Reword SSL_get0_ech_name_override documentation.

Hopefully it's a little clearer that this may be called whether or not
ECH is offered. (And whether or not it's a server.)

Bug: 275
Change-Id: I39c8ce5758543a0cfda84652b3fc0a5b9669fd0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49165
Reviewed-by: Matt Mueller <mattm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
grpc-202302
David Benjamin 4 years ago committed by Boringssl LUCI CQ
parent 07b365f63a
commit 37a3c70c0e
  1. 10
      include/openssl/ssl.h

@ -3601,12 +3601,12 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl,
const uint8_t *ech_config_list,
size_t ech_config_list_len);
// SSL_get0_ech_name_override sets |*out_name| and |*out_name_len| to point to a
// buffer containing the ECH public name, if the server rejected ECH, or the
// empty string otherwise.
// SSL_get0_ech_name_override, if |ssl| is a client and the server rejected ECH,
// sets |*out_name| and |*out_name_len| to point to a buffer containing the ECH
// public name. Otherwise, the buffer will be empty.
//
// This function should be called during the certificate verification callback
// (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|) if |ssl| is a client offering ECH. If
// When offering ECH as a client, this function should be called during the
// certificate verification callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|). If
// |*out_name_len| is non-zero, the caller should verify the certificate against
// the result, interpreted as a DNS name, rather than the true server name. In
// this case, the handshake will never succeed and is only used to authenticate

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