|
|
|
|
SSL,277,ALPN_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,309,ALPS_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,281,APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,291,APPLICATION_DATA_ON_SHUTDOWN
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,100,APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,101,ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,102,BAD_ALERT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,103,BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,104,BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,105,BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,106,BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,107,BAD_ECC_CERT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,108,BAD_ECPOINT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,109,BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,110,BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,111,BAD_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,112,BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,113,BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,114,BAD_SIGNATURE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,115,BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,116,BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,117,BAD_SSL_FILETYPE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,118,BAD_WRITE_RETRY
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,119,BIO_NOT_SET
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,261,BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,120,BN_LIB
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,121,BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,275,CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,272,CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,122,CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,123,CA_DN_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,124,CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,274,CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,125,CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,126,CERT_CB_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,292,CERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,127,CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,128,CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,129,CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,304,CIPHER_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,130,CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,131,CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,132,CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,133,CONNECTION_REJECTED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,134,CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,316,COULD_NOT_PARSE_HINTS
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,135,CUSTOM_EXTENSION_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,136,DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,137,DECODE_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,138,DECRYPTION_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,139,DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,140,DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,141,DH_P_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,142,DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,254,DOWNGRADE_DETECTED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,143,DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,257,DUPLICATE_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,264,DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,296,DUPLICATE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,283,EARLY_DATA_NOT_IN_USE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,144,ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING
|
Implement ClientHelloOuter handshakes.
If a client offers ECH, but the server rejects it, the client completes
the handshake with ClientHelloOuter in order to authenticate retry keys.
Implement this flow. This is largely allowing the existing handshake to
proceed, but with some changes:
- Certificate verification uses the other name. This CL routes this up to
the built-in verifier and adds SSL_get0_ech_name_override for the
callback.
- We need to disable False Start to pick up server Finished in TLS 1.2.
- Client certificates, notably in TLS 1.3 where they're encrypted,
should only be revealed to the true server. Fortunately, not sending
client certs is always an option, so do that.
Channel ID has a similar issue. I've just omitted the extension in
ClientHelloOuter because it's deprecated and is unlikely to be used
with ECH at this point. ALPS may be worth some pondering but, the way
it's currently used, is not sensitive.
(Possibly we should change the draft to terminate the handshake before
even sending that flight...)
- The session is never offered in ClientHelloOuter, but our internal
book-keeping doesn't quite notice.
I had to replace ech_accept with a tri-state ech_status to correctly
handle an edge case in SSL_get0_ech_name_override: when ECH + 0-RTT +
reverify_on_resume are all enabled, the first certificate verification
is for the 0-RTT session and should be against the true name, yet we
have selected_ech_config && !ech_accept. A tri-state tracks when ECH is
actually rejected. I've maintained this on the server as well, though
the server never actually cares.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Ie55966ca3dc4ffcc8c381479f0fe9bcacd34d0f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48135
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
SSL,319,ECH_REJECTED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,310,ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,311,ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,313,ECH_SERVER_WOULD_HAVE_NO_RETRY_CONFIGS
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,282,EMPTY_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,145,EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,146,ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,147,ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,148,ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,149,ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,150,EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,255,EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,151,EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,152,FRAGMENT_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,153,GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,154,HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,284,HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,155,HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,156,HTTP_REQUEST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,157,INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,303,INCONSISTENT_CLIENT_HELLO
|
Update to draft-ietf-tls-esni-13.
Later CLs will clean up the ClientHello construction a bit (draft-12
avoids computing ClientHelloOuter twice). I suspect the transcript
handling on the client can also be simpler, but I'll see what's
convenient after I've changed how ClientHelloOuter is constructed.
Changes of note between draft-10 and draft-13:
- There is now an ECH confirmation signal in both HRR and SH. We don't
actually make much use of this in our client right now, but it
resolves a bunch of weird issues around HRR, including edge cases if
HRR applies to one ClientHello but not the other.
- The confirmation signal no longer depends on key_share and PSK, so we
don't have to work around a weird ordering issue.
- ech_is_inner is now folded into the main encrypted_client_hello code
point. This works better with some stuff around HRR.
- Padding is moved from the padding extension, computed with
ClientHelloInner, to something we fill in afterwards. This makes it
easier to pad up the whole thing to a multiple of 32. I've accordingly
updated to the latest recommended padding construction, and updated
the GREASE logic to match.
- ech_outer_extensions is much easier to process because the order is
required to be consistent. We were doing that anyway, and now a simple
linear scan works.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD now uses an all zero placeholder payload of the
same length. This lets us simplify the server code, but, for now, I've
kept the client code the same. I'll follow this up with a CL to avoid
computing ClientHelloOuter twice.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD is allowed to contain a placeholder PSK. I haven't
filled that in and will do it in a follow-up CL.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I7464345125c53968b2fe692f9268e392120fc2eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48912
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
SSL,321,INCONSISTENT_ECH_NEGOTIATION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,259,INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,315,INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,314,INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,158,INVALID_COMMAND
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,256,INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,301,INVALID_DELEGATED_CREDENTIAL
|
Add most of an ECH client implementation.
Based on an initial implementation by Dan McArdle at
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/46784
This CL contains most of a client implementation for
draft-ietf-tls-esni-10. The pieces missing so far, which will be done in
follow-up CLs are:
1. While the ClientHelloInner is padded, the server Certificate message
is not. I'll add that once we resolve the spec discussions on how to
do that. (We were originally going to use TLS record-level padding,
but that doesn't work well with QUIC.)
2. The client should check the public name is a valid DNS name before
copying it into ClientHelloOuter.server_name.
3. The ClientHelloOuter handshake flow is not yet implemented. This CL
can detect when the server selects ClientHelloOuter, but for now the
handshake immediately fails. A follow-up CL will remove that logic
and instead add the APIs and extra checks needed.
Otherwise, this should be complete, including padding and compression.
The main interesting point design-wise is that we run through
ClientHello construction multiple times. We need to construct
ClientHelloInner and ClientHelloOuter. Then each of those has slight
variants: EncodedClientHelloInner is the compressed form, and
ClientHelloOuterAAD just has the ECH extension erased to avoid a
circular dependency.
I've computed ClientHelloInner and EncodedClientHelloInner concurrently
because the compression scheme requires shifting the extensions around
to be contiguous. However, I've computed ClientHelloOuterAAD and
ClientHelloOuter by running through the logic twice. This probably can
be done better, but the next draft revises the construction anyway, so
I'm thinking I'll rework it then. (In the next draft, we use a
placeholder payload of the same length, so we can construct the
ClientHello once and fill in the payload.)
Additionally, now that we have a client available in ssl_test, this adds
a threading test to confirm that SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys is properly
synchronized. (Confirmed that, if I drop the lock in
SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys, TSan notices.)
Change-Id: Icaff68b595035bdcc73c468ff638e67c84239ef4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48004
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
SSL,318,INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,317,INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,159,INVALID_MESSAGE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,251,INVALID_OUTER_RECORD_TYPE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,269,INVALID_SCT_LIST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,295,INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,160,INVALID_SSL_SESSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,161,INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,302,KEY_USAGE_BIT_INCORRECT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,162,LENGTH_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,164,MISSING_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,258,MISSING_KEY_SHARE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,165,MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,166,MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,167,MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,168,MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,169,MTU_TOO_SMALL
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,308,NEGOTIATED_ALPS_WITHOUT_ALPN
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,170,NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,285,NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,171,NESTED_GROUP
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,307,NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,172,NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,173,NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,174,NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,175,NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,176,NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,262,NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,177,NO_CIPHER_MATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,253,NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,178,NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,265,NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,179,NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,180,NO_P256_SUPPORT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,181,NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,182,NO_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,183,NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,184,NO_SHARED_CIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,266,NO_SHARED_GROUP
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,280,NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,185,NULL_SSL_CTX
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,186,NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,289,OCSP_CB_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,187,OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,268,OLD_SESSION_PRF_HASH_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,188,OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED
|
Update to draft-ietf-tls-esni-13.
Later CLs will clean up the ClientHello construction a bit (draft-12
avoids computing ClientHelloOuter twice). I suspect the transcript
handling on the client can also be simpler, but I'll see what's
convenient after I've changed how ClientHelloOuter is constructed.
Changes of note between draft-10 and draft-13:
- There is now an ECH confirmation signal in both HRR and SH. We don't
actually make much use of this in our client right now, but it
resolves a bunch of weird issues around HRR, including edge cases if
HRR applies to one ClientHello but not the other.
- The confirmation signal no longer depends on key_share and PSK, so we
don't have to work around a weird ordering issue.
- ech_is_inner is now folded into the main encrypted_client_hello code
point. This works better with some stuff around HRR.
- Padding is moved from the padding extension, computed with
ClientHelloInner, to something we fill in afterwards. This makes it
easier to pad up the whole thing to a multiple of 32. I've accordingly
updated to the latest recommended padding construction, and updated
the GREASE logic to match.
- ech_outer_extensions is much easier to process because the order is
required to be consistent. We were doing that anyway, and now a simple
linear scan works.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD now uses an all zero placeholder payload of the
same length. This lets us simplify the server code, but, for now, I've
kept the client code the same. I'll follow this up with a CL to avoid
computing ClientHelloOuter twice.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD is allowed to contain a placeholder PSK. I haven't
filled that in and will do it in a follow-up CL.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I7464345125c53968b2fe692f9268e392120fc2eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48912
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 years ago
|
|
|
SSL,320,OUTER_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,189,OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,190,PARSE_TLSEXT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,191,PATH_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,192,PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,193,PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,267,PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,287,PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,194,PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,271,PSK_IDENTITY_BINDER_COUNT_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,195,PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,196,PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,197,PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,298,QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,305,QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,198,READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,199,RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,200,RECORD_TOO_LARGE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,263,RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,201,RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,202,RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,203,REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,204,RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,205,RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,206,SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,288,SECOND_SERVERHELLO_VERSION_MISMATCH
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,207,SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,273,SERVER_CERT_CHANGED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,286,SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,208,SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,209,SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,250,SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,210,SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION_SENT_BY_SERVER
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,211,SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,212,SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,213,SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1042,SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1020,SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1045,SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1044,SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1046,SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1000,SSLV3_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1030,SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1040,SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1047,SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1041,SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1010,SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1043,SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,214,SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,215,SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,216,SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,290,SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,276,TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,297,TLS13_DOWNGRADE
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1049,TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED
|
|
|
|
|
SSL,1114,TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
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SSL,1113,TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
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SSL,1116,TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
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SSL,1111,TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
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SSL,1050,TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR
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SSL,1021,TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED
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SSL,1051,TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR
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SSL,1121,TLSV1_ALERT_ECH_REQUIRED
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SSL,1060,TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
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SSL,1086,TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
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SSL,1071,TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY
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SSL,1080,TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
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SSL,1120,TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
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SSL,1100,TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION
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SSL,1070,TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION
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SSL,1022,TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW
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SSL,1048,TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA
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SSL,1115,TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
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SSL,1112,TLSV1_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
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SSL,1110,TLSV1_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
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SSL,1090,TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED
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SSL,217,TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
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SSL,218,TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
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SSL,219,TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
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SSL,260,TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
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SSL,220,TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS
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SSL,300,TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA
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SSL,270,TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA
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SSL,221,UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
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SSL,293,UNCOMPRESSED_CERT_TOO_LARGE
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SSL,306,UNEXPECTED_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
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SSL,222,UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION
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SSL,279,UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION_ON_EARLY_DATA
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SSL,223,UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
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SSL,224,UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP
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SSL,225,UNEXPECTED_RECORD
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SSL,226,UNINITIALIZED
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SSL,227,UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
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SSL,228,UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
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SSL,294,UNKNOWN_CERT_COMPRESSION_ALG
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SSL,229,UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
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SSL,230,UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
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SSL,231,UNKNOWN_DIGEST
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SSL,232,UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
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SSL,233,UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
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SSL,234,UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION
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SSL,235,UNKNOWN_STATE
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SSL,236,UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
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SSL,237,UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
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SSL,238,UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
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SSL,312,UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG
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SSL,239,UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
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SSL,240,UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
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SSL,252,UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY
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SSL,241,WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
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SSL,242,WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
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SSL,243,WRONG_CURVE
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SSL,299,WRONG_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_RECEIVED
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SSL,244,WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
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SSL,245,WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
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SSL,246,WRONG_SSL_VERSION
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SSL,247,WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
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SSL,278,WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA
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SSL,248,X509_LIB
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SSL,249,X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS
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