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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package runner
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import "strconv"
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type alert uint8
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const (
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// alert level
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alertLevelWarning = 1
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alertLevelError = 2
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)
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const (
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alertCloseNotify alert = 0
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alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10
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alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20
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alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21
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alertRecordOverflow alert = 22
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alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30
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alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40
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alertBadCertificate alert = 42
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alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43
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alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44
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alertCertificateExpired alert = 45
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alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46
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alertIllegalParameter alert = 47
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alertUnknownCA alert = 48
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alertAccessDenied alert = 49
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alertDecodeError alert = 50
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alertDecryptError alert = 51
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alertProtocolVersion alert = 70
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alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71
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alertInternalError alert = 80
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alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86
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alertUserCanceled alert = 90
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alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100
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alertMissingExtension alert = 109
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alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110
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alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112
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alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
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alertUnknownPSKIdentity alert = 115
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alertCertificateRequired alert = 116
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alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120
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Implement ClientHelloOuter handshakes.
If a client offers ECH, but the server rejects it, the client completes
the handshake with ClientHelloOuter in order to authenticate retry keys.
Implement this flow. This is largely allowing the existing handshake to
proceed, but with some changes:
- Certificate verification uses the other name. This CL routes this up to
the built-in verifier and adds SSL_get0_ech_name_override for the
callback.
- We need to disable False Start to pick up server Finished in TLS 1.2.
- Client certificates, notably in TLS 1.3 where they're encrypted,
should only be revealed to the true server. Fortunately, not sending
client certs is always an option, so do that.
Channel ID has a similar issue. I've just omitted the extension in
ClientHelloOuter because it's deprecated and is unlikely to be used
with ECH at this point. ALPS may be worth some pondering but, the way
it's currently used, is not sensitive.
(Possibly we should change the draft to terminate the handshake before
even sending that flight...)
- The session is never offered in ClientHelloOuter, but our internal
book-keeping doesn't quite notice.
I had to replace ech_accept with a tri-state ech_status to correctly
handle an edge case in SSL_get0_ech_name_override: when ECH + 0-RTT +
reverify_on_resume are all enabled, the first certificate verification
is for the 0-RTT session and should be against the true name, yet we
have selected_ech_config && !ech_accept. A tri-state tracks when ECH is
actually rejected. I've maintained this on the server as well, though
the server never actually cares.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ie55966ca3dc4ffcc8c381479f0fe9bcacd34d0f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48135
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
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alertECHRequired alert = 121
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)
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var alertText = map[alert]string{
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alertCloseNotify: "close notify",
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alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message",
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alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC",
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alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed",
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alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow",
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alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure",
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alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure",
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alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate",
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alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate",
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alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate",
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alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate",
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alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate",
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alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter",
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alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority",
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alertAccessDenied: "access denied",
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alertDecodeError: "error decoding message",
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alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message",
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alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported",
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alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level",
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alertInternalError: "internal error",
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alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback",
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alertUserCanceled: "user canceled",
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alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation",
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alertMissingExtension: "missing extension",
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alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension",
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alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
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alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name",
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alertUnknownPSKIdentity: "unknown PSK identity",
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alertCertificateRequired: "certificate required",
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alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol",
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Implement ClientHelloOuter handshakes.
If a client offers ECH, but the server rejects it, the client completes
the handshake with ClientHelloOuter in order to authenticate retry keys.
Implement this flow. This is largely allowing the existing handshake to
proceed, but with some changes:
- Certificate verification uses the other name. This CL routes this up to
the built-in verifier and adds SSL_get0_ech_name_override for the
callback.
- We need to disable False Start to pick up server Finished in TLS 1.2.
- Client certificates, notably in TLS 1.3 where they're encrypted,
should only be revealed to the true server. Fortunately, not sending
client certs is always an option, so do that.
Channel ID has a similar issue. I've just omitted the extension in
ClientHelloOuter because it's deprecated and is unlikely to be used
with ECH at this point. ALPS may be worth some pondering but, the way
it's currently used, is not sensitive.
(Possibly we should change the draft to terminate the handshake before
even sending that flight...)
- The session is never offered in ClientHelloOuter, but our internal
book-keeping doesn't quite notice.
I had to replace ech_accept with a tri-state ech_status to correctly
handle an edge case in SSL_get0_ech_name_override: when ECH + 0-RTT +
reverify_on_resume are all enabled, the first certificate verification
is for the 0-RTT session and should be against the true name, yet we
have selected_ech_config && !ech_accept. A tri-state tracks when ECH is
actually rejected. I've maintained this on the server as well, though
the server never actually cares.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ie55966ca3dc4ffcc8c381479f0fe9bcacd34d0f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48135
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
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alertECHRequired: "ECH required",
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}
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func (e alert) String() string {
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s, ok := alertText[e]
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if ok {
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return s
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}
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return "alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
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}
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func (e alert) Error() string {
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return e.String()
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}
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