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#! /usr/bin/env perl
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# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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#
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# ====================================================================
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# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
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# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
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# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
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# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
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# ====================================================================
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#
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# This module implements support for ARMv8 AES instructions. The
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# module is endian-agnostic in sense that it supports both big- and
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# little-endian cases. As does it support both 32- and 64-bit modes
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# of operation. Latter is achieved by limiting amount of utilized
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# registers to 16, which implies additional NEON load and integer
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# instructions. This has no effect on mighty Apple A7, where results
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# are literally equal to the theoretical estimates based on AES
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# instruction latencies and issue rates. On Cortex-A53, an in-order
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# execution core, this costs up to 10-15%, which is partially
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# compensated by implementing dedicated code path for 128-bit
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# CBC encrypt case. On Cortex-A57 parallelizable mode performance
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# seems to be limited by sheer amount of NEON instructions...
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#
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# Performance in cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key:
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#
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# CBC enc CBC dec CTR
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# Apple A7 2.39 1.20 1.20
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# Cortex-A53 1.32 1.29 1.46
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# Cortex-A57(*) 1.95 0.85 0.93
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# Denver 1.96 0.86 0.80
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# Mongoose 1.33 1.20 1.20
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#
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# (*) original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision
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# and are still same even for updated module;
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$flavour = shift;
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$output = shift;
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$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
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( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
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( $xlate="${dir}../../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
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die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl";
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open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\"";
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*STDOUT=*OUT;
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$prefix="aes_hw";
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$code=<<___;
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#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
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#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
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.text
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___
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$code.=".arch armv8-a+crypto\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/);
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$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
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.arch armv7-a // don't confuse not-so-latest binutils with argv8 :-)
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.fpu neon
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.code 32
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#undef __thumb2__
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___
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# Assembler mnemonics are an eclectic mix of 32- and 64-bit syntax,
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# NEON is mostly 32-bit mnemonics, integer - mostly 64. Goal is to
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# maintain both 32- and 64-bit codes within single module and
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# transliterate common code to either flavour with regex vodoo.
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#
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{{{
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my ($inp,$bits,$out,$ptr,$rounds)=("x0","w1","x2","x3","w12");
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my ($zero,$rcon,$mask,$in0,$in1,$tmp,$key)=
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$flavour=~/64/? map("q$_",(0..6)) : map("q$_",(0..3,8..10));
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# On AArch64, put the data .rodata and use adrp + add for compatibility with
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# execute-only memory. On AArch32, put it in .text and use adr.
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$code.= ".section .rodata\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/);
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$code.=<<___;
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.align 5
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.Lrcon:
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.long 0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01
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.long 0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d // rotate-n-splat
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.long 0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b
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.text
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.globl ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
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.type ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,%function
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.align 5
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${prefix}_set_encrypt_key:
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.Lenc_key:
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___
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$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
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aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
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// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
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AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
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stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
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add x29,sp,#0
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___
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$code.=<<___;
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mov $ptr,#-1
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cmp $inp,#0
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b.eq .Lenc_key_abort
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cmp $out,#0
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b.eq .Lenc_key_abort
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mov $ptr,#-2
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cmp $bits,#128
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b.lt .Lenc_key_abort
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cmp $bits,#256
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b.gt .Lenc_key_abort
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tst $bits,#0x3f
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b.ne .Lenc_key_abort
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___
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$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
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adrp $ptr,:pg_hi21:.Lrcon
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add $ptr,$ptr,:lo12:.Lrcon
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___
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$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
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adr $ptr,.Lrcon
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___
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$code.=<<___;
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cmp $bits,#192
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veor $zero,$zero,$zero
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vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
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mov $bits,#8 // reuse $bits
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vld1.32 {$rcon,$mask},[$ptr],#32
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b.lt .Loop128
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b.eq .L192
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b .L256
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.align 4
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.Loop128:
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vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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aese $key,$zero
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subs $bits,$bits,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $key,$key,$rcon
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$key
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b.ne .Loop128
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vld1.32 {$rcon},[$ptr]
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vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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aese $key,$zero
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $key,$key,$rcon
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$key
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vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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aese $key,$zero
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $key,$key,$rcon
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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veor $in0,$in0,$key
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out]
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add $out,$out,#0x50
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mov $rounds,#10
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b .Ldone
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.align 4
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.L192:
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vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#8
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vmov.i8 $key,#8 // borrow $key
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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vsub.i8 $mask,$mask,$key // adjust the mask
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.Loop192:
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vtbl.8 $key,{$in1},$mask
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
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vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#8
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aese $key,$zero
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subs $bits,$bits,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vdup.32 $tmp,${in0}[3]
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veor $tmp,$tmp,$in1
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veor $key,$key,$rcon
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vext.8 $in1,$zero,$in1,#12
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vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1
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veor $in1,$in1,$tmp
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veor $in0,$in0,$key
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veor $in1,$in1,$key
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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b.ne .Loop192
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mov $rounds,#12
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add $out,$out,#0x20
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b .Ldone
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.align 4
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.L256:
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vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
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mov $bits,#7
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mov $rounds,#14
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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|
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.Loop256:
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vtbl.8 $key,{$in1},$mask
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12
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vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#16
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aese $key,$zero
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|
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subs $bits,$bits,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $key,$key,$rcon
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veor $in0,$in0,$tmp
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vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1
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veor $in0,$in0,$key
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vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16
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b.eq .Ldone
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|
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vdup.32 $key,${in0}[3] // just splat
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in1,#12
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aese $key,$zero
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veor $in1,$in1,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in1,$in1,$tmp
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vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12
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veor $in1,$in1,$tmp
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veor $in1,$in1,$key
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b .Loop256
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.Ldone:
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str $rounds,[$out]
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mov $ptr,#0
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.Lenc_key_abort:
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|
|
mov x0,$ptr // return value
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|
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`"ldr x29,[sp],#16" if ($flavour =~ /64/)`
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|
|
ret
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|
|
|
.size ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_encrypt_key
|
|
|
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|
|
.globl ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
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|
|
.type ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,%function
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|
|
|
.align 5
|
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|
|
${prefix}_set_decrypt_key:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
|
|
|
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
|
|
|
|
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
|
|
|
|
add x29,sp,#0
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
stmdb sp!,{r4,lr}
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
bl .Lenc_key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp x0,#0
|
|
|
|
b.ne .Ldec_key_abort
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sub $out,$out,#240 // restore original $out
|
|
|
|
mov x4,#-16
|
|
|
|
add $inp,$out,x12,lsl#4 // end of key schedule
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out]
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {v1.16b},[$inp]
|
|
|
|
vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp],x4
|
|
|
|
vst1.32 {v1.16b},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Loop_imc:
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out]
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {v1.16b},[$inp]
|
|
|
|
aesimc v0.16b,v0.16b
|
|
|
|
aesimc v1.16b,v1.16b
|
|
|
|
vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp],x4
|
|
|
|
vst1.32 {v1.16b},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
cmp $inp,$out
|
|
|
|
b.hi .Loop_imc
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out]
|
|
|
|
aesimc v0.16b,v0.16b
|
|
|
|
vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
|
|
|
|
.Ldec_key_abort:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
ldmia sp!,{r4,pc}
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
|
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
|
|
|
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.size ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_decrypt_key
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
}}}
|
|
|
|
{{{
|
|
|
|
sub gen_block () {
|
|
|
|
my $dir = shift;
|
|
|
|
my ($e,$mc) = $dir eq "en" ? ("e","mc") : ("d","imc");
|
|
|
|
my ($inp,$out,$key)=map("x$_",(0..2));
|
|
|
|
my $rounds="w3";
|
|
|
|
my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout)=map("q$_",(0..3));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.globl ${prefix}_${dir}crypt
|
|
|
|
.type ${prefix}_${dir}crypt,%function
|
|
|
|
.align 5
|
|
|
|
${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
|
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
|
|
|
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
|
|
|
ldr $rounds,[$key,#240]
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$inout},[$inp]
|
|
|
|
sub $rounds,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Loop_${dir}c:
|
|
|
|
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
|
|
|
|
aes$mc $inout,$inout
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
|
|
|
|
aes$mc $inout,$inout
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
|
|
|
|
b.gt .Loop_${dir}c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
|
|
|
|
aes$mc $inout,$inout
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
|
|
|
|
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
|
|
|
|
veor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$inout},[$out]
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
|
|
.size ${prefix}_${dir}crypt,.-${prefix}_${dir}crypt
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
&gen_block("en");
|
|
|
|
&gen_block("de");
|
|
|
|
}}}
|
|
|
|
{{{
|
|
|
|
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4)); my $enc="w5";
|
|
|
|
my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
|
|
|
|
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
|
|
|
|
my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.globl ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
|
|
|
|
.type ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,%function
|
|
|
|
.align 5
|
|
|
|
${prefix}_cbc_encrypt:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
|
|
|
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
|
|
|
|
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
|
|
|
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
|
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|
|
add x29,sp,#0
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
mov ip,sp
|
|
|
|
stmdb sp!,{r4-r8,lr}
|
|
|
|
vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so
|
|
|
|
ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load remaining args
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#16
|
|
|
|
mov $step,#16
|
|
|
|
b.lo .Lcbc_abort
|
|
|
|
cclr $step,eq
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp $enc,#0 // en- or decrypting?
|
|
|
|
ldr $rounds,[$key,#240]
|
|
|
|
and $len,$len,#-16
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$ivec},[$ivp]
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$dat},[$inp],$step
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule...
|
|
|
|
sub $rounds,$rounds,#6
|
|
|
|
add $key_,$key,x5,lsl#4 // pointer to last 7 round keys
|
|
|
|
sub $rounds,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q10-q11},[$key_],#32
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key_],#32
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key_],#32
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key_]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
add $key_,$key,#32
|
|
|
|
mov $cnt,$rounds
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lcbc_dec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp $rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
veor $dat,$dat,$ivec
|
|
|
|
veor $rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lcbc_enc128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_]
|
|
|
|
add $key_,$key,#16
|
|
|
|
add $key4,$key,#16*4
|
|
|
|
add $key5,$key,#16*5
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
add $key6,$key,#16*6
|
|
|
|
add $key7,$key,#16*7
|
|
|
|
b .Lenter_cbc_enc
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.align 4
|
|
|
|
.Loop_cbc_enc:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
.Lenter_cbc_enc:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,$in0
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key4]
|
|
|
|
cmp $rounds,#4
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,$in1
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key5]
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lcbc_enc192
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key6]
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key7]
|
|
|
|
nop
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_enc192:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#16
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
cclr $step,eq
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q10
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q11
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_] // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q15
|
|
|
|
veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
b .Lcbc_done
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.align 5
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_enc128:
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_]
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
b .Lenter_cbc_enc128
|
|
|
|
.Loop_cbc_enc128:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
.Lenter_cbc_enc128:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#16
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,$in0
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
cclr $step,eq
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,$in1
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q10
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q11
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
|
|
|
|
aese $dat,q15
|
|
|
|
veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
b .Lcbc_done
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9));
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.align 5
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_dec:
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#32 // bias
|
|
|
|
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
vorr $in1,$dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat1,$dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vorr $in2,$dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
b.lo .Lcbc_dec_tail
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat1,$dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
vorr $in0,$dat,$dat
|
|
|
|
vorr $in1,$dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vorr $in2,$dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Loop3x_cbc_dec:
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
b.gt .Loop3x_cbc_dec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#0x30
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
|
|
|
|
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
|
|
|
|
// are loaded with last "words"
|
|
|
|
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
|
|
|
|
mov $key_,$key
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q12
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q12
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q12
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q13
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q13
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q13
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q14
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q14
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q14
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat0,q15
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q15
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q15
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
|
|
|
|
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
veor $dat2,$dat2,$tmp2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
|
|
|
|
b.hs .Loop3x_cbc_dec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmn $len,#0x30
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lcbc_done
|
|
|
|
nop
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_dec_tail:
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
b.gt .Lcbc_dec_tail
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q12
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q12
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
cmn $len,#0x20
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q13
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q13
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q14
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q14
|
|
|
|
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat1,q15
|
|
|
|
aesd $dat2,q15
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lcbc_dec_one
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp2,$tmp2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
b .Lcbc_done
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_dec_one:
|
|
|
|
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_done:
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$ivp]
|
|
|
|
.Lcbc_abort:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
vldmia sp!,{d8-d15}
|
|
|
|
ldmia sp!,{r4-r8,pc}
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
ldr x29,[sp],#16
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.size ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,.-${prefix}_cbc_encrypt
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
}}}
|
|
|
|
{{{
|
|
|
|
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4));
|
|
|
|
my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_)=("w5","w6","x7");
|
|
|
|
my ($ctr,$tctr0,$tctr1,$tctr2)=map("w$_",(8..10,12));
|
|
|
|
my $step="x12"; # aliases with $tctr2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
|
|
|
|
my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
my ($dat,$tmp)=($dat0,$tmp0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.globl ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
|
|
|
|
.type ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
|
|
|
|
.align 5
|
|
|
|
${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligble.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
5 years ago
|
|
|
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
|
|
|
|
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
|
|
|
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
|
|
|
|
add x29,sp,#0
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
mov ip,sp
|
|
|
|
stmdb sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
|
|
|
|
vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so
|
|
|
|
ldr r4, [ip] @ load remaining arg
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
ldr $rounds,[$key,#240]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ldr $ctr, [$ivp, #12]
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$dat0},[$ivp]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule...
|
|
|
|
sub $rounds,$rounds,#4
|
|
|
|
mov $step,#16
|
|
|
|
cmp $len,#2
|
|
|
|
add $key_,$key,x5,lsl#4 // pointer to last 5 round keys
|
|
|
|
sub $rounds,$rounds,#2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key_],#32
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key_],#32
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key_]
|
|
|
|
add $key_,$key,#32
|
|
|
|
mov $cnt,$rounds
|
|
|
|
cclr $step,lo
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
|
|
|
|
// affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
|
|
|
|
// respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
|
|
|
|
// instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
|
|
|
|
// after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
|
|
|
|
// single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The vmov.32 lines
|
|
|
|
// could write to $dat1 and $dat2 directly, but that trips this bugs.
|
|
|
|
// We write to $ivec and copy to the final register as a workaround.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
|
|
|
|
// [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
|
|
|
|
#ifndef __ARMEB__
|
|
|
|
rev $ctr, $ctr
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
add $tctr1, $ctr, #1
|
|
|
|
vorr $ivec,$dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
rev $tctr1, $tctr1
|
|
|
|
vmov.32 ${ivec}[3],$tctr1
|
|
|
|
add $ctr, $ctr, #2
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec
|
|
|
|
b.ls .Lctr32_tail
|
|
|
|
rev $tctr2, $ctr
|
|
|
|
vmov.32 ${ivec}[3],$tctr2
|
|
|
|
sub $len,$len,#3 // bias
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec
|
|
|
|
b .Loop3x_ctr32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.align 4
|
|
|
|
.Loop3x_ctr32:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aese $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aese $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
b.gt .Loop3x_ctr32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
add $tctr0,$ctr,#1
|
|
|
|
aese $dat2,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
rev $tctr0,$tctr0
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
|
|
|
|
mov $key_,$key
|
|
|
|
aese $dat2,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp2,$dat2
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp0,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp1,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
|
|
|
|
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
add $tctr1,$ctr,#2
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp2,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
|
|
|
|
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
add $ctr,$ctr,#3
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp0,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp1,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
|
|
|
|
// Note the logic to update $dat0, $dat1, and $dat1 is written to work
|
|
|
|
// around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
|
|
|
|
// 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
|
|
|
|
veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr0
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp2,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec
|
|
|
|
rev $tctr1,$tctr1
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp0,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
|
|
|
|
vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr1
|
|
|
|
rev $tctr2,$ctr
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp1,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec
|
|
|
|
vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr2
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp2,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
|
|
|
|
vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec
|
|
|
|
subs $len,$len,#3
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp0,q15
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp1,q15
|
|
|
|
aese $tmp2,q15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
veor $in0,$in0,$tmp0
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
veor $in1,$in1,$tmp1
|
|
|
|
mov $cnt,$rounds
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
veor $in2,$in2,$tmp2
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$in2},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
b.hs .Loop3x_ctr32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
adds $len,$len,#3
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lctr32_done
|
|
|
|
cmp $len,#1
|
|
|
|
mov $step,#16
|
|
|
|
cclr $step,eq
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lctr32_tail:
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
|
|
|
|
b.gt .Lctr32_tail
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q8
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q9
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],$step
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q12
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q13
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q14
|
|
|
|
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
|
|
|
|
aese $dat0,q15
|
|
|
|
aese $dat1,q15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp $len,#1
|
|
|
|
veor $in0,$in0,$dat0
|
|
|
|
veor $in1,$in1,$dat1
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
|
|
|
|
b.eq .Lctr32_done
|
|
|
|
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.Lctr32_done:
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
vldmia sp!,{d8-d15}
|
|
|
|
ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,pc}
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
|
|
|
|
ldr x29,[sp],#16
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
.size ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
}}}
|
|
|
|
$code.=<<___;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
___
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
|
|
if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
|
|
|
|
my %opcode = (
|
|
|
|
"aesd" => 0x4e285800, "aese" => 0x4e284800,
|
|
|
|
"aesimc"=> 0x4e287800, "aesmc" => 0x4e286800 );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local *unaes = sub {
|
|
|
|
my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o &&
|
|
|
|
sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s",
|
|
|
|
$opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5),
|
|
|
|
$mnemonic,$arg;
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|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
|
|
|
|
s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo; # old->new registers
|
|
|
|
s/@\s/\/\//o; # old->new style commentary
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo or
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|
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s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel $1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o or
|
|
|
|
s/mov\.([a-z]+)\s+([wx][0-9]+),\s*([wx][0-9]+)/csel $2,$3,$2,$1/o or
|
|
|
|
s/vmov\.i8/movi/o or # fix up legacy mnemonics
|
|
|
|
s/vext\.8/ext/o or
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|
|
|
s/vrev32\.8/rev32/o or
|
|
|
|
s/vtst\.8/cmtst/o or
|
|
|
|
s/vshr/ushr/o or
|
|
|
|
s/^(\s+)v/$1/o or # strip off v prefix
|
|
|
|
s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# fix up remaining legacy suffixes
|
|
|
|
s/\.[ui]?8//o;
|
|
|
|
m/\],#8/o and s/\.16b/\.8b/go;
|
|
|
|
s/\.[ui]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
|
|
|
|
s/\.[ui]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go;
|
|
|
|
s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Switch preprocessor checks to aarch64 versions.
|
|
|
|
s/__ARME([BL])__/__AARCH64E$1__/go;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print $_,"\n";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else { ######## 32-bit code
|
|
|
|
my %opcode = (
|
|
|
|
"aesd" => 0xf3b00340, "aese" => 0xf3b00300,
|
|
|
|
"aesimc"=> 0xf3b003c0, "aesmc" => 0xf3b00380 );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local *unaes = sub {
|
|
|
|
my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ($arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o) {
|
|
|
|
my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19)
|
|
|
|
|(($2&7)<<1) |(($2&8)<<2);
|
|
|
|
# since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
|
|
|
|
# correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
|
|
|
|
# assemblers don't implement it:-(
|
|
|
|
sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s",
|
|
|
|
$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
|
|
|
|
($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
|
|
|
|
$mnemonic,$arg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sub unvtbl {
|
|
|
|
my $arg=shift;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*q([0-9]+)/o &&
|
|
|
|
sprintf "vtbl.8 d%d,{q%d},d%d\n\t".
|
|
|
|
"vtbl.8 d%d,{q%d},d%d", 2*$1,$2,2*$3, 2*$1+1,$2,2*$3+1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sub unvdup32 {
|
|
|
|
my $arg=shift;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o &&
|
|
|
|
sprintf "vdup.32 q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sub unvmov32 {
|
|
|
|
my $arg=shift;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\],(.*)/o &&
|
|
|
|
sprintf "vmov.32 d%d[%d],%s",2*$1+($2>>1),$2&1,$3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
|
|
|
|
s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go; # new->old registers
|
|
|
|
s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers
|
|
|
|
s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# fix up remaining new-style suffixes
|
|
|
|
s/\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*\[(.+)\],#8/sprintf "{d%d},[$2]!",2*$1/eo or
|
|
|
|
s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo or
|
|
|
|
s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2 $1,#0/o or
|
|
|
|
s/vtbl\.8\s+(.*)/unvtbl($1)/geo or
|
|
|
|
s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo or
|
|
|
|
s/vmov\.32\s+(.*)/unvmov32($1)/geo or
|
|
|
|
s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o or
|
|
|
|
s/^(\s+)mov\./$1mov/o or
|
|
|
|
s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print $_,"\n";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
|