Following the guidance in
https://opensource.google/documentation/reference/releasing/authors,
start maintaining an AUTHORS file.
Update all existing Google copyright lines to 'The BoringSSL Authors'
per the document. This CL also changes the styling to match the new
guidance: removed the '(c)' and the comma.
All other existing copyright lines are left unmodified. Going forward,
our preference will be that new contributions to BoringSSL use 'The
BoringSSL Authors', optionally adding to the AUTHORS file if the
contributor desires.
To avoid being presumptuous, this CL does *not* proactively list every
past contributor in the BoringSSL half of the AUTHORS file. Past
contributors are welcome to send us a patch to be added, or request that
we add you. (Listed or not, the commit log continues to be a more
accurate record, and any existing non-Google copyright lines were left
unmodified.)
The OpenSSL half of the AUTHORS file is seeded with the contents of the
current OpenSSL AUTHORS file, as of writing. The current contents in the
latest revision of the 1.1.1 branch
(b372b1f76450acdfed1e2301a39810146e28b02c) and master
(d992e8729ee38b082482dc010e090bb20d1c7bd5) are identical, just formatted
in text vs Markdown.
Note when reviewing: CONTRIBUTING.md and AUTHORS contain non-mechanical
changes.
Bug: 364634028
Change-Id: I319d0ee63ec021ad85e248e8e3304b9cf9566681
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/74149
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a desire to upstream this in a compatible way to other
projects so they can use the same public API as us, however for
some C based build systems having an include file potentially
on the include path that can end up being picked up when you
include <time.h> is problematic and annoying, so let's
just avoid the unnecessary pain.
Update-Note: <openssl/time.h> has moved to <openssl/posix_time.h>
Change-Id: I7c6aa92e95a10ff65275851fcf596b06e4848789
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/65847
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I have a use for these in the chrome verifier conversions, we
could choose to make them hidden again after a future move to
boringssl..
Change-Id: If059debbdf482d64577ad04c1ec4f9c82724de1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55305
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Most asymmetric operations scale superlinearly, which makes them
potential DoS vectors. This (and other problems) are mitigated with
fixed sizes, like RSA-2048, P-256, or curve25519.
In older algorithms like RSA and DSA, these sizes are conventions rather
than well-defined algorithms. "Everyone" uses RSA-2048, but code which
imports an RSA key may see an arbitrary key size, possibly from an
untrusted source. This is commonly a public key, so we bound RSA key
sizes in check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes.
However, some applications import external private keys, and may need
tighter bounds. These typically parse the key then check the result.
However, parsing itself can perform superlinear work (RSA_check_key or
recovering the DSA public key).
This CL does the following:
- Rename check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes to rsa_check_public_key and
additionally call it from RSA_check_key.
- Fix a bug where RSA_check_key, on CRT-less keys, did not bound d, and
bound p and q before multiplying (quadratic).
- Our DSA verifier had stricter checks on q (160-, 224-, and 256-bit
only) than our DSA signer (multiple of 8 bits). Aligner the signer to
the verifier's checks.
- Validate DSA group sizes on parse, as well as priv_key < q, to bound
the running time.
Ideally these invariants would be checked exactly once at construction,
but our RSA and DSA implementations suffer from some OpenSSL's API
mistakes (https://crbug.com/boringssl/316), which means it is hard to
consistently enforce invariants. This CL focuses on the parser, but
later I'd like to better rationalize the freeze_private_key logic.
Performance of parsing RSA and DSA keys, gathered on my laptop.
Did 15130 RSA-2048 parse operations in 5022458us (3012.5 ops/sec)
Did 4888 RSA-4096 parse operations in 5060606us (965.9 ops/sec)
Did 354 RSA-16384 parse operations in 5043565us (70.2 ops/sec)
Did 88 RSA-32768 parse operations in 5038293us (17.5 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Did 35000 DSA-1024/256 parse operations in 5030447us (6957.6 ops/sec)
Did 11316 DSA-2048/256 parse operations in 5094664us (2221.1 ops/sec)
Did 5488 DSA-3072/256 parse operations in 5096032us (1076.9 ops/sec)
Did 3172 DSA-4096/256 parse operations in 5041220us (629.2 ops/sec)
Did 840 DSA-8192/256 parse operations in 5070616us (165.7 ops/sec)
Did 285 DSA-10000/256 parse operations in 5004033us (57.0 ops/sec)
Did 74 DSA-20000/256 parse operations in 5066299us (14.6 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL]
Update-Note: Some invalid or overly large RSA and DSA keys may
previously have been accepted that are now rejected at parse time. For
public keys, this only moves the error from verification to parsing. In
some private key cases, we would previously allow signing with those
keys, but the resulting signatures would not be accepted by BoringSSL
anyway. This CL makes us behave more consistently.
Bug: oss-fuzz:24730
Change-Id: I4ad2003ee61138b693e65d3da4c6aa00bc165251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Bob Beck
Adam Langley