Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖) https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_ECDSA_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_ECDSA_H
#include <openssl/base.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// ECDSA contains functions for signing and verifying with the Digital Signature
// Algorithm over elliptic curves.
// Signing and verifying.
// ECDSA_sign signs |digest_len| bytes from |digest| with |key| and writes the
// resulting signature to |sig|, which must have |ECDSA_size(key)| bytes of
// space. On successful exit, |*sig_len| is set to the actual number of bytes
// written. The |type| argument should be zero. It returns one on success and
// zero otherwise.
//
// WARNING: |digest| must be the output of some hash function on the data to be
// signed. Passing unhashed inputs will not result in a secure signature scheme.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, uint8_t *sig,
unsigned int *sig_len, const EC_KEY *key);
// ECDSA_verify verifies that |sig_len| bytes from |sig| constitute a valid
// signature by |key| of |digest|. (The |type| argument should be zero.) It
// returns one on success or zero if the signature is invalid or an error
// occurred.
//
// WARNING: |digest| must be the output of some hash function on the data to be
// verified. Passing unhashed inputs will not result in a secure signature
// scheme.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
size_t sig_len, const EC_KEY *key);
// ECDSA_size returns the maximum size of an ECDSA signature using |key|. It
// returns zero if |key| is NULL or if it doesn't have a group set.
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *key);
// Low-level signing and verification.
//
// Low-level functions handle signatures as |ECDSA_SIG| structures which allow
// the two values in an ECDSA signature to be handled separately.
struct ecdsa_sig_st {
BIGNUM *r;
BIGNUM *s;
};
// ECDSA_SIG_new returns a fresh |ECDSA_SIG| structure or NULL on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
// ECDSA_SIG_free frees |sig| its member |BIGNUM|s.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig);
// ECDSA_SIG_get0_r returns the r component of |sig|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig);
// ECDSA_SIG_get0_s returns the s component of |sig|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig);
// ECDSA_SIG_get0 sets |*out_r| and |*out_s|, if non-NULL, to the two
// components of |sig|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **out_r,
const BIGNUM **out_s);
// ECDSA_SIG_set0 sets |sig|'s components to |r| and |s|, neither of which may
// be NULL. On success, it takes ownership of each argument and returns one.
// Otherwise, it returns zero.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
// ECDSA_do_sign signs |digest_len| bytes from |digest| with |key| and returns
// the resulting signature structure, or NULL on error.
//
// WARNING: |digest| must be the output of some hash function on the data to be
// signed. Passing unhashed inputs will not result in a secure signature scheme.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, const EC_KEY *key);
// ECDSA_do_verify verifies that |sig| constitutes a valid signature by |key|
// of |digest|. It returns one on success or zero if the signature is invalid
// or on error.
//
// WARNING: |digest| must be the output of some hash function on the data to be
// verified. Passing unhashed inputs will not result in a secure signature
// scheme.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *key);
// ASN.1 functions.
// ECDSA_SIG_parse parses a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value structure from |cbs| and
// advances |cbs|. It returns a newly-allocated |ECDSA_SIG| or NULL on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_parse(CBS *cbs);
// ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes parses |in| as a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value structure.
// It returns a newly-allocated |ECDSA_SIG| structure or NULL on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len);
// ECDSA_SIG_marshal marshals |sig| as a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value and appends
// the result to |cbb|. It returns one on success and zero on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_SIG_marshal(CBB *cbb, const ECDSA_SIG *sig);
// ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes marshals |sig| as a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value and, on
// success, sets |*out_bytes| to a newly allocated buffer containing the result
// and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. The result should be freed with
// |OPENSSL_free|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig);
// ECDSA_SIG_max_len returns the maximum length of a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value
// structure for a group whose order is represented in |order_len| bytes, or
// zero on overflow.
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t ECDSA_SIG_max_len(size_t order_len);
// Testing-only functions.
// ECDSA_sign_with_nonce_and_leak_private_key_for_testing behaves like
// |ECDSA_do_sign| but uses |nonce| for the ECDSA nonce 'k', instead of a random
// value. |nonce| is interpreted as a big-endian integer. It must be reduced
// modulo the group order and padded with zeros up to |BN_num_bytes(order)|
// bytes.
//
// WARNING: This function is only exported for testing purposes, when using test
// vectors or fuzzing strategies. It must not be used outside tests and may leak
// any private keys it is used with.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *
ECDSA_sign_with_nonce_and_leak_private_key_for_testing(const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len,
const EC_KEY *eckey,
const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_len);
// Deprecated functions.
// d2i_ECDSA_SIG parses aa DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value structure from |len|
// bytes at |*inp|, as described in |d2i_SAMPLE|.
//
// Use |ECDSA_SIG_parse| instead.
OPENSSL_EXPORT ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **out, const uint8_t **inp,
long len);
// i2d_ECDSA_SIG marshals |sig| as a DER-encoded ECDSA-Sig-Value, as described
// in |i2d_SAMPLE|.
//
// Use |ECDSA_SIG_marshal| instead.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, uint8_t **outp);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
extern "C++" {
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG_free)
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
} // extern C++
#endif
#define ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 100
#define ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 101
#define ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES 102
#define ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 103
#define ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED 104
#define ECDSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR 105
Cap the number of ECDSA and DSA sign iterations. When the parameters are incorrect, all assumptions of (EC)DSA fly out the window, including whether the retry loop actually terminates. While ECDSA is broadly used with fixed, named groups, DSA was catastrophically mis-specified with arbitrary parameters being the default and only mode. Cap the number of retries in DSA_do_sign so invalid DSA groups cannot infinite loop, e.g. if the "generator" is really nilpotent. This also caps the iteration count for ECDSA. We do, sadly, support arbitrary curves via EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp, to help Conscrypt remain compatible with a badly-designed Java API. After https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51925, we documented that untrusted parameters are not supported and may produce garbage outputs, but we did not document that infinite loops are possible. I don't have an example where an invalid curve breaks ECDSA, but as it breaks all preconditions, I cannot be confident it doesn't exist, so just cap the iterations. Thanks to Hanno Böck who originally reported an infinite loop on invalid DSA groups. While that variation did not affect BoringSSL, it inspired us to find other invalid groups which did. Thanks also to Guido Vranken who found, in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20268, an infinite loop when the private key is zero. That was fixed in the preceding CL, as it impacts valid groups too, but the infinite loop is ultimately in the same place, so this change also would have mitigated the loop. Update-Note: If signing starts failing with ECDSA_R_INVALID_ITERATIONS, something went horribly wrong because it should not be possible with real curves. (Needing even one retry has probability 2^-256 or so.) Change-Id: If8fb0157055d3d8cb180fe4f27ea7eb349ec2738 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57228 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2 years ago
#define ECDSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS 106
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_ECDSA_H