Change-Id: I3f7026b982f8503fd814be6feb99725f8e60b274
Signed-off-by: Rebecca Chang Swee Fun <rebecca.chang@starfivetech.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54005
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This syscall is required by generatekey in keystore.
Signed-off-by: Liu Cunyuan <liucunyuan.lcy@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Han <han_mao@linux.alibaba.com>
Change-Id: I4dd0534daa6cfa52429e5bf398679fccb7d67e7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL has a large exported API surface for exporting the policy tree
out of an X509_STORE_CTX. As far as I can tell, no one uses any of these
APIs. Remove them.
Update-Note: It is no longer possibly to see the policy tree after an
X.509 verification. As far as we can tell, this feature is unused.
Change-Id: Ieab374774805e90106555ce4e4155f8451ceb5b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53327
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_load_client_CA_file can just call
SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack.
SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack itself is rewritten to use scopers
and also give subquadratic running time. Sorting after every insertion
does not actually help. (It would have been faster to do a linear
search.) Instead, gather the names first, then sort and deduplicate.
Finally, add a SSL_add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack. This is both to
simplify testing and because Envoy code copied from
SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, complete with the quadratic
behavior. It is the only external project that depends on the
STACK_OF(T) comparison function. To simplify making that const-correct,
just export the function they needed anyway.
Bug: 498
Change-Id: I00d13c949a535c0d60873fe4ba2e5604bb585cca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53007
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This has no callers, and seems to be practically unusable. The only way
to set an X509_CRL_METHOD is X509_CRL_set_default_method, which is not
thread-safe and globally affects the CRL implementation across the
application.
The comment says it's to handle large CRLs, so lots of processes don't
have to store the same CRL in memory. As far as I can tell,
X509_CRL_METHOD cannot be used to help with this. It doesn't swap out
storage of the CRL, just signature verification and lookup into it. But
by the time we call into X509_CRL_METHOD, the CRL has already been
downloaded and the data stored on the X509_CRL structure. (Perhaps this
made more sense before the structure was made opaque?)
Update-Note: APIs relating to X509_CRL_METHOD are removed.
Change-Id: Ia5befa2a0e4f4416c2fb2febecad99fa31c1c6ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52687
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This type is opaque, with no accessors or setters, and there is no way
to get a hold of one except by parsing it. It's only used indirectly via
X509 functions.
The 'other' field is unused and appears to be impossible to set or
query, in either us or upstream.
Change-Id: I4aca665872792f75e9d92e5af68da597b849d4b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Having to check for header_len == len and a last byte of 0x80 is
actually unambiguous, but not obvious. Before we supported multi-byte
tags, a two-byte header was always {tag, 0x80}, but now a three-byte
header could be {tag1, tag2, 0x80}. But a 0x80 suffix could also be
{tag, 0x81, 0x80} for a 128-byte definite-length element.
This is unambiguous because header_len == len implies either zero length
or indefinite-length, and it is not possible to encode a definite length
of zero, in BER or DER, with a header that ends in 0x80. Still, rather
than go through all this, we can just report indefinite lengths to the
caller directly.
Update-Note: This is a breaking change to CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element.
There is only one external caller of this function, and it should be
possible to fix them atomically with this change, so I haven't bothered
introducing another name, etc. (See cl/429632075 for the fix.)
Change-Id: Ic94dab562724fd0b388bc8d2a7a223f21a8da413
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
After https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45965,
X509_VAL became largely unusable. While it did still exist as an
ASN1_ITEM and we emitted d2i/i2d/new/free functions, there is no way to
access its contents. Thus, hide it entirely.
Interestingly, although we got that to stick a while ago, I missed that
OpenSSL actually keeps X509_VAL exported, so it's possible we'll find 3p
code that uses this later. Since a standalone X509_VAL isn't especially
useful to construct or encode, this is most likely to come up in code
defining new types with <openssl/asn1t.h>.
Still, if we need to rexport this later (revert this *and* bring back
the struct), it won't be a big deal. Nothing in the public API even
constrains X509 to use X509_VAL.
Update-Note: The last remnants of the now (barely usable) X509_VAL are
no longer exported. It is unlikely anyone was relying on this.
Bug: 425
Change-Id: I90975f2f7ec27753675d2b5fa18b5cc4716319f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50085
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/asn1 represents an ASN.1 NULL value as a non-null ASN1_NULL*
pointer, (ASN1_NULL*)1. It is a non-null pointer because a null pointer
represents an omitted OPTIONAL NULL. It is an opaque pointer because
there is no sense in allocating anything.
This pointer cannot be dereferenced, yet ASN1_NULL is a typedef for int.
This is confusing and probably undefined behavior. (N1548, 6.3.2.3,
clause 7 requires pointer conversions between two pointer types be
correctly aligned, even if the pointer is never dereferenced. Strangely,
clause 5 above does not impose the same requirement when converting from
integer to pointer, though it mostly punts to the implementation
definition.) Of course, all of tasn_*.c is a giant strict aliasing
violation anyway, but an opaque struct pointer is a slightly better
choice here.
(Note that, although ASN1_BOOLEAN is also a typedef for int, that
situation is different: the ASN1_BOOLEAN representation is a plain
ASN1_BOOLEAN, not ASN1_BOOLEAN*, while the ASN1_NULL representation is a
pointer. ASN1_NULL could have had the same treatment and even used a
little less memory, but changing that would break the API.)
Update-Note: Code that was assuming ASN1_NULL was an int typedef will
fail to compile. Given this was never dereferencable, it is hard to
imagine anything relying on this.
Bug: 438
Change-Id: Ia0c652eed66e76f82a3843af1fc877f06c8d5e8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49805
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This unexports X509, X509_CINF, X509_NAME_ENTRY, X509_NAME, X509_OBJECT,
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_STORE_CTX.
Note this means X509_STORE_CTX can no longer be stack-allocated.
Update-Note: Patch cl/390055173 into the roll that includes this. This
unexports most of the X.509 structs, aligning with OpenSSL. Use the
accessor APIs instead.
Bug: 425
Change-Id: I53e915bfae3b8dc4b67642279d0e54dc606f2297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although not permitted by the TLS specification, systems sometimes
ossify TLS extension order, or byte offsets of various fields. To
keep the ecosystem healthy, add an API to reorder ClientHello
extensions.
Since ECH, HelloRetryRequest, and HelloVerifyRequest are sensitive to
extension order, I've implemented this by per-connection permutation of
the indices in the kExtensions structure. This ensures that all
ClientHellos within a connection are consistently ordered. As follow-up
work, permuting the other messages would also be nice, though any server
messages would need to be incorporated in handshake hints.
Change-Id: I18ce39b4df5ee376c654943f07ec26a50e0923a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48045
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We'll need to maintain two transcripts on the ECH client and then, once
we know which of ClientHelloOuter or ClientHelloInner is used, overwrite
the default transcript with the alternate one.
Rather than indirect through a pointer, move support is easy enough.
Then this can just be hs->transcript = std::move(hs->inner_transcript).
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Id4b0a0a48b956cd65ce8fc3dacfd16eebe2eb778
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47993
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also now that it's finalized, flip the default for
SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint.
Update-Note: QUIC APIs now default to the standard code point rather
than the draft one. QUICHE has already been calling
SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint, so this should not affect them. Once
callers implementing the draft versions cycle out, we can then drop
SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint altogether. I've also bumped
BORINGSSL_API_VERSION in case we end up needing an ifdef.
Change-Id: Id2cab66215f4ad4c1e31503d329c0febfdb4603e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47864
Reviewed-by: David Schinazi <dschinazi@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can unexport the X509_REQ_INFO type entirely. (NB: OpenSSL hasn't
done this, but has unexported so much of X509_REQ_INFO that it is
impossible to use what remains anyway.)
Update-Note: Callers that reach into X509_REQ and X509_REQ_INFO must use
accessors instead.
Change-Id: I1eea5207b9195c8051d5e467acd63ad5f0caf89d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This CL adds an initial implementation of the ECH server, with pieces of
the client in BoGo as necessary for testing. In particular, the server
supports ClientHelloInner compression with ech_outer_extensions. When
ECH decryption fails, it can send retry_configs back to the client.
This server passes the "ech-accept" and "ech-reject" test cases in
tls-interop-runner[0] when tested against both the cloudflare-go and nss
clients. For reproducibility, I started with the main branch at commit
707604c262d8bcf3e944ed1d5a675077304732ce and updated the endpoint's
script to pass the server's ECHConfig and private key to the boringssl
tool.
Follow-up CLs will update HPKE to the latest draft and catch us up to
draft-10.
[0]: https://github.com/xvzcf/tls-interop-runner
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I49be35af46d1fd5dd9c62252f07d0bae179381ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45285
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I85f0364b83440469c0d15c32dd96607be31fc1b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45904
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Our use-case for this does not require optimisation at the current time,
so a clean C implementation is fine.
Change-Id: I8f29572c33e8dbcc37961c099c71c14aafc8d0a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL has a fixed-width version of DH_compute_key nowadays. Searching
around callers of DH_compute_key, many of them go back and re-pad the
secret anyway. Uses of DH should migrate to modern primitives but, in
the meantime, DH_compute_key_padded seems worthwhile for OpenSSL
compatibility and giving fixed-width users a function to avoid the
timing leak.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION since one of the uses is in wpa_supplicant
and they like to compile against a wide range of Android revisions.
Update-Note: No compatibility impact, but callers that use
DH_compute_key and then fix up the removed leading zeros can switch to
this function. Then they should migrate to something else.
Change-Id: Icf8b2ace3972fa174a0f08ece39710f7599f96f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45004
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Note that when BoringSSL is not in QUIC mode, it
will error if it sees the new codepoint as a server
but it will ignore the legacy codepoint as that could
be a different private usage of that codepoint.
Change-Id: I314f8f0b169cedd96eeccc42b44153e97044388c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
IETF QUIC draft 33 is replacing the TLS extension
codepoint for QUIC transport parameters from 0xffa5
to 57. To support multiple versions of Chrome, we
need to support both codepoints in BoringSSL. This
CL adds support for the new codepoint in a way that
can be enabled on individual connections.
Change-Id: I3bf06ea0710702c0dc45bb3ff2e3d772e9f87f9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44585
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than the FIPS module actively collecting entropy from the CPU or
OS, this change configures Android FIPS to passively receive entropy.
See FIPS IG 7.14 section two.
Change-Id: Ibfc5c5042e560718474b89970199d35b67c21296
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44305
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
<openssl/base.h> checks for a supported platform, but we don't check
endianness of ARM and MIPS, which are bi-endian. See
https://crbug.com/1153312#c7.
Switch this around. Documentation on which define is "official" is hard
to come by, so I mostly mimicked Chromium. Chromium detects
little-endian ARM and MIPS with __ARMEL__ and __MIPSEL__ respectively,
without looking at __arm__ or __mips__. It uses __aarch64__
instead of __AARCH64EL__, but I think that's an oversight. I can get
Clang to output for aarch64_be and that defines __aarch64__ with
__AARCH64EB__.
<openssl/arm_arch.h> (which we should simplify and align with base.h
once this CL sticks) also normalizes to __ARMEL__ over __BYTE_ORDER__
and friends. Although, interestingly, arm_arch.h defines its own
__ARMEL__ on GNUC aarch64, even though Clang does *not* define __ARMEL__
on aarch64. (I'm guessing this aligned for the benefit of the "armx"
bi-arch asm files.) This value is based on __BYTE_ORDER__, not
__ARMEL__, but it assumes GNUC arm always defines __ARMEL__, so I think
it's reasonable to assume GNUC aarch64 always defines __AARCH64EL__.
Given all this, probably the simplest thing that's most likely to work
is to use __ARMEL__, __MIPSEL__, and __AARCH64EL__. Note this does not
change the _M_* checks. _M_* are Windows's definitions, which I think we
can reasonably assume come with an endianness opinion. (Windows' ARM and
ARM64 ABIs mandate little-endian.) This aligns with Chromium.
Update-Note: CPU processor defines are a mess. If a little-endian ARM or
MIPS build breaks, some of the assumptions above may be wrong. In that
case, the output $CC -dM -E - < /dev/null on the offending toolchain
will be useful to fix it. If a big-endian ARM or MIPS build breaks, this
is working as intended. Any resulting binaries weren't producing the
right outputs.
Change-Id: I2a9e662d09df119a71226e91716d84e7ac3792aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44324
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
QUICHE has a switch-case converting ssl_early_data_reason_t to a string
for logging. This causes a lot of churn when we add a new value.
Instead, add a function for this. Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION so we can
easily land a CL in QUICHE to start using the function without
coordinating repositories.
Change-Id: I176ca07b4f75a3ea7153a387219459665062aad9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43724
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See b/169780122. This CL should be a no-op (the only other OPENSSL_LINUX
defines are in urandom/getrandom logic, which Trusty doesn't use), but
should be easier to work for future code.
Change-Id: I7676ce234a20ddaf54a881f2da1e1fcd680d1c78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
With TLS 1.3 and Ed25519 support, we're much closer to OpenSSL 1.1.1
these days than OpenSSL 1.1.0. I've also added a test to keep
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER and OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT in sync.
Update-Note: Some OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL checks may
need to be updated. Hopefully even more can go away.
Bug: 367
Change-Id: Idaa238b74f35993c9c03fec31f1346c15cf82968
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42864
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: If an SSL_QUIC_METHOD is set, connections will now fail if
ALPN is not negotiated. This new behavior can be detected by checking
if the value of BORINGSSL_API_VERSION is greater than 10.
Bug: 294
Change-Id: I42fb80aa09268e77cec4a51e49cdad79bd72fa58
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rebecca Chang Swee Fun
Mao Han
Adam Langley
David Benjamin
Shelley Vohr
Daniel McArdle
Bradley Hess
Adam Langley
David Schinazi
Nick Harper