Mirror of BoringSSL (grpc依赖)
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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318 lines
10 KiB
318 lines
10 KiB
4 years ago
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
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static void tls_on_handshake_complete(SSL *ssl) {
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// The handshake should have released its final message.
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assert(!ssl->s3->has_message);
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// During the handshake, |hs_buf| is retained. Release if it there is no
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// excess in it. There should not be any excess because the handshake logic
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// rejects unprocessed data after each Finished message. Note this means we do
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// not allow a TLS 1.2 HelloRequest to be packed into the same record as
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// Finished. (Schannel also rejects this.)
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assert(!ssl->s3->hs_buf || ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0);
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if (ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
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ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
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}
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}
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static bool tls_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
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Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
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// Cipher changes are forbidden if the current epoch has leftover data.
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if (tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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return false;
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}
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if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
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if (!ssl->quic_method->set_read_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
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secret_for_quic.data(),
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secret_for_quic.size())) {
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return false;
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}
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// QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
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// keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
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// have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
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if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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OPENSSL_memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
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ssl->s3->read_level = level;
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return true;
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}
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static bool tls_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
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Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
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if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
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if (!ssl->quic_method->set_write_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
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secret_for_quic.data(),
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secret_for_quic.size())) {
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return false;
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}
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// QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
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// keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
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// have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
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if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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OPENSSL_memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
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ssl->s3->write_level = level;
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return true;
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}
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static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
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false /* is_dtls */,
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tls_new,
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tls_free,
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tls_get_message,
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tls_next_message,
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tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data,
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tls_open_handshake,
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tls_open_change_cipher_spec,
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tls_open_app_data,
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tls_write_app_data,
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tls_dispatch_alert,
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tls_init_message,
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tls_finish_message,
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tls_add_message,
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tls_add_change_cipher_spec,
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tls_flush_flight,
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tls_on_handshake_complete,
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tls_set_read_state,
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tls_set_write_state,
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};
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names(
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STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names) {
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return true;
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}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_clear(CERT *cert) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_free(CERT *cert) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_dup(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf(CERT *cert) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain(CERT *cert) {}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
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return true;
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}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *new_session,
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const SSL_SESSION *session) {
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return true;
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}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_session_clear(SSL_SESSION *session) {}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain(SSL_SESSION *session,
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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uint8_t *out_alert) {
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return false;
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}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { return true; }
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static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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return true;
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}
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static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return true; }
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static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
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static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
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const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method = {
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ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names,
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ssl_noop_x509_clear,
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ssl_noop_x509_free,
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ssl_noop_x509_dup,
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ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain,
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ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf,
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ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects,
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ssl_noop_x509_session_dup,
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ssl_noop_x509_session_clear,
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ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain,
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ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free,
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ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA,
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};
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
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using namespace bssl;
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const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void) {
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static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
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0,
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&kTLSProtocolMethod,
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&ssl_crypto_x509_method,
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};
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return &kMethod;
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void) {
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return TLS_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLS_with_buffers_method(void) {
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static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
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0,
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&kTLSProtocolMethod,
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&ssl_noop_x509_method,
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};
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return &kMethod;
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}
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// Legacy version-locked methods.
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) {
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static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
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TLS1_2_VERSION,
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&kTLSProtocolMethod,
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&ssl_crypto_x509_method,
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};
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return &kMethod;
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void) {
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static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
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TLS1_1_VERSION,
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&kTLSProtocolMethod,
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&ssl_crypto_x509_method,
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};
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return &kMethod;
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void) {
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static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
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TLS1_VERSION,
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&kTLSProtocolMethod,
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&ssl_crypto_x509_method,
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};
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return &kMethod;
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}
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// Legacy side-specific methods.
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_2_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_1_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_2_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_1_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void) {
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return TLSv1_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void) {
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return SSLv23_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void) {
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return SSLv23_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void) {
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return TLS_method();
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}
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const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void) {
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return TLS_method();
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}
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