Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖) https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
4 years ago
#include <algorithm>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
Span<const uint8_t> in);
int tls_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
assert(ssl_can_write(ssl));
assert(!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher());
*out_needs_handshake = false;
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
size_t total_bytes_written = ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written;
if (in.size() < total_bytes_written) {
// This can happen if the caller disables |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE|,
// asks us to write some input of length N, we successfully encrypt M bytes
// and write it, but fail to write the rest. We will report
// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE|. If the caller then retries with fewer than M
// bytes, we cannot satisfy that request. The caller is required to always
// retry with at least as many bytes as the previous attempt.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
in = in.subspan(total_bytes_written);
const bool is_early_data_write =
!ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
for (;;) {
4 years ago
size_t max_send_fragment = ssl->max_send_fragment;
if (is_early_data_write) {
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
if (hs->early_data_written >= hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data) {
ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
4 years ago
hs->can_early_write = false;
*out_needs_handshake = true;
return -1;
}
4 years ago
max_send_fragment = std::min(
max_send_fragment, size_t{hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data -
hs->early_data_written});
}
const size_t to_write = std::min(max_send_fragment, in.size());
size_t bytes_written;
int ret = do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
in.subspan(0, to_write));
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
return ret;
}
// Note |bytes_written| may be less than |to_write| if there was a pending
// record from a smaller write attempt.
assert(bytes_written <= to_write);
total_bytes_written += bytes_written;
in = in.subspan(bytes_written);
if (is_early_data_write) {
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written += bytes_written;
}
if (in.empty() || (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)) {
ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = 0;
*out_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
return 1;
}
}
}
// do_tls_write writes an SSL record of the given type. On success, it sets
// |*out_bytes_written| to number of bytes successfully written and returns one.
// On error, it returns a value <= 0 from the underlying |BIO|.
static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
Span<const uint8_t> in) {
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
// If there is a pending write, the retry must be consistent.
if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty() &&
(ssl->s3->pending_write.size() > in.size() ||
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
(!(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) &&
ssl->s3->pending_write.data() != in.data()) ||
ssl->s3->pending_write_type != type)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return -1;
}
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
// Flush any unwritten data to the transport. There may be data to flush even
// if |wpend_tot| is zero.
int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
// If there is a pending write, we just completed it. Report it to the caller.
if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty()) {
*out_bytes_written = ssl->s3->pending_write.size();
ssl->s3->pending_write = {};
return 1;
}
SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH || buf->size() > 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
// We may have unflushed handshake data that must be written before |in|. This
// may be a KeyUpdate acknowledgment, 0-RTT key change messages, or a
// NewSessionTicket.
Span<const uint8_t> pending_flight;
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != nullptr) {
pending_flight = MakeConstSpan(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->pending_flight->data),
ssl->s3->pending_flight->length);
pending_flight = pending_flight.subspan(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
}
size_t max_out = pending_flight.size();
if (!in.empty()) {
const size_t max_ciphertext_len = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
if (max_ciphertext_len < in.size() ||
max_out + max_ciphertext_len < max_out) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return -1;
}
max_out += max_ciphertext_len;
}
if (max_out == 0) {
// Nothing to write.
*out_bytes_written = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!buf->EnsureCap(pending_flight.size() + ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(ssl),
max_out)) {
return -1;
}
// Copy |pending_flight| to the output.
if (!pending_flight.empty()) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(buf->remaining().data(), pending_flight.data(),
pending_flight.size());
ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
buf->DidWrite(pending_flight.size());
}
if (!in.empty()) {
size_t ciphertext_len;
if (!tls_seal_record(ssl, buf->remaining().data(), &ciphertext_len,
buf->remaining().size(), type, in.data(), in.size())) {
return -1;
}
buf->DidWrite(ciphertext_len);
}
// Now that we've made progress on the connection, uncork KeyUpdate
// acknowledgments.
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
// Flush the write buffer.
ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
// Track the unfinished write.
if (!in.empty()) {
ssl->s3->pending_write = in;
ssl->s3->pending_write_type = type;
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes. Writing application data goes through three steps: 1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer. 2. Flush the write buffer to the network. 3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded. In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform (3). TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the current write buffer. To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2) and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending boolean to track whether there was pending data. This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0) to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first place. Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it has the same data as wpend_tot. Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
}
return ret;
}
*out_bytes_written = in.size();
return 1;
}
ssl_open_record_t tls_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
Span<uint8_t> in) {
assert(ssl_can_read(ssl));
assert(!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher());
uint8_t type;
Span<uint8_t> body;
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
return ret;
}
const bool is_early_data_read = ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
// Post-handshake data prior to TLS 1.3 is always renegotiation, which we
// never accept as a server. Otherwise |tls_get_message| will send
// |SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE|.
if (ssl->server && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (is_early_data_read) {
if (body.size() > kMaxEarlyDataAccepted - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA);
*out_alert = SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read += body.size();
}
if (body.empty()) {
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
*out = body;
return ssl_open_record_success;
}
ssl_open_record_t tls_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
uint8_t *out_alert,
Span<uint8_t> in) {
uint8_t type;
Span<uint8_t> body;
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
return ret;
}
if (type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (body.size() != 1 || body[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, body);
return ssl_open_record_success;
}
void ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
// This function is called in response to a fatal error from the peer. Ignore
// any failures writing the alert and report only the original error. In
// particular, if the transport uses |SSL_write|, our existing error will be
// clobbered so we must save and restore the error queue. See
// https://crbug.com/959305.
//
// TODO(davidben): Return the alert out of the handshake, rather than calling
// this function internally everywhere.
//
// TODO(davidben): This does not allow retrying if the alert hit EAGAIN. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/130.
UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> err_state(ERR_save_state());
ssl_send_alert_impl(ssl, level, desc);
ERR_restore_state(err_state.get());
}
int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
// It is illegal to send an alert when we've already sent a closing one.
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
if (level == SSL3_AL_WARNING && desc == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
} else {
assert(level == SSL3_AL_FATAL);
assert(desc != SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
}
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = true;
ssl->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
if (ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
// Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
// immediately.
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
}
// The alert will be dispatched later.
return -1;
}
int tls_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->quic_method) {
if (!ssl->quic_method->send_alert(ssl, ssl->s3->write_level,
ssl->s3->send_alert[1])) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
size_t bytes_written;
int ret =
do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
assert(bytes_written == 2);
}
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = false;
// If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now.
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get());
}
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
return 1;
}
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END