Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖) https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_INTERNAL_H
#include <openssl/base.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// Default implementations of RSA operations.
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_default_method(void);
size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa);
int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
int padding);
int rsa_default_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding);
int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len);
BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(void);
void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b);
void BN_BLINDING_invalidate(BN_BLINDING *b);
int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e,
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_ctx, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, const BN_BLINDING *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont_ctx,
BN_CTX *ctx);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len,
const uint8_t *from, size_t from_len);
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len,
const uint8_t *from, size_t from_len);
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len);
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len, const uint8_t *param,
size_t param_len, const EVP_MD *md,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len);
Bound RSA and DSA key sizes better. Most asymmetric operations scale superlinearly, which makes them potential DoS vectors. This (and other problems) are mitigated with fixed sizes, like RSA-2048, P-256, or curve25519. In older algorithms like RSA and DSA, these sizes are conventions rather than well-defined algorithms. "Everyone" uses RSA-2048, but code which imports an RSA key may see an arbitrary key size, possibly from an untrusted source. This is commonly a public key, so we bound RSA key sizes in check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes. However, some applications import external private keys, and may need tighter bounds. These typically parse the key then check the result. However, parsing itself can perform superlinear work (RSA_check_key or recovering the DSA public key). This CL does the following: - Rename check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes to rsa_check_public_key and additionally call it from RSA_check_key. - Fix a bug where RSA_check_key, on CRT-less keys, did not bound d, and bound p and q before multiplying (quadratic). - Our DSA verifier had stricter checks on q (160-, 224-, and 256-bit only) than our DSA signer (multiple of 8 bits). Aligner the signer to the verifier's checks. - Validate DSA group sizes on parse, as well as priv_key < q, to bound the running time. Ideally these invariants would be checked exactly once at construction, but our RSA and DSA implementations suffer from some OpenSSL's API mistakes (https://crbug.com/boringssl/316), which means it is hard to consistently enforce invariants. This CL focuses on the parser, but later I'd like to better rationalize the freeze_private_key logic. Performance of parsing RSA and DSA keys, gathered on my laptop. Did 15130 RSA-2048 parse operations in 5022458us (3012.5 ops/sec) Did 4888 RSA-4096 parse operations in 5060606us (965.9 ops/sec) Did 354 RSA-16384 parse operations in 5043565us (70.2 ops/sec) Did 88 RSA-32768 parse operations in 5038293us (17.5 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL] Did 35000 DSA-1024/256 parse operations in 5030447us (6957.6 ops/sec) Did 11316 DSA-2048/256 parse operations in 5094664us (2221.1 ops/sec) Did 5488 DSA-3072/256 parse operations in 5096032us (1076.9 ops/sec) Did 3172 DSA-4096/256 parse operations in 5041220us (629.2 ops/sec) Did 840 DSA-8192/256 parse operations in 5070616us (165.7 ops/sec) Did 285 DSA-10000/256 parse operations in 5004033us (57.0 ops/sec) Did 74 DSA-20000/256 parse operations in 5066299us (14.6 ops/sec) [rejected by this CL] Update-Note: Some invalid or overly large RSA and DSA keys may previously have been accepted that are now rejected at parse time. For public keys, this only moves the error from verification to parsing. In some private key cases, we would previously allow signing with those keys, but the resulting signatures would not be accepted by BoringSSL anyway. This CL makes us behave more consistently. Bug: oss-fuzz:24730 Change-Id: I4ad2003ee61138b693e65d3da4c6aa00bc165251 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42504 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
// rsa_check_public_key checks that |rsa|'s public modulus and exponent are
// within DoS bounds.
int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa);
// RSA_private_transform calls either the method-specific |private_transform|
// function (if given) or the generic one. See the comment for
// |private_transform| in |rsa_meth_st|.
int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len);
// This constant is exported for test purposes.
extern const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[];
extern const size_t kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen;
Make RSA self-test lazy. We need to ensure that all public functions that end up doing a cryptographic RSA operation run the self-tests first. We could do that by putting calls in the lower-most functions but the self-tests must run operations without creating a cycle. Therefore calls are placed as low down as possible except where it would conflict with the self-tests. Some functions need to be split so that there's a private version that doesn't require that the self tests have passed. Here's the call-graph that I used for this: ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ private_decrypt │ └───────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▼ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ decrypt │ └───────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▼ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ default_decrypt │ └───────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▼ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ private_transform │ ◀┐ └───────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ │ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ │ default_private_transform │ │ └───────────────────────────┘ │ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ │ private_encrypt │ │ └───────────────────────────┘ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │ │ sign_pss_mgf1 │ │ │ └───────────────┘\ ▼ │ ┌────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ │ sign │ ──▶ │ sign_raw │ │ └────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ │ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ │ default_sign_raw │ ─┘ └───────────────────────────┘ ┌−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−┐ ╎ Verification ╎ ╎ ╎ ╎ ┌───────────────────────────┐ ╎ ╎ │ public_decrypt │ ╎ ╎ └───────────────────────────┘ ╎ ╎ │ ╎ ╎ │ ╎ ╎ │ ╎ ┌−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− │ ╎ ╎ ▼ ╎ ╎ ┌────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐ ╎ ╎ │ verify │ ────▶ │ verify_raw │ ╎ ╎ └────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘ ╎ ╎ ╎ └−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−┘ ┌−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−┐ ╎ Encryption ╎ ╎ ╎ ╎ ┌───────────────────────────┐ ╎ ╎ │ public_encrypt │ ╎ ╎ └───────────────────────────┘ ╎ ╎ │ ╎ ╎ │ ╎ ╎ ▼ ╎ ╎ ┌───────────────────────────┐ ╎ ╎ │ encrypt │ ╎ ╎ └───────────────────────────┘ ╎ ╎ ╎ └−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−┘ Speed difference looks to be in the noise. Before: Did 19716 RSA 2048 signing operations in 10050000us (1961.8 ops/sec) Did 712000 RSA 2048 verify (same key) operations in 10007156us (71149.1 ops/sec) Did 590000 RSA 2048 verify (fresh key) operations in 10004296us (58974.7 ops/sec) Did 101866 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 10090285us (10095.5 ops/sec) Did 2919 RSA 4096 signing operations in 10019359us (291.3 ops/sec) Did 203000 RSA 4096 verify (same key) operations in 10008421us (20282.9 ops/sec) Did 175000 RSA 4096 verify (fresh key) operations in 10026353us (17454.0 ops/sec) Did 30900 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 10090073us (3062.4 ops/sec) After: Did 19525 RSA 2048 signing operations in 10000499us (1952.4 ops/sec) Did 706000 RSA 2048 verify (same key) operations in 10002172us (70584.7 ops/sec) Did 588000 RSA 2048 verify (fresh key) operations in 10010856us (58736.2 ops/sec) Did 101864 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 10063474us (10122.2 ops/sec) Did 2919 RSA 4096 signing operations in 10037480us (290.8 ops/sec) Did 203000 RSA 4096 verify (same key) operations in 10026966us (20245.4 ops/sec) Did 175000 RSA 4096 verify (fresh key) operations in 10032281us (17443.7 ops/sec) Did 31416 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 10031047us (3131.9 ops/sec) Change-Id: I8dec8a33066717b7078f160e3f93c33cd354bb0c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51426 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
3 years ago
// Functions that avoid self-tests.
//
// Self-tests need to call functions that don't try and ensure that the
// self-tests have passed. These functions, in turn, need to limit themselves
// to such functions too.
//
// These functions are the same as their public versions, but skip the self-test
// check.
int rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa);
int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len, int padding);
int rsa_sign_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
unsigned digest_len, uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len,
RSA *rsa);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_INTERNAL_H