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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
if (a == NULL) {
Reject missing required fields in i2d functions. See also 006906cddda37e24a66443199444ef4476697477 from OpenSSL, though this CL uses a different strategy from upstream. Upstream makes ASN1_item_ex_i2d continue to allow optionals and checks afterwards at every non-optional call site. This CL pushes down an optional parameter and says functions cannot omit items unless explicitly allowed. I think this is a better default, though it is a larger change. Fields are only optional when they come from an ASN1_TEMPLATE with the OPTIONAL flag. Upstream's strategy misses top-level calls. This CL additionally adds checks for optional ASN1_TEMPLATEs in contexts where it doesn't make sense. Only fields of SEQUENCEs and SETs may be OPTIONAL, but the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE split doesn't quite match ASN.1 itself. ASN1_TEMPLATE is additionally responsible for explicit/implicit tagging, and SEQUENCE/SET OF. That means CHOICE arms and the occasional top-level type (ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE) use ASN1_TEMPLATE but will get confused if marked optional. As part of this, i2d_FOO(NULL) now returns -1 rather than "successfully" writing 0 bytes. If we want to allow NULL at the top-level, that's not too hard to arrange, but our CBB-based i2d functions do not. Update-Note: Structures with missing mandatory fields can no longer be encoded. Note that, apart from the cases already handled by preceding CLs, tasn_new.c will fill in non-NULL empty objects everywhere. The main downstream impact I've seen of this particular change is in combination with other bugs. Consider a caller that does: GENERAL_NAME *name = GENERAL_NAME_new(); name->type = GEN_DNS; name->d.dNSName = DoSomethingComplicated(...); Suppose DoSomethingComplicated() was actually fallible and returned NULL, but the caller forgot to check. They'd now construct a GENERAL_NAME with a missing field. Previously, this would silently serialize some garbage (omitted field) or empty string. Now we fail to encode, but the true error was the uncaught DoSomethingComplicated() failure. (Which likely was itself a bug.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I37fe618761be64a619be9fdc8d416f24ecbb8c46 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49350 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
}
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
if (a->length == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT);
return -1;
}
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
int objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1) {
return objsize;
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
}
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
if (*pp == NULL) {
if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding. asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being handled. 628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL was silently misinterpreting the input structure. This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It is, unfortunately, a little messy because: 1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be able to report an omitted element. 2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must distinguish between an omitted element and an element with zero-length contents. 3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now. It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB later. I've just added an output parameter for now. In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed that. Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT. Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields. (Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.) Bug: 429 Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
return -1;
}
} else {
p = *pp;
}
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
OPENSSL_memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
/*
* If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
* If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
*/
*pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length;
return objsize;
}
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0);
}
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
char buf[80], *p = buf;
int i;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return (BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4));
i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof buf, a);
if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1);
if (!p)
return -1;
i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i + 1, a);
}
if (i <= 0)
return BIO_write(bp, "<INVALID>", 9);
BIO_write(bp, p, i);
if (p != buf)
OPENSSL_free(p);
return (i);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
const unsigned char *p;
long len;
int tag, xclass;
int inf, i;
ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL;
p = *pp;
inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
if (inf & 0x80) {
i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
goto err;
}
if (tag != V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT;
goto err;
}
ret = c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(a, &p, len);
if (ret)
*pp = p;
return ret;
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, i);
return (NULL);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *data;
int i, length;
/*
* Sanity check OID encoding. Need at least one content octet. MSB must
* be clear in the last octet. can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers,
* see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
p[len - 1] & 0x80) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
length = (int)len;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) {
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) ||
!((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) {
if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
} else {
ret = (*a);
}
p = *pp;
/* detach data from object */
data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
ret->data = NULL;
/* once detached we can change it */
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) {
ret->length = 0;
if (data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(data);
data = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (data == NULL) {
i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(data, p, length);
/* If there are dynamic strings, free them here, and clear the flag */
if ((ret->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) != 0) {
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->sn);
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->ln);
ret->flags &= ~ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS;
}
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data = data;
ret->length = length;
ret->sn = NULL;
ret->ln = NULL;
p += length;
if (a != NULL)
(*a) = ret;
*pp = p;
return (ret);
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, i);
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret;
ret = (ASN1_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ASN1_OBJECT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
ret->length = 0;
ret->data = NULL;
ret->nid = 0;
ret->sn = NULL;
ret->ln = NULL;
ret->flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
return (ret);
}
void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return;
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
a->data = NULL;
a->length = 0;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, const unsigned char *data, int len,
const char *sn, const char *ln)
{
ASN1_OBJECT o;
o.sn = sn;
o.ln = ln;
o.data = data;
o.nid = nid;
o.length = len;
o.flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
return (OBJ_dup(&o));
}