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boringssl/sources.cmake

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acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
# This file contains source lists that are also consumed by
# generate_build_files.py.
#
# TODO(davidben): Move the other source lists into this file.
set(
CRYPTO_TEST_DATA
Add basic BLAKE2b-256 support. Our use-case for this does not require optimisation at the current time, so a clean C implementation is fine. Change-Id: I8f29572c33e8dbcc37961c099c71c14aafc8d0a3 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/45164 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/blake2/blake2b256_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8_tests.txt
Add a CCM AEAD for Matter, the IoT standard. Change-Id: I8b1e4652d8d1445a6665af88d158e006ff3fdb20 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53185 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_ccm_matter_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt
Add AES-GCM AEADs with internal nonce generation. For FIPS reasons, one might wish to ensure that a random AES-GCM nonce was generated entirely within the FIPS module. If so, then these are the AEADs for you. Change-Id: Ic2b7864b089f446401f700d7d55bfa6336c61e23 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43686 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_gcm_randnonce_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_gcm_siv_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_128_gcm_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_192_gcm_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt
Add AES-GCM AEADs with internal nonce generation. For FIPS reasons, one might wish to ensure that a random AES-GCM nonce was generated entirely within the FIPS module. If so, then these are the AEADs for you. Change-Id: Ic2b7864b089f446401f700d7d55bfa6336c61e23 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43686 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_gcm_randnonce_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_gcm_siv_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_256_gcm_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/chacha20_poly1305_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/xchacha20_poly1305_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/cipher_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_128_cbc.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_128_ctr.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_128_gcm.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_192_cbc.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_192_ctr.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_256_cbc.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_256_ctr.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_256_gcm.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/tdes_cbc.txt
crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/tdes_ecb.txt
crypto/curve25519/ed25519_tests.txt
crypto/ecdh_extra/ecdh_tests.txt
crypto/evp/evp_tests.txt
crypto/evp/scrypt_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_tests.txt
Split bn_tests.txt into several test files. FileTests run sequentially and cannot be filtered. Split them up so it's easier to, say, just run the ModExp ones. Also our test sharding machinery will do a slightly better job parallelizing them when split up like this. (This is one of our slower tests.) Change-Id: Ie69864982f043655f68e592440b1f36e971b033a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55230 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/exp_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/gcd_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/miller_rabin_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/mod_exp_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/mod_inv_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/mod_mul_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/mod_sqrt_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/product_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/quotient_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/shift_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/bn/test/sum_tests.txt
Move cmac into the FIPS module boundary. Change-Id: I2cffb9e870785a1c49d3ae872387494632bfb8fe Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52567 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
3 years ago
crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_3des_cmac_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes128_cmac_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes192_cmac_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes256_cmac_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_scalar_base_mult_tests.txt
P-256 assembly optimisations for Aarch64. The ARMv8 assembly code in this commit is mostly taken from OpenSSL's `ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl` at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/19e277dd19f2897f6a7b7eb236abe46655e575bf/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl (see Note 1), adapting it to the implementation in p256-x86_64.c. Most of the assembly functions found in `crypto/fipsmodule/ec/asm/p256-x86_64-asm.pl` required to support that code have their analogous functions in the imported OpenSSL ARMv8 Perl assembly implementation with the exception of the functions: - ecp_nistz256_select_w5 - ecp_nistz256_select_w7 An implementation for these functions was added. Summary of modifications to the imported code: * Renamed to `p256-armv8-asm.pl` * Modified the location of `arm-xlate.pl` and `arm_arch.h` * Replaced the `scatter-gather subroutines` with `select subroutines`. The `select subroutines` are implemented for ARMv8 similarly to their x86_64 counterparts, `ecp_nistz256_select_w5` and `ecp_nistz256_select_w7`. * `ecp_nistz256_add` is removed because it was conflicting during the static build with the function of the same name in p256-nistz.c. The latter calls another assembly function, `ecp_nistz256_point_add`. * `__ecp_nistz256_add` renamed to `__ecp_nistz256_add_to` to avoid the conflict with the function `ecp_nistz256_add` during the static build. * l. 924 `add sp,sp,#256` the calculation of the constant, 32*(12-4), is not left for the assembler to perform. Other modifications: * `beeu_mod_inverse_vartime()` was implemented for AArch64 in `p256_beeu-armv8-asm.pl` similarly to its implementation in `p256_beeu-x86_64-asm.pl`. * The files containing `p256-x86_64` in their name were renamed to, `p256-nistz` since the functions and tests defined in them are hereby running on ARMv8 as well, if enabled. * Updated `delocate.go` and `delocate.peg` to handle the offset calculation in the assembly instructions. * Regenerated `delocate.peg.go`. Notes: 1- The last commit in the history of the file is in master only, the previous commits are in OpenSSL 3.0.1 2- This change focuses on AArch64 (64-bit architecture of ARMv8). It does not support ARMv4 or ARMv7. Testing the performance on Armv8 platform using -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release: Before: ``` Did 2596 ECDH P-256 operations in 1093956us (2373.0 ops/sec) Did 6996 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1044630us (6697.1 ops/sec) Did 2970 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1084848us (2737.7 ops/sec) ``` After: ``` Did 6699 ECDH P-256 operations in 1091684us (6136.4 ops/sec) Did 20000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1012944us (19744.4 ops/sec) Did 7051 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1060000us (6651.9 ops/sec) ``` Change-Id: I9fdef12db365967a9264b5b32c07967b55ea48bd Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51805 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256-nistz_tests.txt
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa_sign_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa_verify_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm_tests.txt
crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg_vectors.txt
crypto/hmac_extra/hmac_tests.txt
Implement HPKE. draft-ietf-tls-esni-07 uses HPKE for encryption. Bug: 275 Change-Id: I4af39be4df534f8c1c991c4df82d38c6adcf2574 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41304 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/hpke/hpke_test_vectors.txt
Start a Kyber implementation with basic Keccak code. Change-Id: I8e9a0b83453e44bdecab017144596bd3d61898ac Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57385 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/kyber/keccak_tests.txt
Adding a C implementation of Kyber. Passes test vectors, and should be constant time, but is currently not optimized and neither the API nor the standard is stable. Change-Id: I89b90877e023a43ee7238e11b86065444ab3bdec Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57845 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/kyber/kyber_tests.txt
Move PKCS#12 samples to embed_test_data. pkcs12_test.cc was getting a bit long. Along the way, embed_test_data.go needed a fix to work around a syntax quirk of C++. Change-Id: Ic4a19f77d177ebd607918feb253a08f1f9037981 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46044 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/pkcs8/test/empty_password.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/no_encryption.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/nss.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/null_password.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/openssl.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/pbes2_sha1.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/pbes2_sha256.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/unicode_password.p12
crypto/pkcs8/test/windows.p12
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/poly1305/poly1305_tests.txt
crypto/siphash/siphash_tests.txt
Add X509_get_pathlen and X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions. Conscrypt will need these functions. Also fix a bug in X509_get_extension_flags's error-handling. While I'm here, add X509_CRL_get0_extensions for completeness. Nothing uses this yet, but this could later be an alternative to avoid Conscrypt's mess with templates. Change-Id: I9393b75fcf53346535e6a4712355be081baa630d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42744 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_ca.pem
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_0.pem
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_1.pem
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_10.pem
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_leaf.pem
crypto/x509/test/basic_constraints_none.pem
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_authority_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_basic_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_ext_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_name_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_subject_alt_name.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_subject_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_authority_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_basic_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_ext_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_name_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_subject_alt_name.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_subject_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_authority_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_basic_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_ext_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_name_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_subject_alt_name.pem
crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_subject_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/many_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/many_names1.pem
crypto/x509/test/many_names2.pem
crypto/x509/test/many_names3.pem
Add some tests for anyPolicy. anyPolicy causes crypto/x509 to synthesize policy nodes in places. Add some test coverage for this. Change-Id: I1b1dcba35088d6cabce6b40e36e478ec4756effa Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55753 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_any.pem
Add tests for rejecting duplicate policy OIDs. Change-Id: I738490d70208885481f638273d663140444c3a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55825 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_duplicate.pem
Fix handling of EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on the leaf. X509_policy_check returns -1 if some certificate had an unparseable extension, in which case it sets EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on it. The calling code then iterates over the certificates to find the offending one, so the callback has a chance to undo it. But it skips i = 0, the leaf, and instead just silentely returns success. We really should cut down on the callback's ability to mess things up here but, in the meantime, fix this. Also add a test covering this case. While I'm here, I've updated make_invalid_extensions.go, which I pulled some code from, to rename fooOrPanic to mustFoo. That seems to be the convention in the Go standard library. (regexp.MustCompile, etc.) Change-Id: Ib07c9f4175e66483bd7c0f7d49aea931bf36e53f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55748 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_invalid.pem
Add some tests for policy mapping. Change-Id: I739f0b9d45ab9411bd0a6f465e159d6dea82277a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55754 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped_any.pem
Test policy mappings from invalid policies. Such mappings should be ignored. Change-Id: Ic75d3c17e3f2d25da75b15d59e38177f9bc1c044 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56034 Reviewed-by: Matt Mueller <mattm@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped_oid3.pem
Test requireAnyPolicy being a SkipCerts value And specifically that it also counts at the leaf, which was a bug I'd nearly introduced. (RFC 5280 is written somewhat confusingly. The wrap-up and prepare procedures have some duplicate processing.) Change-Id: Iea901b96f64e12199fec426dc936bfbde16f88a4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56035 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped.pem
Fix some memory leaks in policy_cache_new. If a certificate has policy constraints, but the certificate policies extension is either missing or unsuitable (in a way not caught by the parser), the policy constraints object is leaked. As part of this, add some basic tests for policy constraints. Change-Id: I4a2c618019d1f92b0f3b9ad4cf6e29d4926e3095 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55752 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require_duplicate.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require_no_policies.pem
Test requireAnyPolicy being a SkipCerts value And specifically that it also counts at the leaf, which was a bug I'd nearly introduced. (RFC 5280 is written somewhat confusingly. The wrap-up and prepare procedures have some duplicate processing.) Change-Id: Iea901b96f64e12199fec426dc936bfbde16f88a4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56035 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require1.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require2.pem
Fix handling of EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on the leaf. X509_policy_check returns -1 if some certificate had an unparseable extension, in which case it sets EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on it. The calling code then iterates over the certificates to find the offending one, so the callback has a chance to undo it. But it skips i = 0, the leaf, and instead just silentely returns success. We really should cut down on the callback's ability to mess things up here but, in the meantime, fix this. Also add a test covering this case. While I'm here, I've updated make_invalid_extensions.go, which I pulled some code from, to rename fooOrPanic to mustFoo. That seems to be the convention in the Go standard library. (regexp.MustCompile, etc.) Change-Id: Ib07c9f4175e66483bd7c0f7d49aea931bf36e53f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55748 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem
Add some tests for anyPolicy. anyPolicy causes crypto/x509 to synthesize policy nodes in places. Add some test coverage for this. Change-Id: I1b1dcba35088d6cabce6b40e36e478ec4756effa Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55753 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_any.pem
Add tests for rejecting duplicate policy OIDs. Change-Id: I738490d70208885481f638273d663140444c3a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55825 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_duplicate.pem
Fix handling of EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on the leaf. X509_policy_check returns -1 if some certificate had an unparseable extension, in which case it sets EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on it. The calling code then iterates over the certificates to find the offending one, so the callback has a chance to undo it. But it skips i = 0, the leaf, and instead just silentely returns success. We really should cut down on the callback's ability to mess things up here but, in the meantime, fix this. Also add a test covering this case. While I'm here, I've updated make_invalid_extensions.go, which I pulled some code from, to rename fooOrPanic to mustFoo. That seems to be the convention in the Go standard library. (regexp.MustCompile, etc.) Change-Id: Ib07c9f4175e66483bd7c0f7d49aea931bf36e53f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55748 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_invalid.pem
Fix handling of critical X.509 policy constraints If we see a critical policy constraints extension, we have two options: We can either process it, which requires running policy validation, or reject the certificate. We and OpenSSL do neither by default, which means we may accept certificate chains that we weren't supposed to. This fixes it by enabling X.509 policy validation unconditionally and makes X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK moot. As a side effect, callers no longer need to do anything for CVE-2023-0466. This is the opposite of [0]'s advice, which instead recommends skipping the feature and rejecting critical policy contraints. That would be a good move for a new X.509 implementation. Policy validation is badly-designed, even by X.509's standards. But we have OpenSSL's history of previously accepting critical policy constraints (even though it didn't check it). I also found at least one caller that tests a chain with policy constraints, albeit a non-critical one. We now have an efficient policy validation implementation, so just enable it. Of course, fixing this bug in either direction has compatibility risks: either we take on the compat risk of being newly incompatible with policyConstraints-using PKIs, or we take on the compat risk of newly rejecting certificates that were invalid due to a policy validation error, but no one noticed. The latter case seems safer because the chain is unambiguously invalid. Update-Note: X.509 certificate verification (not parsing) will now notice policy-validation-related errors in the certificate chain. These include syntax errors in policy-related extensions, and chains with a requireExplicitPolicy policy constraint that are valid for no certificate policies. Such chains are unambiguously invalid. We just did not check it before by default. This is an obscure corner of X.509 and not expected to come up in most PKIs. [0] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-davidben-x509-policy-graph-01.html#section-3.4.4 Fixed: 557 Change-Id: Icc00c7797bb95fd3b14570eb068543fd83cda7b9 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/58426 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_none.pem
Add some tests for policy mapping. Change-Id: I739f0b9d45ab9411bd0a6f465e159d6dea82277a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55754 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid1.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid2.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid3.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid4.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid5.pem
Test requireAnyPolicy being a SkipCerts value And specifically that it also counts at the leaf, which was a bug I'd nearly introduced. (RFC 5280 is written somewhat confusingly. The wrap-up and prepare procedures have some duplicate processing.) Change-Id: Iea901b96f64e12199fec426dc936bfbde16f88a4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56035 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_require.pem
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_require1.pem
Fix handling of EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on the leaf. X509_policy_check returns -1 if some certificate had an unparseable extension, in which case it sets EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY on it. The calling code then iterates over the certificates to find the offending one, so the callback has a chance to undo it. But it skips i = 0, the leaf, and instead just silentely returns success. We really should cut down on the callback's ability to mess things up here but, in the meantime, fix this. Also add a test covering this case. While I'm here, I've updated make_invalid_extensions.go, which I pulled some code from, to rename fooOrPanic to mustFoo. That seems to be the convention in the Go standard library. (regexp.MustCompile, etc.) Change-Id: Ib07c9f4175e66483bd7c0f7d49aea931bf36e53f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55748 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf.pem
Fix inhibitPolicyMapping in the new policy tree code. There was a typo and inhibitPolicyMapping updated the wrong value. With this fixed, we pass the PKITS tests (as imported into Chromium). Change-Id: I3b80eb56561ae5ae88023fa639d697a9f1757b21 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56205 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_root_cross_inhibit_mapping.pem
Test requireAnyPolicy being a SkipCerts value And specifically that it also counts at the leaf, which was a bug I'd nearly introduced. (RFC 5280 is written somewhat confusingly. The wrap-up and prepare procedures have some duplicate processing.) Change-Id: Iea901b96f64e12199fec426dc936bfbde16f88a4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56035 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem
Fix inhibitPolicyMapping in the new policy tree code. There was a typo and inhibitPolicyMapping updated the wrong value. With this fixed, we pass the PKITS tests (as imported into Chromium). Change-Id: I3b80eb56561ae5ae88023fa639d697a9f1757b21 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56205 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/policy_root2.pem
Tighten up supported PSS combinations in X.509. Matching Chromium, Go, and TLS 1.3, only allow SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 RSA-PSS signatures, where MGF-1 and message hash match and salt length is hash length. Sadly, we are stuck tolerating an explicit trailerField for now. See the certificates in cl/362617931. This also fixes an overflow bug in handling the salt length. On platforms with 64-bit long and 32-bit int, we would misinterpret, e.g, 2^62 + 32 as 32. Also clean up the error-handling of maskHash. It was previously handled in a very confusing way; syntax errors in maskHash would succeed and only be noticed later, in rsa_mgf1_decode. I haven't done it in this change, but as a followup, we can, like Chromium, reduce X.509 signature algorithms down to a single enum. Update-Note: Unusual RSA-PSS combinations in X.509 are no longer accepted. This same change (actually a slightly stricter version) has already landed in Chrome. Bug: 489 Change-Id: I85ca3a4e14f76358cac13e66163887f6dade1ace Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53865 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2 years ago
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1_explicit.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1_mgf1_syntax_error.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha224.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_explicit_trailer.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_mgf1_sha384.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_mgf1_syntax_error.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_omit_nulls.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_salt_overflow.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_salt31.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_unknown_mgf.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_wrong_trailer.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha384.pem
crypto/x509/test/pss_sha512.pem
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
crypto/x509/test/some_names1.pem
crypto/x509/test/some_names2.pem
crypto/x509/test/some_names3.pem
Check for trailing data in extensions. X509V3_EXT_d2i should notice if an extension has extra data at the end. Update-Note: Some previously accepted invalid certicates may be rejected, either in certificate verification or in X509_get_ext_d2i. Bug: 352 Change-Id: Iacbb74a52d15bf3318b4cb8271d44b0f0a2df137 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/50285 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_authority_key_identifier.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_basic_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_ext_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_key_usage.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_name_constraints.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_subject_alt_name.pem
crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_subject_key_identifier.pem
acvp: add CMAC-AES support. Change by Dan Janni. Change-Id: I3f059e7b1a822c6f97128ca92a693499a3f7fa8f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41984 Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
4 years ago
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_cbc_pkcs5_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_cmac_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_gcm_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/chacha20_poly1305_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/dsa_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdh_secp224r1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdh_secp256r1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdh_secp384r1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdh_secp521r1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha224_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/eddsa_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hkdf_sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hkdf_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hkdf_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hkdf_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hmac_sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hmac_sha224_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hmac_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hmac_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/hmac_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/kwp_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/kw_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/primality_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha1_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha224_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_misc_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_2048_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_3072_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_4096_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha1_mgf1_20_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_0_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_3072_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_4096_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_4096_sha512_mgf1_32_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_misc_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_sig_gen_misc_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha256_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha384_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha512_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/x25519_test.txt
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/xchacha20_poly1305_test.txt
)