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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <utility>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
// The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
// SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
// that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information.
static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
return MakeUnique<SSL_SESSION>(x509_method);
}
uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
// Take the first four bytes of |session_id|. Session IDs are generated by the
// server randomly, so we can assume even using the first four bytes results
// in a good distribution.
uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
if (session_id.size() < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, session_id.data(), session_id.size());
session_id = tmp_storage;
}
uint32_t hash =
((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
return hash;
}
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session, int dup_flags) {
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> new_session = ssl_session_new(session->x509_method);
if (!new_session) {
return nullptr;
}
new_session->is_server = session->is_server;
new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version;
new_session->is_quic = session->is_quic;
new_session->sid_ctx_length = session->sid_ctx_length;
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx_length);
// Copy the key material.
new_session->secret_length = session->secret_length;
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->secret, session->secret, session->secret_length);
new_session->cipher = session->cipher;
// Copy authentication state.
if (session->psk_identity != nullptr) {
new_session->psk_identity.reset(
OPENSSL_strdup(session->psk_identity.get()));
if (new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
}
if (session->certs != nullptr) {
auto buf_up_ref = [](CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buf);
return buf;
};
new_session->certs.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(
session->certs.get(), buf_up_ref, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free));
if (new_session->certs == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
}
if (!session->x509_method->session_dup(new_session.get(), session)) {
return nullptr;
}
new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result;
new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(session->ocsp_response);
new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
UpRef(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256,
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid;
new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm;
new_session->timeout = session->timeout;
new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout;
new_session->time = session->time;
// Copy non-authentication connection properties.
if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) {
new_session->session_id_length = session->session_id_length;
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->session_id, session->session_id,
session->session_id_length);
new_session->group_id = session->group_id;
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->original_handshake_hash,
session->original_handshake_hash,
session->original_handshake_hash_len);
new_session->original_handshake_hash_len =
session->original_handshake_hash_len;
new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = session->ticket_lifetime_hint;
new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add;
new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data;
new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret;
new_session->has_application_settings = session->has_application_settings;
if (!new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(session->early_alpn) ||
!new_session->quic_early_data_context.CopyFrom(
session->quic_early_data_context) ||
!new_session->local_application_settings.CopyFrom(
session->local_application_settings) ||
!new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom(
session->peer_application_settings)) {
return nullptr;
}
}
// Copy the ticket.
if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET &&
!new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(session->ticket)) {
return nullptr;
}
// The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data.
new_session->not_resumable = true;
return new_session;
}
void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
// To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time, update the
// time, but mark the session expired.
if (session->time > now.tv_sec) {
session->time = now.tv_sec;
session->timeout = 0;
session->auth_timeout = 0;
return;
}
// Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired,
// clamp the timeouts at zero.
uint64_t delta = now.tv_sec - session->time;
session->time = now.tv_sec;
if (session->timeout < delta) {
session->timeout = 0;
} else {
session->timeout -= delta;
}
if (session->auth_timeout < delta) {
session->auth_timeout = 0;
} else {
session->auth_timeout -= delta;
}
}
void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
uint32_t timeout) {
// Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so |timeout| is measured
// correctly.
ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
if (session->timeout > timeout) {
return;
}
session->timeout = timeout;
if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) {
session->timeout = session->auth_timeout;
}
}
uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
uint16_t ret;
if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&ret, session->ssl_version)) {
// An |SSL_SESSION| will never have an invalid version. This is enforced by
// the parser.
assert(0);
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_session_protocol_version(session),
session->cipher);
}
bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
return false;
}
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session = ssl_session_new(ssl->ctx->x509_method);
if (session == NULL) {
return false;
}
session->is_server = ssl->server;
session->ssl_version = ssl->version;
session->is_quic = ssl->quic_method != nullptr;
// Fill in the time from the |SSL_CTX|'s clock.
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
session->time = now.tv_sec;
uint16_t version = ssl_protocol_version(ssl);
if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
// TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for
// longer.
session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout;
session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
} else {
// TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a
// much shorter timeout.
session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
}
if (hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return false;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx,
hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length);
session->sid_ctx_length = hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length;
// The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in.
session->not_resumable = true;
session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
hs->new_session = std::move(session);
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
return true;
}
int ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ctx, &now);
{
// Avoid acquiring a write lock in the common case (i.e. a non-default key
// is used or the default keys have not expired yet).
MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
if (ctx->ticket_key_current &&
(ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 ||
ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) &&
(!ctx->ticket_key_prev ||
ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) {
return 1;
}
}
MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
if (!ctx->ticket_key_current ||
(ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 &&
ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) {
// The current key has not been initialized or it is expired.
auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<TicketKey>();
if (!new_key) {
return 0;
}
RAND_bytes(new_key->name, 16);
RAND_bytes(new_key->hmac_key, 16);
RAND_bytes(new_key->aes_key, 16);
new_key->next_rotation_tv_sec =
now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
if (ctx->ticket_key_current) {
// The current key expired. Rotate it to prev and bump up its rotation
// timestamp. Note that even with the new rotation time it may still be
// expired and get dropped below.
ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec +=
SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
ctx->ticket_key_prev = std::move(ctx->ticket_key_current);
}
ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(new_key);
}
// Drop an expired prev key.
if (ctx->ticket_key_prev &&
ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) {
ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset();
}
return 1;
}
static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
const uint8_t *session_buf,
size_t session_len) {
ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx;
// If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
// connection.
static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
return CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder,
strlen(kTicketPlaceholder));
}
// Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
// work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
SSL_CTX *tctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
uint8_t key_name[16];
if (tctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
if (tctx->ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
return 0;
}
} else {
// Rotate ticket key if necessary.
if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(tctx)) {
return 0;
}
MutexReadLock lock(&tctx->lock);
if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) ||
!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16);
}
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get())) ||
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
return 0;
}
size_t total = 0;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
total = session_len;
#else
int len;
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
#endif
if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
return 0;
}
unsigned hlen;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||
!HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), ptr, &hlen) ||
!CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
const uint8_t *session_buf,
size_t session_len) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *method = ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method;
const size_t max_overhead = method->max_overhead(ssl);
const size_t max_out = session_len + max_overhead;
if (max_out < max_overhead) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, max_out)) {
return 0;
}
size_t out_len;
if (!method->seal(ssl, ptr, &out_len, max_out, session_buf,
session_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
return 0;
}
if (!CBB_did_write(out, out_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
const SSL_SESSION *session) {
// Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket.
uint8_t *session_buf = NULL;
size_t session_len;
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) {
return -1;
}
int ret = 0;
if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method) {
ret = ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, out, session_buf, session_len);
} else {
ret = ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(hs, out, session_buf, session_len);
}
OPENSSL_free(session_buf);
return ret;
}
int ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
const SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return session->sid_ctx_length == hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length &&
OPENSSL_memcmp(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx,
hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length) == 0;
}
int ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
// Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow.
if (now.tv_sec < session->time) {
return 0;
}
return session->timeout > now.tv_sec - session->time;
}
int ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
const SSL_SESSION *session) {
const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
return ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, session) &&
// The session must have been created by the same type of end point as
// we're now using it with.
ssl->server == session->is_server &&
// The session must not be expired.
ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) &&
// Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
// version.
ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
// Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. This
// is stricter than necessary for TLS 1.3, which allows cross-cipher
// resumption if the PRF hashes match. We require an exact match for
// simplicity. If loosening this, the 0-RTT accept logic must be
// updated to check the cipher.
hs->new_cipher == session->cipher &&
// If the session contains a client certificate (either the full
// certificate or just the hash) then require that the form of the
// certificate matches the current configuration.
((sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs.get()) == 0 &&
!session->peer_sha256_valid) ||
session->peer_sha256_valid ==
hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) &&
// Only resume if the underlying transport protocol hasn't changed.
// This is to prevent cross-protocol resumption between QUIC and TCP.
(hs->ssl->quic_method != nullptr) == session->is_quic;
}
// ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets
// |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found.
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_lookup_session(
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
out_session->reset();
if (session_id.empty() || session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
// Try the internal cache, if it exists.
if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
uint32_t hash = ssl_hash_session_id(session_id);
auto cmp = [](const void *key, const SSL_SESSION *sess) -> int {
Span<const uint8_t> key_id =
*reinterpret_cast<const Span<const uint8_t> *>(key);
Span<const uint8_t> sess_id =
MakeConstSpan(sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
return key_id == sess_id ? 0 : 1;
};
MutexReadLock lock(&ssl->session_ctx->lock);
// |lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key| returns a non-owning pointer.
session = UpRef(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key(ssl->session_ctx->sessions,
&session_id, hash, cmp));
// TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list.
}
// Fall back to the external cache, if it exists.
if (!session && ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb != nullptr) {
int copy = 1;
session.reset(ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, session_id.data(),
session_id.size(), &copy));
if (!session) {
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
if (session.get() == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
session.release(); // This pointer is not actually owned.
return ssl_hs_pending_session;
}
// Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
// (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
// between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
// 0], or things won't be thread-safe).
if (copy) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get());
}
// Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary.
if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
}
}
if (session && !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session.get())) {
// The session was from the cache, so remove it.
SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
session.reset();
}
*out_session = std::move(session);
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
bool *out_tickets_supported,
bool *out_renew_ticket,
const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
// This is used only by servers.
assert(hs->ssl->server);
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
bool renew_ticket = false;
// If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present.
CBS ticket;
const bool tickets_supported =
!(SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &ticket,
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
if (tickets_supported && CBS_len(&ticket) != 0) {
switch (ssl_process_ticket(hs, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket,
MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id,
client_hello->session_id_len))) {
case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
break;
case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
assert(!session);
break;
case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
return ssl_hs_error;
case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
}
} else {
// The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID.
enum ssl_hs_wait_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
hs, &session,
MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len));
if (lookup_ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
return lookup_ret;
}
}
*out_session = std::move(session);
*out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported;
*out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket;
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
static bool remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, bool lock) {
if (session == nullptr || session->session_id_length == 0) {
return false;
}
if (lock) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
}
SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, session);
bool found = found_session == session;
if (found) {
found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
}
if (lock) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
}
if (found) {
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called
// under a lock.
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != nullptr) {
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
}
return found;
}
void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (ssl->session.get() == session) {
return;
}
ssl->session = UpRef(session);
}
// locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) {
return;
}
if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
// last element in list
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
// only one element in list
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
// first element in list
ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
} else { // middle of list
session->next->prev = session->prev;
session->prev->next = session->next;
}
}
session->prev = session->next = NULL;
}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
}
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
} else {
session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
session->next->prev = session;
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
}
}
static bool add_session_locked(SSL_CTX *ctx, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session) {
SSL_SESSION *new_session = session.get();
SSL_SESSION *old_session;
if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, new_session)) {
return false;
}
// |ctx->sessions| took ownership of |new_session| and gave us back a
// reference to |old_session|. (|old_session| may be the same as
// |new_session|, in which case we traded identical references with
// |ctx->sessions|.)
session.release();
session.reset(old_session);
if (old_session != nullptr) {
if (old_session == new_session) {
// |session| was already in the cache. There are no linked list pointers
// to update.
return false;
}
// There was a session ID collision. |old_session| was replaced with
// |session| in the hash table, so |old_session| must be removed from the
// linked list to match.
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
}
// This does not increment the reference count. Although |session| is inserted
// into two structures (a doubly-linked list and the hash table), |ctx| only
// takes one reference.
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, new_session);
// Enforce any cache size limits.
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions) >
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail,
/*lock=*/false)) {
break;
}
}
}
return true;
}
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl) {
SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx.get();
SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
int mode = SSL_is_server(ssl) ? SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER : SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT;
if (!SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(session) ||
(ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
return;
}
// Clients never use the internal session cache.
if (ssl->server &&
!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ref = UpRef(session);
bool remove_expired_sessions = false;
{
MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
add_session_locked(ctx, std::move(ref));
if (!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
// Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
remove_expired_sessions = true;
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
}
}
}
if (remove_expired_sessions) {
// |SSL_CTX_flush_sessions| takes the lock we just released. We could
// merge the critical sections, but we'd then call user code under a
// lock, or compute |now| earlier, even when not flushing.
OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
}
}
if (ctx->new_session_cb != nullptr) {
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ref = UpRef(session);
if (ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ref.get())) {
// |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
ref.release();
}
}
}
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
using namespace bssl;
ssl_session_st::ssl_session_st(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method)
: x509_method(method),
extended_master_secret(false),
peer_sha256_valid(false),
not_resumable(false),
ticket_age_add_valid(false),
is_server(false),
is_quic(false),
has_application_settings(false) {
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
time = ::time(nullptr);
}
ssl_session_st::~ssl_session_st() {
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, this, &ex_data);
x509_method->session_clear(this);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ssl_session_new(ctx->x509_method).release();
}
int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
return 1;
}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session == NULL ||
!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
return;
}
session->~ssl_session_st();
OPENSSL_free(session);
}
const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
unsigned *out_len) {
if (out_len != NULL) {
*out_len = session->session_id_length;
}
return session->session_id;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid,
size_t sid_len) {
if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
// Use memmove in case someone passes in the output of |SSL_SESSION_get_id|.
OPENSSL_memmove(session->session_id, sid, sid_len);
session->session_id_length = sid_len;
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->timeout;
}
uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session == NULL) {
// NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility.
return 0;
}
return session->time;
}
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->x509_peer;
}
const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *
SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->certs.get();
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL_SESSION *session,
const uint8_t **out,
size_t *out_len) {
if (session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
*out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
*out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
} else {
*out = nullptr;
*out_len = 0;
}
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session,
const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
if (session->ocsp_response) {
*out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response.get());
*out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response.get());
} else {
*out = nullptr;
*out_len = 0;
}
}
size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out,
size_t max_out) {
// TODO(davidben): Fix secret_length's type and remove these casts.
if (max_out == 0) {
return (size_t)session->secret_length;
}
if (max_out > (size_t)session->secret_length) {
max_out = (size_t)session->secret_length;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session->secret, max_out);
return max_out;
}
uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, uint64_t time) {
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
session->time = time;
return time;
}
uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, uint32_t timeout) {
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
session->timeout = timeout;
session->auth_timeout = timeout;
return 1;
}
const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *session,
unsigned *out_len) {
if (out_len != NULL) {
*out_len = session->sid_ctx_length;
}
return session->sid_ctx;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
size_t sid_ctx_len) {
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
static_assert(sizeof(session->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx_len does not fit");
session->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
}
int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return !session->not_resumable &&
(session->session_id_length != 0 || !session->ticket.empty());
}
int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return !session->ticket.empty();
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session,
const uint8_t **out_ticket, size_t *out_len) {
if (out_ticket != nullptr) {
*out_ticket = session->ticket.data();
}
*out_len = session->ticket.size();
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ticket(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *ticket,
size_t ticket_len) {
return session->ticket.CopyFrom(MakeConstSpan(ticket, ticket_len));
}
uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->ticket_lifetime_hint;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->cipher;
}
int SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return session->peer_sha256_valid;
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session,
const uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len) {
if (session->peer_sha256_valid) {
*out_ptr = session->peer_sha256;
*out_len = sizeof(session->peer_sha256);
} else {
*out_ptr = nullptr;
*out_len = 0;
}
}
int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
session->ticket_max_early_data != 0;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data(SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(session)) {
return UpRef(session).release();
}
bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> copy =
SSL_SESSION_dup(session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
if (!copy) {
return nullptr;
}
copy->ticket_max_early_data = 0;
// Copied sessions are non-resumable until they're completely filled in.
copy->not_resumable = session->not_resumable;
assert(!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(copy.get()));
return copy.release();
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) {
Prefer established session properties mid renegotiation. Among many many problems with renegotiation is it makes every API ambiguous. Do we return the pending handshake's properties, or the most recently completed handshake? Neither answer is unambiguously correct: On the one hand, OpenSSL's API makes renegotiation transparent, so the pending handshake breaks invariants. E.g., currently, SSL_get_current_cipher and other functions can return NULL mid renegotiation. See https://crbug.com/1010748. On the other hand, OpenSSL's API is callback-heavy. During a handshake callback, the application most likely wants to check the pending parameters. Most notably, cert verify callbacks calling SSL_get_peer_certificate. Historically, only the pending state was available to return anyway. We've since changed this (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612), but we kept the public APIs as-is. I was particularly worried about cert verify callbacks. As of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/14028/ and https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/19665/, cert verify is moot. We implement the 3-SHAKE mitigation in library, so the peer cert cannot change, and we don't reverify the certificate at all. With that, I think we should switch to returning the established parameters. Chromium is the main consumer that enables renegotiation, and it would be better off with this behavior. (Maybe we should try to forbid other properties, like the cipher suite, from changing on renegotiation. Unchangeable properties make this issue moot.) This CL would break if the handshake internally used SSL_get_session, but this is no longer true as of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41865. Update-Note: Some APIs will now behave differently mid-renegotation. I think this is the safer option, but it is possible code was relying on the other one. Fixed: chromium:1010748 Change-Id: I42157ccd9704cde3eebf947136d47cda6754c36e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54165 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
3 years ago
// Once the initially handshake completes, we return the most recently
// established session. In particular, if there is a pending renegotiation, we
// do not return information about it until it completes.
//
// Code in the handshake must either use |hs->new_session| (if updating a
// partial session) or |ssl_handshake_session| (if trying to query properties
// consistently across TLS 1.2 resumption and other handshakes).
if (ssl->s3->established_session != nullptr) {
return ssl->s3->established_session.get();
}
Prefer established session properties mid renegotiation. Among many many problems with renegotiation is it makes every API ambiguous. Do we return the pending handshake's properties, or the most recently completed handshake? Neither answer is unambiguously correct: On the one hand, OpenSSL's API makes renegotiation transparent, so the pending handshake breaks invariants. E.g., currently, SSL_get_current_cipher and other functions can return NULL mid renegotiation. See https://crbug.com/1010748. On the other hand, OpenSSL's API is callback-heavy. During a handshake callback, the application most likely wants to check the pending parameters. Most notably, cert verify callbacks calling SSL_get_peer_certificate. Historically, only the pending state was available to return anyway. We've since changed this (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612), but we kept the public APIs as-is. I was particularly worried about cert verify callbacks. As of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/14028/ and https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/19665/, cert verify is moot. We implement the 3-SHAKE mitigation in library, so the peer cert cannot change, and we don't reverify the certificate at all. With that, I think we should switch to returning the established parameters. Chromium is the main consumer that enables renegotiation, and it would be better off with this behavior. (Maybe we should try to forbid other properties, like the cipher suite, from changing on renegotiation. Unchangeable properties make this issue moot.) This CL would break if the handshake internally used SSL_get_session, but this is no longer true as of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41865. Update-Note: Some APIs will now behave differently mid-renegotation. I think this is the safer option, but it is possible code was relying on the other one. Fixed: chromium:1010748 Change-Id: I42157ccd9704cde3eebf947136d47cda6754c36e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54165 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
3 years ago
// Otherwise, we must be in the initial handshake.
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
Prefer established session properties mid renegotiation. Among many many problems with renegotiation is it makes every API ambiguous. Do we return the pending handshake's properties, or the most recently completed handshake? Neither answer is unambiguously correct: On the one hand, OpenSSL's API makes renegotiation transparent, so the pending handshake breaks invariants. E.g., currently, SSL_get_current_cipher and other functions can return NULL mid renegotiation. See https://crbug.com/1010748. On the other hand, OpenSSL's API is callback-heavy. During a handshake callback, the application most likely wants to check the pending parameters. Most notably, cert verify callbacks calling SSL_get_peer_certificate. Historically, only the pending state was available to return anyway. We've since changed this (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612), but we kept the public APIs as-is. I was particularly worried about cert verify callbacks. As of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/14028/ and https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/19665/, cert verify is moot. We implement the 3-SHAKE mitigation in library, so the peer cert cannot change, and we don't reverify the certificate at all. With that, I think we should switch to returning the established parameters. Chromium is the main consumer that enables renegotiation, and it would be better off with this behavior. (Maybe we should try to forbid other properties, like the cipher suite, from changing on renegotiation. Unchangeable properties make this issue moot.) This CL would break if the handshake internally used SSL_get_session, but this is no longer true as of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41865. Update-Note: Some APIs will now behave differently mid-renegotation. I think this is the safer option, but it is possible code was relying on the other one. Fixed: chromium:1010748 Change-Id: I42157ccd9704cde3eebf947136d47cda6754c36e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54165 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
3 years ago
assert(hs != nullptr);
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
// Return the 0-RTT session, if in the 0-RTT state. While the handshake has
// not actually completed, the public accessors all report properties as if
// it has.
if (hs->early_session) {
return hs->early_session.get();
}
Prefer established session properties mid renegotiation. Among many many problems with renegotiation is it makes every API ambiguous. Do we return the pending handshake's properties, or the most recently completed handshake? Neither answer is unambiguously correct: On the one hand, OpenSSL's API makes renegotiation transparent, so the pending handshake breaks invariants. E.g., currently, SSL_get_current_cipher and other functions can return NULL mid renegotiation. See https://crbug.com/1010748. On the other hand, OpenSSL's API is callback-heavy. During a handshake callback, the application most likely wants to check the pending parameters. Most notably, cert verify callbacks calling SSL_get_peer_certificate. Historically, only the pending state was available to return anyway. We've since changed this (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612), but we kept the public APIs as-is. I was particularly worried about cert verify callbacks. As of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/14028/ and https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/19665/, cert verify is moot. We implement the 3-SHAKE mitigation in library, so the peer cert cannot change, and we don't reverify the certificate at all. With that, I think we should switch to returning the established parameters. Chromium is the main consumer that enables renegotiation, and it would be better off with this behavior. (Maybe we should try to forbid other properties, like the cipher suite, from changing on renegotiation. Unchangeable properties make this issue moot.) This CL would break if the handshake internally used SSL_get_session, but this is no longer true as of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41865. Update-Note: Some APIs will now behave differently mid-renegotation. I think this is the safer option, but it is possible code was relying on the other one. Fixed: chromium:1010748 Change-Id: I42157ccd9704cde3eebf947136d47cda6754c36e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54165 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
3 years ago
// Otherwise, return the partial session.
return (SSL_SESSION *)ssl_handshake_session(hs);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> owned_session = UpRef(session);
MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
return add_session_locked(ctx, std::move(owned_session));
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
return remove_session(ctx, session, /*lock=*/true);
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
// SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started.
if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
ssl->s3->hs == NULL ||
ssl->s3->hs->state != 0) {
abort();
}
ssl_set_session(ssl, session);
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 0;
}
// Historically, zero was treated as |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|.
if (timeout == 0) {
timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
}
uint32_t old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout;
ctx->session_timeout = timeout;
return old_timeout;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return ctx->session_timeout;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
}
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
uint64_t time;
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = reinterpret_cast<TIMEOUT_PARAM *>(void_param);
if (param->time == 0 ||
session->time + session->timeout < session->time ||
param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) {
// TODO(davidben): This can probably just call |remove_session|.
(void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session);
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called
// under a lock.
if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
}
}
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time) {
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
tp.ctx = ctx;
tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
if (tp.cache == NULL) {
return;
}
tp.time = time;
MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id,
int id_len, int *out_copy)) {
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
const uint8_t *id,
int id_len,
int *out_copy) {
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(
SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
int value) {
return ctx->info_callback;
}