Added 2 byte skipping if there no sound present, that fixes playback
files without sound stream.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
If AVCodecParameters.codec_tag is 'hvc1' use it instead of 'hev1' for
h.265 streams. QuickTime (and other Apple software) requires 'hvc1'.
(cherry picked from commit 84ab1cc437)
Signed-off-by: Derek Buitenhuis <derek.buitenhuis@gmail.com>
mux.c init_muxer() already sets codec_tag correctly in the cases
simplified here.
This also adds the capability to support alternative tags for the
same codec_id.
(cherry picked from commit f6f86f432f)
Signed-off-by: Derek Buitenhuis <derek.buitenhuis@gmail.com>
when use fmp4 segment type in hls and use codec copy,
there have an error message.
error message:
[mp4 @ 0x25df020] Tag avc1 incompatible with output codec id '28' ([33][0][0][0])
[hls @ 0x2615c80] Some of the provided format options in '(null)' are not recognized
Could not write header for output file #0 (incorrect codec parameters ?): Invalid argument
this patch can fix it.
Signed-off-by: Liu Qi <w_liuqi@kingsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Liu <lq@onvideo.cn>
ff_mp4_obj_type contains the wrong type of tags for
AVOutputFormat.codec_tag. AVOutputFormat.codec_tag is used to
validate AVCodecParameters.codec_tag so needs to be the same
type of tag.
Creates new tag lists for mp4 and ismv. New tag lists support
same list of codecs found in ff_mp4_obj_type. psp uses the same
tag list as mp4 since these both use mp4_get_codec_tag to look up tags.
(cherry picked from commit 713efb2c0d)
Signed-off-by: Derek Buitenhuis <derek.buitenhuis@gmail.com>
Skip the codec_tag altogether here, to let the user (try to) set
whichever codec/tag is preferred; the individual chained muxer will
reject invalid codecs anyway.
(cherry picked from commit 61f589e31e)
Signed-off-by: Derek Buitenhuis <derek.buitenhuis@gmail.com>
Otherwise AVTimebaseSource gets av_apply_bitstream_filters' documentation in doxygen.
Signed-off-by: Max Weber <mii7303@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This implements the 0x10 frame format for Interplay MVE movies. The
format is a variation on the 0x06 format with some changes. In addition
to the decoding map there's also a skip map. This skip map is used to
determine what 8x8 blocks can change in a particular frame.
This format expects to be able to copy an 8x8 block from before the last
time it was changed. This can be an arbitrary time in the past. In order
to implement this this decoder allocates two additional AVFrames where
actual decoding happens. At the end of a frame decoding changed blocks
are copied to a finished frame based on the skip map.
The skip map's encoding is a little convulted, I'll refer to the code
for details.
Values in the decoding map are the same as in format 0x06.
Signed-off-by: Hein-Pieter van Braam <hp@tmm.cx>
This implements the 0x06 frame format for Interplay MVE movies. The
format is relatively simple. The video data consists of two parts:
16 bits per 8x8 block movement data
a number of 8x8 blocks of pixel data
For each 8x8 block of pixel data the movement data is consulted. There
are 3 possible meanings of the movement data:
* zero : copy the 8x8 block from the pixel data
* negative : copy the 8x8 block from the previous frame from an offset
determined by the actual value of the entry -0xC000.
* positive : copy the 8x8 block from the current frame from an offset
determined by the actual value of the entry -0x4000
Decoding happens in two passes, in the fist pass only new pixeldata is
copied, during the second pass data is copied from the previous and
current frames.
The codec expects that the current frame being decoded to still has the
data from 2 frames ago on it when decoding starts.
Signed-off-by: Hein-Pieter van Braam <hp@tmm.cx>
Interplay MVE can contain up to three different frame formats. They
require different streams of information to render a frame. This patch
changes the IP packet format to prepare for the extra frame formats.
Signed-off-by: Hein-Pieter van Braam <hp@tmm.cx>
Interplay MVE movies have a SEND_BUFFER operation. Only after this
command does the current decoding buffer get displayed. This is required
for the other frame formats. They are fixed-size and can't always encode
a full frame worth of pixeldata.
This code prevents half-finished frames from being emitted.
Signed-off-by: Hein-Pieter van Braam <hp@tmm.cx>
Buffering more than one packet can be a huge performance improvement for
encoding files with small packets (e.g. wav) over SMB/CIFS.
Acked-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Marton Balint <cus@passwd.hu>
If flushing is not disabled, then mux.c will signal the end of the packets with
an AVIO_DATA_MARKER_FLUSH_POINT, and aviobuf will be able to decide to flush or
not based on the preferred minimum packet size set by the used protocol.
Reviewed-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Marton Balint <cus@passwd.hu>
This patch makes aviobuf work more like traditinal file IO, which is how people
think about it.
For example, in the past, aviobuf only flushed buffers until the current buffer
position, even if more data was written to it previously, and a backward seek
was used to reposition the IO context.
From now, aviobuf will keep track of the written data, so no explicit seek will
be required till the end of the buffer, or till the end of file before flushing.
This fixes at least one regression, fate-vsynth3-flv was broken if
flush_packets option was set to false, an explicit seek was removed in
4e3cc4bdd8.
Also from now on, if a forward seek in the write buffer were to cause a gap
between the already written data and the new file position, a flush will
happen.
The must_flush varable is also removed, which might have caused needless
flushes with multiple seeks whithin the write buffer. Since we know the amount
of data written to it, we will know when to flush.
Signed-off-by: Marton Balint <cus@passwd.hu>
Fixes a NULL pointer derefence when ogg_init() returns a failure and
a stream's private data was not yet allocated.
This is a regression since 3c5a53cdfa
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
When the hlsenc at BYTERANGE mode, it should not show the warning message:
"Duplicated segment filename detected:"
Reported-by: Marco <marco@worldcast.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Liu <lq@chinaffmpeg.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kucera <daniel.kucera@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas George <george@nsup.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kucera <daniel.kucera@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas George <george@nsup.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
If the videos starts with B frame, then the minimum composition time
as computed by stts + ctts will be non-zero. Hence we need to shift
the DTS, so that the first pts is zero. This was the intention of that
code-block. However it was subtracting by the wrong amount.
For example, for one of the videos in the bug nonFormatted.mp4 we have
stts:
sample_count duration
960 1001
ctts:
sample_count duration
1 3003
2 0
1 3003
....
The resulting composition times are : 3003, 1001, 2002, 6006, ...
The minimum composition time or PTS is 1001, which should be used to
offset DTS. However the code block was wrongly using ctts[0] which is
3003. Hence the PTS was negative. This change computes the minimum pts
encountered while fixing the index, and then subtracts it from all the
timestamps after the edit list fixes are applied.
Samples files available from:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=721451https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=723537
fate-suite/h264/twofields_packet.mp4 is a similar file starting with 2
B frames. Before this change the PTS of first two B-frames was -6006
and -3003, and I am guessing one of them got dropped when being decoded
and remuxed to the framecrc before, and now it is not being dropped.
Signed-off-by: Sasi Inguva <isasi@google.com>
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
originally requested by Nicolas.
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Atempt to read and propagate only full ADTS frames and not other data,
like id3v1 or APETags at the end of the file.
Fixes ticket #6437.
Reviewed-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
The loglevel is choosen so that the main filename and any images of
multi image sequences are shown only at debug level to avoid
clutter.
This makes exploits in playlists more visible. As they would show
accesses to private/sensitive files
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
WebM supports a subset of elements from the Chapters master.
See https://www.webmproject.org/docs/container/#chapters
Addresses ticket #6425
Reviewed-by: James Zern <jzern@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Derek Buitenhuis
Azamat H. Hackimov
John Stebbins
Steven Liu
Martin Storsjö
Max Weber
Paul B Mahol
KongQun Yang
Hein-Pieter van Braam
Andreas Håkon
Marton Balint
James Almer
Daniel Kucera
Timo Rothenpieler
Sasi Inguva
raymondzheng
wm4
Michael Niedermayer
Sysiphus