchronized. (Confirmed that, if I drop the lock in
SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys, TSan notices.)
Change-Id: Icaff68b595035bdcc73c468ff638e67c84239ef4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48004
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously we would extract the KEM ID from the ECHConfig and then parse
the private key using the corresponding KEM type. This CL makes it take
a pre-pared EVP_HPKE_KEY and checks it matches. This does require the
caller pass the key type through externally, which is probably prudent?
(On the other hand we are still inferring config from the rest of the
ECHConfig... maybe we can add an API to extract the EVP_HPKE_KEM from a
serialized ECHConfig if it becomes a problem. I could see runner or tool
wanting that out of convenience.)
The immediate motivation is to add APIs to programmatically construct
ECHConfigs. I'm thinking we can pass a const EVP_HPKE_KEY * to specify
the key, at which point it's weird for SSL_ECH_KEYS_add to look
different.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I2d424323885103d3fe0a99a9012c160baa8653bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48002
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
While decompression is deterministic, compression is not. New revisions
of the compression algorithm may start using different (hopefully
smaller!) compressions. So this doesn't cause hint mismatches, add a
certificate compression hint. If the shim's Certificate message matches
the handshaker, we'll reuse the already compressed message.
This also adds what appears to be a missing test for when the server
cannot find compression algorithms in common.
Change-Id: Idbedaceb20208463d8f61581ee27971c17fcd126
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The first thing any deployment will want to monitor is whether ECH was
actually used. Also it's useful if the command-line tool can output
this. (The alert is how the client signals it discarded the connection
due to ECH reject.)
This also disables ECH with the handoff mechanism for now. (The
immediate cause being that ech_accept isn't serialized.) We'll probably
need to make some decisions around the ordering here, since ECH affects
where the true ClientHello is available.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ie4559733290e653a514fcd94431090bf86bc3172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47911
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The remaining remnants of Channel ID all configure the private key ahead
of time. Unwind the callback machinery, which cuts down on async points
and the cases we need to test.
This also unwinds some odd interaction between the callback and
SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled: If a client uses
SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled but doesn't set a callback, the handshake
would still pause at SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP. This is now
removed, so SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled only affects the server and
SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id only affects the client.
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb is removed.
SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled no longer enables Channel ID as a client,
only as a server.
Change-Id: I89ded99ca65e1c61b1bc4e009ca0bdca0b807359
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47907
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We didn't end up deploying this. We also never implemented the final
RFC, so what we do have isn't useful for someone who wishes to deploy
it anyway.
Update-Note: Token binding APIs are removed.
Change-Id: Iecea7c3dcf9d3e2644a3b7afaf61511310b45d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47584
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions/Finished is logically one atomic flight
that exits the early data state, we have process each message
sequentially. Until we've processed Finished, we are still in the early
data state and must support writing data. Individual messages *are*
processed atomically, so the interesting points are before ServerHello
(already tested), after ServerHello, and after EncryptedExtensions.
The TLS 1.3 handshake internally clears ssl->session when processing
ServerHello, so getting the early data information from ssl->session
does not work. Instead, use hs->early_session, which is what other
codepaths use.
I've tested this with runner rather than ssl_test, so we can test both
post-SH and post-EE states. ssl_test would be more self-contained, since
we can directly control the API calls, but it cannot test the post-EE
state. To reduce record overhead, our production implementation packs EE
and Finished into the same record, which means the handshake will
process the two atomically. Instead, I've tested this in runner, with a
flag to partially drive the handshake before reading early data.
I've also tweaked the logic to hopefully be a little clearer.
Bug: chromium:1208784
Change-Id: Ia4901042419c5324054f97743bd1aac59ebf8f24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47485
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See go/handshake-hints (internal).
CL originally by Bin Wu <wub@google.com>. I just reworked the tests and
tidied it up a bit. This is the start of a replacement for the split
handshakes API. For now, only TLS 1.3 is supported. It starts with an
initial set of hints, but we can add more later. (In particular, we
should probably apply the remote handshaker's extension order to avoid
needing to capability protect such changes.)
Change-Id: I7b6a6dfaa84c6c6e3436d2a4026c3652b8a79f0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46535
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This CL adds an initial implementation of the ECH server, with pieces of
the client in BoGo as necessary for testing. In particular, the server
supports ClientHelloInner compression with ech_outer_extensions. When
ECH decryption fails, it can send retry_configs back to the client.
This server passes the "ech-accept" and "ech-reject" test cases in
tls-interop-runner[0] when tested against both the cloudflare-go and nss
clients. For reproducibility, I started with the main branch at commit
707604c262d8bcf3e944ed1d5a675077304732ce and updated the endpoint's
script to pass the server's ECHConfig and private key to the boringssl
tool.
Follow-up CLs will update HPKE to the latest draft and catch us up to
draft-10.
[0]: https://github.com/xvzcf/tls-interop-runner
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I49be35af46d1fd5dd9c62252f07d0bae179381ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45285
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We don't support renegotiation on the server anymore. Even if we did, we
wouldn't want to rerun ALPN anyway, and we don't do resumption on
renegotiation.
Change-Id: I43438d084bfe5fbe9b011ae0f53349df1baf6c97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46533
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This wasn't being used and wasn't even set correctly in split handshake
tests.
Change-Id: I03000db8dd3c227ea44e7bacaf3d1341259fae44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already know all the supported curves in runner.go. No sense in
repeating this list in more places than needed. (I'm about to need a
similar construct for -signing-prefs, so I figure it's worth being
consistent.)
This CL also adds a ShimConfig option because others don't support the
same curves we do and will likely run into this quickly.
Change-Id: Id79cea16891802af021b53a33ffd811a5d51c4ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46186
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This aligns with OpenSSL's behavior. RFC7301 says servers should return
no_application_protocol if the client supported ALPN but no common
protocol was found. We currently interpret all values as
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK. Instead, implement both modes and give guidance on
whne to use each. (NOACK is still useful because the callback may be
shared across multiple configurations, some of which don't support ALPN
at all. Those would want to return NOACK to ignore the list.)
To match upstream, I've also switched SSL_R_MISSING_ALPN, added for
QUIC, to SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL.
Update-Note: Callers that return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from the
ALPN callback will change behavior. The old behavior may be restored by
returning SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, though see the documentation for new
recommendations on return values.
Change-Id: Ib7917b5f8a098571bed764c79aa7a4ce0f728297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Note that when BoringSSL is not in QUIC mode, it
will error if it sees the new codepoint as a server
but it will ignore the legacy codepoint as that could
be a different private usage of that codepoint.
Change-Id: I314f8f0b169cedd96eeccc42b44153e97044388c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This changes the format of the mock QUIC transport to include an
explicit encryption level, matching real QUIC a bit better. In
particular, we need that extra data to properly skip rejected early data
on the shim side. (On the runner, we manage it by synchronizing with the
TLS stack. Still, the levels make it a bit more accurate.)
Testing sending and receiving of actual early data is not very relevant
in QUIC since application I/O is external, but this allows us to more
easily run the same tests in TLS and QUIC.
Along the way, improve error-reporting in mock_quick_transport.cc so
it's easier to diagnose record-level mismatches.
Change-Id: I96175a4023134b03d61dac089f8e7ff4eb627933
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44988
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This wasn't the cause of the bug, but I noticed we never tested it, so
fill that in.
Change-Id: Ib38bc08309e69f43c1995ba2a387643c0a7bae99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44984
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These APIs were used by Chromium to control the carve-out for the TLS
1.3 downgrade signal. As of
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2324170,
Chromium no longer uses them.
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade,
SSL_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade, and SSL_is_tls13_downgrade now do
nothing. Calls sites should be removed. (There are some copies of older
Chromium lying around, so I haven't removed the functions yet.) The
enforcement was already on by default, so this CL does not affect
callers that don't use those functions.
Change-Id: I016af8291cd92051472d239c4650602fe2a68f5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Original CL by svaldez, reworked by davidben.)
Change-Id: I8570808fa5e96a1c9e6e03c4877039a22e73254f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42404
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Add an earlyData and earlyDataRejected flag to configure the standard
0-RTT test options. It's too tedious otherwise. Along the way, I added
an -expect-cipher flag to a few of the tests which could do with them.
This does cause most 0-RTT tests to exchange a quick burst of data, so a
few more fuzzer mode suppressions are needed. I think that's probably
fine. Maybe we should mess with fuzzer mode so it's able to trial
decrypt as this is getting a little tedious.
Change-Id: Ib6490fe006d91294aab1a06d88f7793c6ae840c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43086
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
David Benjamin
Daniel McArdle
David Schinazi
Steven Valdez
Adam Langley