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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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|
Check hs->early_session, not ssl->session, for the early data limit.
ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions/Finished is logically one atomic flight
that exits the early data state, we have process each message
sequentially. Until we've processed Finished, we are still in the early
data state and must support writing data. Individual messages *are*
processed atomically, so the interesting points are before ServerHello
(already tested), after ServerHello, and after EncryptedExtensions.
The TLS 1.3 handshake internally clears ssl->session when processing
ServerHello, so getting the early data information from ssl->session
does not work. Instead, use hs->early_session, which is what other
codepaths use.
I've tested this with runner rather than ssl_test, so we can test both
post-SH and post-EE states. ssl_test would be more self-contained, since
we can directly control the API calls, but it cannot test the post-EE
state. To reduce record overhead, our production implementation packs EE
and Finished into the same record, which means the handshake will
process the two atomically. Instead, I've tested this in runner, with a
flag to partially drive the handshake before reading early data.
I've also tweaked the logic to hopefully be a little clearer.
Bug: chromium:1208784
Change-Id: Ia4901042419c5324054f97743bd1aac59ebf8f24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47485
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
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#include <algorithm>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
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static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
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Span<const uint8_t> in);
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int tls_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
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size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
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assert(ssl_can_write(ssl));
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assert(!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher());
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*out_needs_handshake = false;
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if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
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return -1;
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}
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size_t total_bytes_written = ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written;
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if (in.size() < total_bytes_written) {
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// This can happen if the caller disables |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE|,
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// asks us to write some input of length N, we successfully encrypt M bytes
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// and write it, but fail to write the rest. We will report
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// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE|. If the caller then retries with fewer than M
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// bytes, we cannot satisfy that request. The caller is required to always
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// retry with at least as many bytes as the previous attempt.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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in = in.subspan(total_bytes_written);
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const bool is_early_data_write =
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!ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
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for (;;) {
|
Check hs->early_session, not ssl->session, for the early data limit.
ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions/Finished is logically one atomic flight
that exits the early data state, we have process each message
sequentially. Until we've processed Finished, we are still in the early
data state and must support writing data. Individual messages *are*
processed atomically, so the interesting points are before ServerHello
(already tested), after ServerHello, and after EncryptedExtensions.
The TLS 1.3 handshake internally clears ssl->session when processing
ServerHello, so getting the early data information from ssl->session
does not work. Instead, use hs->early_session, which is what other
codepaths use.
I've tested this with runner rather than ssl_test, so we can test both
post-SH and post-EE states. ssl_test would be more self-contained, since
we can directly control the API calls, but it cannot test the post-EE
state. To reduce record overhead, our production implementation packs EE
and Finished into the same record, which means the handshake will
process the two atomically. Instead, I've tested this in runner, with a
flag to partially drive the handshake before reading early data.
I've also tweaked the logic to hopefully be a little clearer.
Bug: chromium:1208784
Change-Id: Ia4901042419c5324054f97743bd1aac59ebf8f24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47485
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
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size_t max_send_fragment = ssl->max_send_fragment;
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if (is_early_data_write) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
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if (hs->early_data_written >= hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data) {
|
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|
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ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
|
Check hs->early_session, not ssl->session, for the early data limit.
ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions/Finished is logically one atomic flight
that exits the early data state, we have process each message
sequentially. Until we've processed Finished, we are still in the early
data state and must support writing data. Individual messages *are*
processed atomically, so the interesting points are before ServerHello
(already tested), after ServerHello, and after EncryptedExtensions.
The TLS 1.3 handshake internally clears ssl->session when processing
ServerHello, so getting the early data information from ssl->session
does not work. Instead, use hs->early_session, which is what other
codepaths use.
I've tested this with runner rather than ssl_test, so we can test both
post-SH and post-EE states. ssl_test would be more self-contained, since
we can directly control the API calls, but it cannot test the post-EE
state. To reduce record overhead, our production implementation packs EE
and Finished into the same record, which means the handshake will
process the two atomically. Instead, I've tested this in runner, with a
flag to partially drive the handshake before reading early data.
I've also tweaked the logic to hopefully be a little clearer.
Bug: chromium:1208784
Change-Id: Ia4901042419c5324054f97743bd1aac59ebf8f24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47485
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
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hs->can_early_write = false;
|
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*out_needs_handshake = true;
|
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|
|
return -1;
|
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|
|
}
|
Check hs->early_session, not ssl->session, for the early data limit.
ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions/Finished is logically one atomic flight
that exits the early data state, we have process each message
sequentially. Until we've processed Finished, we are still in the early
data state and must support writing data. Individual messages *are*
processed atomically, so the interesting points are before ServerHello
(already tested), after ServerHello, and after EncryptedExtensions.
The TLS 1.3 handshake internally clears ssl->session when processing
ServerHello, so getting the early data information from ssl->session
does not work. Instead, use hs->early_session, which is what other
codepaths use.
I've tested this with runner rather than ssl_test, so we can test both
post-SH and post-EE states. ssl_test would be more self-contained, since
we can directly control the API calls, but it cannot test the post-EE
state. To reduce record overhead, our production implementation packs EE
and Finished into the same record, which means the handshake will
process the two atomically. Instead, I've tested this in runner, with a
flag to partially drive the handshake before reading early data.
I've also tweaked the logic to hopefully be a little clearer.
Bug: chromium:1208784
Change-Id: Ia4901042419c5324054f97743bd1aac59ebf8f24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47485
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
max_send_fragment = std::min(
|
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|
|
max_send_fragment, size_t{hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data -
|
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|
|
hs->early_data_written});
|
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|
}
|
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|
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|
const size_t to_write = std::min(max_send_fragment, in.size());
|
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|
|
size_t bytes_written;
|
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|
|
int ret = do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
|
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|
|
in.subspan(0, to_write));
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
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|
|
ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
|
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|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Note |bytes_written| may be less than |to_write| if there was a pending
|
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|
|
// record from a smaller write attempt.
|
|
|
|
assert(bytes_written <= to_write);
|
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|
|
total_bytes_written += bytes_written;
|
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|
|
in = in.subspan(bytes_written);
|
|
|
|
if (is_early_data_write) {
|
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|
|
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written += bytes_written;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in.empty() || (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = 0;
|
|
|
|
*out_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// do_tls_write writes an SSL record of the given type. On success, it sets
|
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|
|
// |*out_bytes_written| to number of bytes successfully written and returns one.
|
|
|
|
// On error, it returns a value <= 0 from the underlying |BIO|.
|
|
|
|
static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> in) {
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
// If there is a pending write, the retry must be consistent.
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty() &&
|
|
|
|
(ssl->s3->pending_write.size() > in.size() ||
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
(!(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) &&
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_write.data() != in.data()) ||
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_write_type != type)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
// Flush any unwritten data to the transport. There may be data to flush even
|
|
|
|
// if |wpend_tot| is zero.
|
|
|
|
int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
// If there is a pending write, we just completed it. Report it to the caller.
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
*out_bytes_written = ssl->s3->pending_write.size();
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_write = {};
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
|
|
|
|
if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH || buf->size() > 0) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// We may have unflushed handshake data that must be written before |in|. This
|
|
|
|
// may be a KeyUpdate acknowledgment, 0-RTT key change messages, or a
|
|
|
|
// NewSessionTicket.
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> pending_flight;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != nullptr) {
|
|
|
|
pending_flight = MakeConstSpan(
|
|
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->pending_flight->data),
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_flight->length);
|
|
|
|
pending_flight = pending_flight.subspan(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out = pending_flight.size();
|
|
|
|
if (!in.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
const size_t max_ciphertext_len = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (max_ciphertext_len < in.size() ||
|
|
|
|
max_out + max_ciphertext_len < max_out) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
max_out += max_ciphertext_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (max_out == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// Nothing to write.
|
|
|
|
*out_bytes_written = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!buf->EnsureCap(pending_flight.size() + ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(ssl),
|
|
|
|
max_out)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Copy |pending_flight| to the output.
|
|
|
|
if (!pending_flight.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(buf->remaining().data(), pending_flight.data(),
|
|
|
|
pending_flight.size());
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
buf->DidWrite(pending_flight.size());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!in.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
size_t ciphertext_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_seal_record(ssl, buf->remaining().data(), &ciphertext_len,
|
|
|
|
buf->remaining().size(), type, in.data(), in.size())) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf->DidWrite(ciphertext_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now that we've made progress on the connection, uncork KeyUpdate
|
|
|
|
// acknowledgments.
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
|
|
|
|
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
// Flush the write buffer.
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
// Track the unfinished write.
|
|
|
|
if (!in.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_write = in;
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->pending_write_type = type;
|
Fix up book-keeping between the write buffer and pending writes.
Writing application data goes through three steps:
1. Encrypt the data into the write buffer.
2. Flush the write buffer to the network.
3. Report to SSL_write's caller that the write succeeded.
In principle, steps 2 and 3 are done together, but it is possible that
BoringSSL needs to write something, but we are not in the middle of
servicing an SSL_write call. Then we must perform (2) but cannot perform
(3).
TLS 1.3 0-RTT on a client introduces a case like this. Suppose we write
some 0-RTT data, but it is blocked on the network. Meanwhile, the
application tries to read from the socket (protocols like HTTP/2 read
and write concurrently). We discover ServerHello..Finished and must then
respond with EndOfEarlyData..Finished. But to write, we must flush the
current write buffer.
To fix this, https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164 split (2)
and (3) more explicitly. The write buffer may be flushed to the network
at any point, but the wpend_* book-keeping is separate. It represents
whether (3) is done. As part of that, we introduced a wpend_pending
boolean to track whether there was pending data.
This introduces an interesting corner case. We now keep NewSessionTicket
messages buffered until the next SSL_write. (KeyUpdate ACKs are
implemented similarly.) Suppose the caller calls SSL_write(nullptr, 0)
to flush the NewSessionTicket and this hits EWOULDBLOCK. We'll track a
zero-length pending write in wpend_*! A future attempt to write non-zero
data would then violate the moving buffer check. This is strange because
we don't build records for zero-length application writes in the first
place.
Instead, wpend_pending should have been wpend_tot > 0. Remove that and
rearrange the code to check that properly. Also remove wpend_ret as it
has the same data as wpend_tot.
Change-Id: I58c23842cd55e8a8dfbb1854b61278b108b5c7ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53546
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out_bytes_written = in.size();
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_open_record_t tls_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
|
|
Span<uint8_t> in) {
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl_can_read(ssl));
|
|
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
|
|
Span<uint8_t> body;
|
|
|
|
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const bool is_early_data_read = ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
|
|
// Post-handshake data prior to TLS 1.3 is always renegotiation, which we
|
|
|
|
// never accept as a server. Otherwise |tls_get_message| will send
|
|
|
|
// |SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE|.
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->server && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) {
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_discard;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_early_data_read) {
|
|
|
|
if (body.size() > kMaxEarlyDataAccepted - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read += body.size();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (body.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_discard;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out = body;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_open_record_t tls_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
|
|
Span<uint8_t> in) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
|
|
Span<uint8_t> body;
|
|
|
|
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (body.size() != 1 || body[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, body);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
|
|
|
|
// This function is called in response to a fatal error from the peer. Ignore
|
|
|
|
// any failures writing the alert and report only the original error. In
|
|
|
|
// particular, if the transport uses |SSL_write|, our existing error will be
|
|
|
|
// clobbered so we must save and restore the error queue. See
|
|
|
|
// https://crbug.com/959305.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// TODO(davidben): Return the alert out of the handshake, rather than calling
|
|
|
|
// this function internally everywhere.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// TODO(davidben): This does not allow retrying if the alert hit EAGAIN. See
|
|
|
|
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/130.
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> err_state(ERR_save_state());
|
|
|
|
ssl_send_alert_impl(ssl, level, desc);
|
|
|
|
ERR_restore_state(err_state.get());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
|
|
|
|
// It is illegal to send an alert when we've already sent a closing one.
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (level == SSL3_AL_WARNING && desc == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
assert(level == SSL3_AL_FATAL);
|
|
|
|
assert(desc != SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = true;
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
|
|
|
|
// Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
|
|
|
|
// immediately.
|
|
|
|
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// The alert will be dispatched later.
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int tls_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->quic_method) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->quic_method->send_alert(ssl, ssl->s3->write_level,
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[1])) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
size_t bytes_written;
|
|
|
|
int ret =
|
|
|
|
do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(bytes_written == 2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now.
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
|
|
BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
|