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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
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#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <openssl/base.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#if defined(__cplusplus)
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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// EVP_tls_cbc_get_padding determines the padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
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// record in |in|. This decrypted record should not include any "decrypted"
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// explicit IV. If the record is publicly invalid, it returns zero. Otherwise,
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// it returns one and sets |*out_padding_ok| to all ones (0xfff..f) if the
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// padding is valid and zero otherwise. It then sets |*out_len| to the length
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// with the padding removed or |in_len| if invalid.
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//
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// If the function returns one, it runs in time independent of the contents of
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// |in|. It is also guaranteed that |*out_len| >= |mac_size|, satisfying
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// |EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac|'s precondition.
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int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(crypto_word_t *out_padding_ok, size_t *out_len,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
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// EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of the first
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// |in_len| bytes of |in| to |out| in constant time (independent of the concrete
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// value of |in_len|, which may vary within a 256-byte window). |in| must point
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// to a buffer of |orig_len| bytes.
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//
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// On entry:
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// orig_len >= in_len >= md_size
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// md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
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void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t in_len, size_t orig_len);
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// EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |md| is a hash function
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// which EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record supports.
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int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
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// EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix computes the result of hashing |len| bytes
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// from |in| to |ctx| and writes the resulting hash to |out|. |len| is treated
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// as secret and must be at most |max_len|, which is treated as public. |in|
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// must point to a buffer of at least |max_len| bytes. It returns one on success
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// and zero if inputs are too long.
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//
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// This function is exported for unit tests.
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix(
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SHA_CTX *ctx, uint8_t out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
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size_t max_len);
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// EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
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// record.
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//
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// md: the hash function used in the HMAC.
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// EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this hash.
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// md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
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// md_out_size: the number of output bytes is written here.
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// header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
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// data: the record data itself
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// data_size: the secret, reported length of the data once the padding and MAC
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// have been removed.
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// data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
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// record, including padding.
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//
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// On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
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// functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
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// a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
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// padding too. )
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int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
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size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
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const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size,
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size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
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const uint8_t *mac_secret,
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unsigned mac_secret_length);
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#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
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// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
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// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
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// and output parameter.
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union chacha20_poly1305_open_data {
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struct {
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alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
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uint32_t counter;
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uint8_t nonce[12];
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} in;
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struct {
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uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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} out;
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};
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union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data {
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struct {
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alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
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uint32_t counter;
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uint8_t nonce[12];
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const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
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size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
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} in;
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struct {
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uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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} out;
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};
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ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Armv8 (AArch64)
This work continues on top of the CL opened by Vlad Krasnov
(https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44364). The
CL was thoroughly reviewed by David Benjamin but not merged due to
some outstanding comments which this work addresses:
- The flag check when doing the final reduction in poly1305 was
changed from `eq` to `cs`
- The CFI prologues and epilogues of open/seal were modified as
recommended by David.
- Added Pointer Authentication instruction to the functions that are
exported from the assembly code as pointed out by David.
Testing:
- The current tests against ChaCha20-Poly1305 continue to pass.
- More test vectors were produced using a Python script to try and
prove that having `eq` instead of `cs` was a bug. They passed as
well, but didn't result in the most significant word being
non-zero after the reduction, which would have highlighted the
bug. An argument about why it's unlikely to find the vector is
detailed below.
- `objdump -W|Wf|WF` was used to confirm the value of the CFA and the
locations of the registers relative to the CFA were as expected. See
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/01/18/cfi.html.
Performance:
| Size | Before (MB/s) | After (MB/s) | Improvement |
| 16 bytes | 30.5 | 43.3 | 1.42x |
| 256 bytes | 220.7 | 361.5 | 1.64x |
| 1350 bytes | 285.9 | 639.4 | 2.24x |
| 8192 bytes | 329.6 | 798.3 | 2.42x |
| 16384 bytes | 331.9 | 814.9 | 2.46x |
Explanation of the unlikelihood of finding a test vector:
* the modulus is in t2:t1:t0 = 3 : FF..FF : FF..FB, each being a 64 bit
word; i.e. t2 = 3, t1 = all 1s.
* acc2 <= 4 after the previous reduction.
* It is highly likely to have borrow = 1 from acc1 - t1 since t1 is
all FFs.
* So for almost all test vectors we have acc2 <= 4 and borrow = 1,
thus (t2 = acc2 - t2 - borrow) will be 0 whenever acc >
modulus. **It would be highly unlikely to find such a test vector
with t2 > 0 after that final reduction:** Trying to craft that
vector requires having acc and r of high values before their
multiplication, yet ensuring that after the reduction (see Note) of
their product, the resulting value of the accumulator has t2 = 4,
all 1s in t1 and most of t0 so that no borrow occurs from acc1:acc0
- t1:t0.
* Note: the reduction is basically carried by folding over the top
64+62 bits once, then folding them again shifted left by 2,
resulting in adding 5 times those bits.
Change-Id: If7d86b7a9b74ec3615ac2d7a97f80100dbfaee7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51885
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
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#if (defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
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!defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_open_data) == 48,
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"wrong chacha20_poly1305_open_data size");
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
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"wrong chacha20_poly1305_seal_data size");
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OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) {
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ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Armv8 (AArch64)
This work continues on top of the CL opened by Vlad Krasnov
(https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44364). The
CL was thoroughly reviewed by David Benjamin but not merged due to
some outstanding comments which this work addresses:
- The flag check when doing the final reduction in poly1305 was
changed from `eq` to `cs`
- The CFI prologues and epilogues of open/seal were modified as
recommended by David.
- Added Pointer Authentication instruction to the functions that are
exported from the assembly code as pointed out by David.
Testing:
- The current tests against ChaCha20-Poly1305 continue to pass.
- More test vectors were produced using a Python script to try and
prove that having `eq` instead of `cs` was a bug. They passed as
well, but didn't result in the most significant word being
non-zero after the reduction, which would have highlighted the
bug. An argument about why it's unlikely to find the vector is
detailed below.
- `objdump -W|Wf|WF` was used to confirm the value of the CFA and the
locations of the registers relative to the CFA were as expected. See
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/01/18/cfi.html.
Performance:
| Size | Before (MB/s) | After (MB/s) | Improvement |
| 16 bytes | 30.5 | 43.3 | 1.42x |
| 256 bytes | 220.7 | 361.5 | 1.64x |
| 1350 bytes | 285.9 | 639.4 | 2.24x |
| 8192 bytes | 329.6 | 798.3 | 2.42x |
| 16384 bytes | 331.9 | 814.9 | 2.46x |
Explanation of the unlikelihood of finding a test vector:
* the modulus is in t2:t1:t0 = 3 : FF..FF : FF..FB, each being a 64 bit
word; i.e. t2 = 3, t1 = all 1s.
* acc2 <= 4 after the previous reduction.
* It is highly likely to have borrow = 1 from acc1 - t1 since t1 is
all FFs.
* So for almost all test vectors we have acc2 <= 4 and borrow = 1,
thus (t2 = acc2 - t2 - borrow) will be 0 whenever acc >
modulus. **It would be highly unlikely to find such a test vector
with t2 > 0 after that final reduction:** Trying to craft that
vector requires having acc and r of high values before their
multiplication, yet ensuring that after the reduction (see Note) of
their product, the resulting value of the accumulator has t2 = 4,
all 1s in t1 and most of t0 so that no borrow occurs from acc1:acc0
- t1:t0.
* Note: the reduction is basically carried by folding over the top
64+62 bits once, then folding them again shifted left by 2,
resulting in adding 5 times those bits.
Change-Id: If7d86b7a9b74ec3615ac2d7a97f80100dbfaee7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51885
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
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#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
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Check static CPU capabilities on x86.
On Arm, our CRYPTO_is_*_capable functions check the corresponding
preprocessor symbol. This allows us to automatically drop dynamic checks
and fallback code when some capability is always avilable.
This CL does the same on x86, as well as consolidates our
OPENSSL_ia32cap_P checks in one place. Since this abstraction is
incompatible with some optimizations we do around OPENSSL_ia32cap_get()
in the FIPS module, I've marked the symbol __attribute__((const)), which
is enough to make GCC and Clang do the optimizations for us. (We already
do the same to DEFINE_BSS_GET.)
Most x86 platforms support a much wider range of capabilities, so this
is usually a no-op. But, notably, all x86_64 Mac hardware has SSSE3
available, so this allows us to statically drop an AES implementation.
(On macOS with -Wl,-dead_strip, this seems to trim 35080 bytes from the
bssl binary.) Configs like -march=native can also drop a bunch of code.
Update-Note: This CL may break build environments that incorrectly mark
some instruction as statically available. This is unlikely to happen
with vector instructions like AVX, where the compiler could freely emit
them anyway. However, instructions like AES-NI might be set incorrectly.
Change-Id: I44fd715c9887d3fda7cb4519c03bee4d4f2c7ea6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51548
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
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return CRYPTO_is_SSE4_1_capable();
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ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Armv8 (AArch64)
This work continues on top of the CL opened by Vlad Krasnov
(https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44364). The
CL was thoroughly reviewed by David Benjamin but not merged due to
some outstanding comments which this work addresses:
- The flag check when doing the final reduction in poly1305 was
changed from `eq` to `cs`
- The CFI prologues and epilogues of open/seal were modified as
recommended by David.
- Added Pointer Authentication instruction to the functions that are
exported from the assembly code as pointed out by David.
Testing:
- The current tests against ChaCha20-Poly1305 continue to pass.
- More test vectors were produced using a Python script to try and
prove that having `eq` instead of `cs` was a bug. They passed as
well, but didn't result in the most significant word being
non-zero after the reduction, which would have highlighted the
bug. An argument about why it's unlikely to find the vector is
detailed below.
- `objdump -W|Wf|WF` was used to confirm the value of the CFA and the
locations of the registers relative to the CFA were as expected. See
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/01/18/cfi.html.
Performance:
| Size | Before (MB/s) | After (MB/s) | Improvement |
| 16 bytes | 30.5 | 43.3 | 1.42x |
| 256 bytes | 220.7 | 361.5 | 1.64x |
| 1350 bytes | 285.9 | 639.4 | 2.24x |
| 8192 bytes | 329.6 | 798.3 | 2.42x |
| 16384 bytes | 331.9 | 814.9 | 2.46x |
Explanation of the unlikelihood of finding a test vector:
* the modulus is in t2:t1:t0 = 3 : FF..FF : FF..FB, each being a 64 bit
word; i.e. t2 = 3, t1 = all 1s.
* acc2 <= 4 after the previous reduction.
* It is highly likely to have borrow = 1 from acc1 - t1 since t1 is
all FFs.
* So for almost all test vectors we have acc2 <= 4 and borrow = 1,
thus (t2 = acc2 - t2 - borrow) will be 0 whenever acc >
modulus. **It would be highly unlikely to find such a test vector
with t2 > 0 after that final reduction:** Trying to craft that
vector requires having acc and r of high values before their
multiplication, yet ensuring that after the reduction (see Note) of
their product, the resulting value of the accumulator has t2 = 4,
all 1s in t1 and most of t0 so that no borrow occurs from acc1:acc0
- t1:t0.
* Note: the reduction is basically carried by folding over the top
64+62 bits once, then folding them again shifted left by 2,
resulting in adding 5 times those bits.
Change-Id: If7d86b7a9b74ec3615ac2d7a97f80100dbfaee7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/51885
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 years ago
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
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return CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable();
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#endif
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}
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// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_*.pl. It decrypts
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// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
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// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
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// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
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// check.
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extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
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const uint8_t *ciphertext,
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size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
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size_t ad_len,
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union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
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// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_*.pl. It encrypts
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// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
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// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
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// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
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// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
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extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
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const uint8_t *plaintext,
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size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
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size_t ad_len,
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union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
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#else
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OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
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OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
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const uint8_t *ciphertext,
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size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
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size_t ad_len,
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union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data) {
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abort();
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}
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OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
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const uint8_t *plaintext,
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size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
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size_t ad_len,
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union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data) {
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abort();
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(__cplusplus)
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} // extern C
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#endif
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#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
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