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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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Introduce ossl_ssize_t and use it in ASN1_STRING_set.
We have a number of APIs that cannot migrate to size_t because OpenSSL
used negative numbers as some special indicator. This makes it hard to
become size_t-clean.
However, in reality, the largest buffer size is SSIZE_MAX, or, more
accurately PTRDIFF_MAX. But every platform I've ever seen make ptrdiff_t
and size_t the same size. malloc is just obligated to fail allocations
that don't fit in ssize_t. ssize_t itself is not portable (Windows
doesn't have it), but we can define ossl_ssize_t to be ptrdiff_t.
OpenSSL also has an ossl_ssize_t (though they don't use it much), so
we're also improving compatibility.
Start this out with ASN1_STRING_set. It still internally refuses to
construct a string bigger than INT_MAX; the struct can't hold this and
even if we fix the struct, no other code, inside or outside the library,
can tolerate it. But now code which passes in a size_t (including our
own) can do so without overflow.
Bug: 428, 516
Change-Id: I17aa6971733f34dfda7d971882d0f062e92340e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/54953
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
2 years ago
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int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d,
|
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|
ossl_ssize_t len) {
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|
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
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|
}
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int asn1_bit_string_length(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *str,
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|
uint8_t *out_padding_bits) {
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|
int len = str->length;
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|
if (str->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) {
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|
|
// If the string is already empty, it cannot have padding bits.
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|
*out_padding_bits = len == 0 ? 0 : str->flags & 0x07;
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|
return len;
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|
|
}
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|
|
|
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|
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/447): If we move this logic to
|
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|
// |ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit|, can we remove this representation?
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|
while (len > 0 && str->data[len - 1] == 0) {
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|
len--;
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|
}
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|
uint8_t padding_bits = 0;
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|
if (len > 0) {
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|
uint8_t last = str->data[len - 1];
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|
|
assert(last != 0);
|
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|
|
for (; padding_bits < 7; padding_bits++) {
|
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|
|
if (last & (1 << padding_bits)) {
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|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Compute ASN.1 BIT STRING sizes more consistently.
OpenSSL's BIT STRING representation has two modes, one where it
implicitly trims trailing zeros and the other where the number of unused
bits is explicitly set. This means logic in ASN1_item_verify, or
elsewhere in callers, that checks flags and ASN1_STRING_length is
inconsistent with i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
Add ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes for code that needs to deal with X.509
using BIT STRING for some fields instead of OCTET STRING. Switch
ASN1_item_verify to it. Some external code does this too, so export it
as public API.
This is mostly a theoretical issue. All parsed BIT STRINGS use explicit
byte strings, and there are no APIs (apart from not-yet-opaquified
structs) to specify the ASN1_STRING in X509, etc., structures. We
intentionally made X509_set1_signature_value, etc., internally construct
the ASN1_STRING. Still having an API is more consistent and helps nudge
callers towards rejecting excess bits when they want bytes.
It may also be worth a public API for consistently accessing the bit
count. I've left it alone for now because I've not seen callers that
need it, and it saves worrying about bytes-to-bits overflows.
This also fixes a bug in the original version of the truncating logic
when the entire string was all zeros, and const-corrects a few
parameters.
Change-Id: I9d29842a3d3264b0cde61ca8cfea07d02177dbc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
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|
}
|
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|
}
|
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|
|
*out_padding_bits = padding_bits;
|
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|
|
return len;
|
Compute ASN.1 BIT STRING sizes more consistently.
OpenSSL's BIT STRING representation has two modes, one where it
implicitly trims trailing zeros and the other where the number of unused
bits is explicitly set. This means logic in ASN1_item_verify, or
elsewhere in callers, that checks flags and ASN1_STRING_length is
inconsistent with i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
Add ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes for code that needs to deal with X.509
using BIT STRING for some fields instead of OCTET STRING. Switch
ASN1_item_verify to it. Some external code does this too, so export it
as public API.
This is mostly a theoretical issue. All parsed BIT STRINGS use explicit
byte strings, and there are no APIs (apart from not-yet-opaquified
structs) to specify the ASN1_STRING in X509, etc., structures. We
intentionally made X509_set1_signature_value, etc., internally construct
the ASN1_STRING. Still having an API is more consistent and helps nudge
callers towards rejecting excess bits when they want bytes.
It may also be worth a public API for consistently accessing the bit
count. I've left it alone for now because I've not seen callers that
need it, and it saves worrying about bytes-to-bits overflows.
This also fixes a bug in the original version of the truncating logic
when the entire string was all zeros, and const-corrects a few
parameters.
Change-Id: I9d29842a3d3264b0cde61ca8cfea07d02177dbc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Compute ASN.1 BIT STRING sizes more consistently.
OpenSSL's BIT STRING representation has two modes, one where it
implicitly trims trailing zeros and the other where the number of unused
bits is explicitly set. This means logic in ASN1_item_verify, or
elsewhere in callers, that checks flags and ASN1_STRING_length is
inconsistent with i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
Add ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes for code that needs to deal with X.509
using BIT STRING for some fields instead of OCTET STRING. Switch
ASN1_item_verify to it. Some external code does this too, so export it
as public API.
This is mostly a theoretical issue. All parsed BIT STRINGS use explicit
byte strings, and there are no APIs (apart from not-yet-opaquified
structs) to specify the ASN1_STRING in X509, etc., structures. We
intentionally made X509_set1_signature_value, etc., internally construct
the ASN1_STRING. Still having an API is more consistent and helps nudge
callers towards rejecting excess bits when they want bytes.
It may also be worth a public API for consistently accessing the bit
count. I've left it alone for now because I've not seen callers that
need it, and it saves worrying about bytes-to-bits overflows.
This also fixes a bug in the original version of the truncating logic
when the entire string was all zeros, and const-corrects a few
parameters.
Change-Id: I9d29842a3d3264b0cde61ca8cfea07d02177dbc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *str, size_t *out) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t padding_bits;
|
|
|
|
int len = asn1_bit_string_length(str, &padding_bits);
|
|
|
|
if (padding_bits != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out = len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
Compute ASN.1 BIT STRING sizes more consistently.
OpenSSL's BIT STRING representation has two modes, one where it
implicitly trims trailing zeros and the other where the number of unused
bits is explicitly set. This means logic in ASN1_item_verify, or
elsewhere in callers, that checks flags and ASN1_STRING_length is
inconsistent with i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
Add ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes for code that needs to deal with X.509
using BIT STRING for some fields instead of OCTET STRING. Switch
ASN1_item_verify to it. Some external code does this too, so export it
as public API.
This is mostly a theoretical issue. All parsed BIT STRINGS use explicit
byte strings, and there are no APIs (apart from not-yet-opaquified
structs) to specify the ASN1_STRING in X509, etc., structures. We
intentionally made X509_set1_signature_value, etc., internally construct
the ASN1_STRING. Still having an API is more consistent and helps nudge
callers towards rejecting excess bits when they want bytes.
It may also be worth a public API for consistently accessing the bit
count. I've left it alone for now because I've not seen callers that
need it, and it saves worrying about bytes-to-bits overflows.
This also fixes a bug in the original version of the truncating logic
when the entire string was all zeros, and const-corrects a few
parameters.
Change-Id: I9d29842a3d3264b0cde61ca8cfea07d02177dbc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp) {
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Compute ASN.1 BIT STRING sizes more consistently.
OpenSSL's BIT STRING representation has two modes, one where it
implicitly trims trailing zeros and the other where the number of unused
bits is explicitly set. This means logic in ASN1_item_verify, or
elsewhere in callers, that checks flags and ASN1_STRING_length is
inconsistent with i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING.
Add ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes for code that needs to deal with X.509
using BIT STRING for some fields instead of OCTET STRING. Switch
ASN1_item_verify to it. Some external code does this too, so export it
as public API.
This is mostly a theoretical issue. All parsed BIT STRINGS use explicit
byte strings, and there are no APIs (apart from not-yet-opaquified
structs) to specify the ASN1_STRING in X509, etc., structures. We
intentionally made X509_set1_signature_value, etc., internally construct
the ASN1_STRING. Still having an API is more consistent and helps nudge
callers towards rejecting excess bits when they want bytes.
It may also be worth a public API for consistently accessing the bit
count. I've left it alone for now because I've not seen callers that
need it, and it saves worrying about bytes-to-bits overflows.
This also fixes a bug in the original version of the truncating logic
when the entire string was all zeros, and const-corrects a few
parameters.
Change-Id: I9d29842a3d3264b0cde61ca8cfea07d02177dbc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t bits;
|
|
|
|
int len = asn1_bit_string_length(a, &bits);
|
|
|
|
if (len > INT_MAX - 1) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1 + len;
|
|
|
|
if (pp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *p = *pp;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = bits;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(p, a->data, len);
|
|
|
|
if (len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
p[len - 1] &= (0xff << bits);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += len;
|
|
|
|
*pp = p;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char **pp, long len) {
|
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *s;
|
|
|
|
int padding;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len < 1) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len > INT_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = (*a);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = *pp;
|
|
|
|
padding = *(p++);
|
|
|
|
len--;
|
|
|
|
if (padding > 7) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Unused bits in a BIT STRING must be zero.
|
|
|
|
uint8_t padding_mask = (1 << padding) - 1;
|
|
|
|
if (padding != 0 && (len < 1 || (p[len - 1] & padding_mask) != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_PADDING);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// We do this to preserve the settings. If we modify the settings, via
|
|
|
|
// the _set_bit function, we will recalculate on output
|
|
|
|
ret->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); // clear
|
|
|
|
ret->flags |= (ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | padding); // set
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
s = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += len;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret->length = (int)len;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
|
|
|
|
ret->data = s;
|
|
|
|
ret->type = V_ASN1_BIT_STRING;
|
|
|
|
if (a != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
(*a) = ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pp = p;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))) {
|
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// These next 2 functions from Goetz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>
|
|
|
|
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value) {
|
|
|
|
int w, v, iv;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
w = n / 8;
|
|
|
|
v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
|
|
|
|
iv = ~v;
|
|
|
|
if (!value) {
|
|
|
|
v = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
a->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); // clear, set on write
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!value) {
|
|
|
|
return 1; // Don't need to set
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (a->data == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
c = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(w + 1);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
c = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_realloc(a->data, w + 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (w + 1 - a->length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(c + a->length, 0, w + 1 - a->length);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a->data = c;
|
|
|
|
a->length = w + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a->data[w] = ((a->data[w]) & iv) | v;
|
|
|
|
while ((a->length > 0) && (a->data[a->length - 1] == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
a->length--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n) {
|
|
|
|
int w, v;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
w = n / 8;
|
|
|
|
v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07));
|
|
|
|
if ((a == NULL) || (a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ((a->data[w] & v) != 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Checks if the given bit string contains only bits specified by
|
|
|
|
// the flags vector. Returns 0 if there is at least one bit set in 'a'
|
|
|
|
// which is not specified in 'flags', 1 otherwise.
|
|
|
|
// 'len' is the length of 'flags'.
|
|
|
|
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, const unsigned char *flags,
|
|
|
|
int flags_len) {
|
|
|
|
int i, ok;
|
|
|
|
// Check if there is one bit set at all.
|
|
|
|
if (!a || !a->data) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check each byte of the internal representation of the bit string.
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->length && ok; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char mask = i < flags_len ? ~flags[i] : 0xff;
|
|
|
|
// We are done if there is an unneeded bit set.
|
|
|
|
ok = (a->data[i] & mask) == 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|