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#! /usr/bin/env perl
# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
# ====================================================================
#
# GHASH for ARMv8 Crypto Extension, 64-bit polynomial multiplication.
#
# June 2014
# Initial version was developed in tight cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel
# of Linaro from bits-n-pieces from other assembly modules. Just like
# aesv8-armx.pl this module supports both AArch32 and AArch64 execution modes.
#
# July 2014
# Implement 2x aggregated reduction [see ghash-x86.pl for background
# information].
#
# Current performance in cycles per processed byte:
#
# PMULL[2] 32-bit NEON(*)
# Apple A7 0.92 5.62
# Cortex-A53 1.01 8.39
# Cortex-A57 1.17 7.61
# Denver 0.71 6.02
# Mongoose 1.10 8.06
# Kryo 1.16 8.00
#
# (*) presented for reference/comparison purposes;
$flavour = shift;
$output = shift;
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
( $xlate="${dir}../../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
$Xi="x0"; # argument block
$Htbl="x1";
$inp="x2";
$len="x3";
$inc="x12";
{
my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3));
my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hhl,$H2)=map("q$_",(8..14));
$code=<<___;
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
.text
___
$code.=".arch armv8-a+crypto\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/);
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
.fpu neon
.code 32
#undef __thumb2__
___
################################################################################
# void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16],const u64 H[2]);
#
# input: 128-bit H - secret parameter E(K,0^128)
# output: precomputed table filled with degrees of twisted H;
# H is twisted to handle reverse bitness of GHASH;
# only few of 16 slots of Htable[16] are used;
# data is opaque to outside world (which allows to
# optimize the code independently);
#
$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_init_v8
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- | Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ | ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {$t1},[x1] @ load input H
vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
vshl.i64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ 0xc2.0
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
vshr.u64 $t2,$xC2,#63
vdup.32 $t1,${t1}[1]
vext.8 $t0,$t2,$xC2,#8 @ t0=0xc2....01
vshr.u64 $t2,$IN,#63
vshr.s32 $t1,$t1,#31 @ broadcast carry bit
vand $t2,$t2,$t0
vshl.i64 $IN,$IN,#1
vext.8 $t2,$t2,$t2,#8
vand $t0,$t0,$t1
vorr $IN,$IN,$t2 @ H<<<=1
veor $H,$IN,$t0 @ twisted H
vst1.64 {$H},[x0],#16 @ store Htable[0]
@ calculate H^2
vext.8 $t0,$H,$H,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$H
veor $t0,$t0,$H
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$H
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$t0,$t0
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase
vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
veor $H2,$Xl,$t2
vext.8 $t1,$H2,$H2,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing
veor $t1,$t1,$H2
vext.8 $Hhl,$t0,$t1,#8 @ pack Karatsuba pre-processed
vst1.64 {$Hhl-$H2},[x0] @ store Htable[1..2]
ret
.size gcm_init_v8,.-gcm_init_v8
___
################################################################################
# void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16]);
#
# input: Xi - current hash value;
# Htable - table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
# output: Xi - next hash value Xi;
#
$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_gmult_v8
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- | Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ | ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {$t1},[$Xi] @ load Xi
vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl] @ load twisted H, ...
vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
#endif
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
#endif
vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi
ret
.size gcm_gmult_v8,.-gcm_gmult_v8
___
################################################################################
# void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],const u8 *inp,size_t len);
#
# input: table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
# current hash value Xi;
# pointer to input data;
# length of input data in bytes, but divisible by block size;
# output: next hash value Xi;
#
$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_ghash_v8
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- | Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ | ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
___
$code.=<<___;
vld1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ load [rotated] Xi
@ "[rotated]" means that
@ loaded value would have
@ to be rotated in order to
@ make it appear as in
@ algorithm specification
subs $len,$len,#32 @ see if $len is 32 or larger
mov $inc,#16 @ $inc is used as post-
@ increment for input pointer;
@ as loop is modulo-scheduled
@ $inc is zeroed just in time
@ to preclude overstepping
@ inp[len], which means that
@ last block[s] are actually
@ loaded twice, but last
@ copy is not processed
vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl],#32 @ load twisted H, ..., H^2
vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
vld1.64 {$H2},[$Htbl]
cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc?
vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ rotate Xi
vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],#16 @ load [rotated] I[0]
vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ compose 0xc2.0 constant
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t0,$t0
vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
#endif
vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ rotate I[0]
b.lo .Lodd_tail_v8 @ $len was less than 32
___
{ my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$In) = map("q$_",(4..7));
#######
# Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
# [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
# [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
#
$code.=<<___;
vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[1]
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
#endif
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ I[i]^=Xi
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
b .Loop_mod2x_v8
.align 4
.Loop_mod2x_v8:
vext.8 $t2,$IN,$IN,#8
subs $len,$len,#32 @ is there more data?
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo·Xi.lo
cclr $inc,lo @ is it time to zero $inc?
vpmull.p64 $Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
veor $t2,$t2,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi·Xi.hi
veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xln @ accumulate
vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+2]
veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc?
veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xmn
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+3]
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t0,$t0
#endif
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
#endif
vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $IN,$IN,$Xh @ accumulate $IN early
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
veor $IN,$IN,$t2
veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl
vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
b.hs .Loop_mod2x_v8 @ there was at least 32 more bytes
veor $Xh,$Xh,$t2
vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ re-construct $IN
adds $len,$len,#32 @ re-construct $len
veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xh @ re-construct $Xl
b.eq .Ldone_v8 @ is $len zero?
___
}
$code.=<<___;
.Lodd_tail_v8:
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
veor $t1,$t0,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2
.Ldone_v8:
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
#endif
vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.size gcm_ghash_v8,.-gcm_ghash_v8
___
}
$code.=<<___;
.asciz "GHASH for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 2
___
if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
sub unvmov {
my $arg=shift;
$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi),\s*q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/o &&
sprintf "ins v%d.d[%d],v%d.d[%d]",$1,($2 eq "lo")?0:1,$3,($4 eq "lo")?0:1;
}
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel $1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o or
s/vmov\.i8/movi/o or # fix up legacy mnemonics
s/vmov\s+(.*)/unvmov($1)/geo or
s/vext\.8/ext/o or
s/vshr\.s/sshr\.s/o or
s/vshr/ushr/o or
s/^(\s+)v/$1/o or # strip off v prefix
s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o;
s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo; # old->new registers
s/@\s/\/\//o; # old->new style commentary
# fix up remaining legacy suffixes
s/\.[ui]?8(\s)/$1/o;
s/\.[uis]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
m/\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1q/o; # 1st pmull argument
m/l\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1d/go; # 2nd and 3rd pmull arguments
s/\.[uisp]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go;
s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o;
print $_,"\n";
}
} else { ######## 32-bit code
sub unvdup32 {
my $arg=shift;
$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o &&
sprintf "vdup.32 q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1;
}
sub unvpmullp64 {
my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)/o) {
my $word = 0xf2a00e00|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
|(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4)
|(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2);
$word |= 0x00010001 if ($mnemonic =~ "2");
# since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
# correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
# assemblers don't implement it:-(
sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s",
$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
$mnemonic,$arg;
}
}
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go; # new->old registers
s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers
s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
# fix up remaining new-style suffixes
s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2 $1,#0/o or
s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo or
s/v?(pmull2?)\.p64\s+(.*)/unvpmullp64($1,$2)/geo or
s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo or
s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o or
s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o;
print $_,"\n";
}
}
close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT"; # enforce flush